THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

SWANN, Judge.

¶1 This is a forcible entry and detainer ("FED") action initiated by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank") against Kevin Brandeburg for possession of real property ("the Property") located in Yavapai County. Brandeburg appeals the superior court's judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank. Brandeburg defended by essentially attacking the validity of Deutsche Bank's title to the Property. Because an FED action is not the proper forum for challenging the validity of title, we affirm the superior court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 After Brandeburg defaulted on a deed of trust that he had executed in connection with the Property, Deutsche Bank purchased the Property at a trustee's sale conducted on August 23, 2010, and received a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale ("Trustee's Deed"). Four days later, Deutsche Bank recorded the Trustee's Deed. Brandeburg received written notice on September 1, 2010, telling him to vacate the Property by September 6. Because Brandeburg did not do so, Deutsche Bank filed a complaint for FED on September 13. Copies of the Trustee's Deed and the written notice were attached to the complaint.

¶3 On September 21, the day of the initial hearing, Brandeburg filed a motion requesting the case's dismissal; seeking sanctions; and demanding disclosure, discovery and a jury trial. Deutsche Bank responded by arguing that Brandeburg raised inappropriate issues regarding Deutsche Bank's title to the Property rather than a proper challenge to the Trustee Deed's presumptive validity. The court denied the motion to dismiss and set the matter for a jury trial.

¶4 On September 27, Brandeburg filed an answer denying all allegations in the complaint. According to him, the complaint did not give sufficient notice of Deutsche Bank's claims. He also asserted counterclaims.1 Deutsche Bank moved to strike the answer and counterclaims, and it moved for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 9(d) of the Rules of Procedure for Eviction Actions ("RPEA").

¶5 At the October 4, 2010 pretrial conference, the superior court denied Deutsche Bank's motion to strike the answer. But it granted the motion to strike the counterclaims2 and granted Deutsche Bank judgment on the pleadings. The court entered judgment, finding Brandeburg guilty of forcible detainer and ordering him to surrender possession by October 24 or face a writ of restitution.

¶6 Brandeburg appeals,3 and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 We review the superior court's conclusions of law de novo. Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 195 Ariz. 358, 359, ¶ 2, 988 P.2d 143, 144 (App. 1999) (citation omitted). But when we review a judgment on the pleadings in favor of a plaintiff, all material allegations of the opposing party's pleadings are assumed to be true. Food for Health Co., Inc. v. 3839 Joint Venture, 129 Ariz. 103, 106, 628 P.2d 986, 989 (App. 1981) (citation omitted). And "all allegations of the moving party which have been denied are taken as false so that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is only granted if the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment." Id.

DISCUSSION

¶8 "Forcible entry and detainer is a statutory proceeding whose object is to provide a summary, speedy and adequate means for obtaining possession of premises by one entitled to actual possession." Colonial Tri-City Ltd. P'ship v. Ben Franklin Stores, Inc., 179 Ariz. 428, 433, 880 P.2d 648, 653 (App. 1993). In such a proceeding, the only issue before the court is the right of actual possession — the court may not inquire into the merits of title. A.R.S. § 12-1177(A); Curtis v. Morris, 186 Ariz. 534, 534, 925 P.2d 259, 259 (1996).

¶9 As evidence of its right to actual possession, Deutsche Bank provided the superior court with a copy of the executed, acknowledged Trustee's Deed as well as a copy of the written notice to Brandeburg to vacate the Property. The complaint alleged that Brandeburg failed to vacate the Property and was therefore guilty of forcible detainer. Under A.R.S. § 33-811(B), a trustee's deed raises the presumption of compliance with the requirements of the deed of trust "relating to the exercise of the power of sale and the sale of the trust property."4 Brandeburg presented no evidence to rebut this presumption of compliance or any other evidence that showed Deutsche Bank did not have a right to actual possession. Brandeburg's general denial based on the purported vagueness of the complaint is insufficient to avoid judgment on the pleadings because the complaint adequately alleged the facts necessary to an FED claim. See Walker v. Estavillo, 73 Ariz. 211, 215, 240 P.2d 173, 176 (1952); Food for Health, 129 Ariz. at 106, 628 P.2d at 989 (App. 1981).

¶10 Brandeburg argued to the superior court that the Trustee's Deed was invalid because Deutsche Bank was not a bona fide purchaser for value due to defects and irregularities in the recordings, including "possibly fraudulent documents." On appeal, he makes these same assertions in arguing that the superior court's proceedings violated his "right to due process."5 These issues, however, relate to the merits of Deutsche Bank's title, and the superior court's decision to not address them in the FED action was proper. See Morris, 186 Ariz. at 534, 925 P.2d at 259. Further, based on the unrebutted allegations in the complaint, no triable issue existed, and Deutsche Bank was entitled to judgment on the pleadings. See RPEA 11(d). Accordingly, we reject Brandeburg's argument that he was entitled to a jury trial.6

¶11 Finally, Brandeburg asserts that it was reversible error for the court to remark in its final judgment that Brandeburg was properly served by Deutsche Banks's posting of the requisite legal papers at his front door and subsequent certified mailing. The court's remark was a mistake because the record reflects that Brandeburg was served pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(d) by service upon an occupant of suitable age and discretion. This court suspended the appeal and revested jurisdiction in the superior court to consider Deutsche Bank's motion to correct this clerical mistake pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a). The superior court did so. We decline to reverse on this basis.

CONCLUSION

¶12 The judgment is affirmed. Because he is not the prevailing party, Brandeburg's request for attorney's fees on appeal is denied. Deutsche Bank requests its appellate fees pursuant to ARCAP 25. This appeal merits such an award contingent upon Deutsche Bank's compliance with ARCAP 21.

MICHAEL J. BROWN, Judge, JON W. THOMPSON, Judge, concurring.