MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

SUSAN RUSS WALKER, Chief Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff brought the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying him benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. # 1). This court entered judgment reversing the decision of the Commissioner and remanded the case for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g). (Doc. # 17). This court previously awarded plaintiff fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), in the amount of $3,195.91 (Doc. # 21).

This action is presently before the court on the plaintiff's counsel's petition, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for authorization to charge her client the amount of $12,029.22 for 17.7 hours of work performed in prosecuting plaintiff's appeal before this court.1 The Commissioner responds that, while she does not generally take a position on § 406(b) fee requests, she will notify the court if it appears that a fee agreement or petition conflicts with the statute or case law; she notes no such concern in the present case. (Doc. # 27).

The contingency fee agreement between plaintiff and his attorney provides, in part, that:

(Exhibit A to Doc. # 25 at ¶ B)(emphasis in original). Plaintiff's counsel's petition does not indicate whether the favorable decision on plaintiff's claim was rendered by Appeals Council itself or "at the ALJ hearing level" upon remand from the Appeals Council. However, in either event, the agreement provides for an attorney fee in the amount of twenty-five percent of past due benefits under the first clause of paragraph B of the fee agreement, if the Appeals Council issued the favorable decision (with or without further remand to an ALJ), or under the second clause, if an ALJ issued favorable decision.

In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002), the Supreme Court examined the issue of attorney's fees sought in connection with contingency fee agreements in Social Security disability cases. The Court held that "§ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claims in court. Rather § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases." Id. at 807. The burden is on the attorney for the claimant to "show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered." Id.

The amount that counsel asks the court to approve ($12,029.22) is the balance of twenty-five percent of plaintiff's past-due benefits ($88,116.90),2 after deducting the $10,000.00 fee that plaintiff's counsel has asked the Commissioner to authorize for work performed at the administrative level.3 Counsel argues that she "has spent a total of 67.80 hours over a period of 77 months representing the plaintiff in connection with [his] claim for Social Security Disability Benefits." (Doc. # 25, ¶ 4). As counsel further notes, however, only 17.7 hours of the total hours were spent on work before this court. (Id.).4

Plaintiff's counsel, who bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested fee, relies on orders issued by Judge Guin in the Northern District of Alabama authorizing the maximum fee permitted under the statute. In all of these cases, Judge Guin relied, in part, on the high quality of the work in the case before him. However, to the extent that these orders also reflect the view that a 25% contingency fee is always reasonable in Social Security appeals,5 the court cannot agree; Gisbrecht instructs that the court is to review the fee resulting from a contingent fee agreement for reasonableness, based on the facts of the particular case before it. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 ("Courts that approach fee determinations by looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness, have appropriately reduced the attorney's recovery based on the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved."). The Supreme Court observed that if the "benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is. . . in order." Id.

Upon review of this court's record, including the brief that counsel filed in support of plaintiff's claim, the court finds that counsel has failed to carry her burden of showing that the requested fee is reasonable. In light of the presentation of the issues in this particular action, and the amount of time spent in prosecuting plaintiff's appeal to this court, the court finds that a downward adjustment of the fee from $12,029.22 to the amount of $9,500.00 renders an award that largely preserves the benefit of counsel's contingent fee agreement with her client and compensates her reasonably for her work.6

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), that counsel's petition (Doc. # 25) is GRANTED to the extent that counsel is authorized to charge her client the amount of $9,500.00 in attorney's fees for the 17.7 hours of work performed before the court.

It is further ORDERED that plaintiff's counsel is DIRECTED to take the steps necessary to ensure that plaintiff is credited or refunded the amount of $3,195.91, the amount of the fees previously awarded to plaintiff pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.