JAMES A. TEILBORG, Senior District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that this Court deny the Petition. Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R. In addition, the Petitioner also requested an evidentiary hearing that the R&R recommends the Court denies.
As the R&R quoted, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this case as follows:
R&R at 1-2.
Petitioner submitted a reply to the Respondents' reply to Petitioner's initial objection to the R&R. (Doc. 44). While a reply to Respondents' reply is not allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 72 and is moot, the Court will consider it regardless.
This Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is "clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise." United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D.Ariz. 2003) ("Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, `but not otherwise.'"); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9
The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner exhausted before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must deny the Petition on those claims unless "a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law"
"When applying these standards, the federal court should review the `last reasoned decision' by a state court. . . ." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the summary denial of Petitioner's petition for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals renders the trial court's decision on Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief the "last reasoned decision" of the state court, subject to this Court's review. See Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-03 (1991) ("later unexplained orders upholding [a] judgment [rejecting a federal claim]" raises a presumption that the reviewing court "looks through" that order to the last reasoned decision).
In his Petition, Petitioner raised one legal theory for habeas relief, ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Petitioner raised eight different factual variations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court will review the theory and factual variations on which Petitioner filed an objection de novo.
The R&R recounts the law governing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel as follows:
R&R at 7-9.
As noted above, Petitioner argues only one legal theory: ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Petitioner asserts eight different factual variations upon this single legal theory.
"Petitioner alleges in ground one that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to elicit a statement Petitioner made while being questioned by the police chief that during the fight with the victim, Petitioner picked up from a table the knife he used to defend himself and stab the victim." R&R at 9. As the R&R states, Petitoner's counsel did in fact elicit a statement from the police chief in regards to the knife. R&R at 9; (Doc. 19. Ex. R at 1182). As the record reflects, Petitioner's trial counsel questioned: "Now, Nelson told you that he picked up the knife, the knife he used off the table in the living room, correct?" (Doc. 19, Ex. R at 1182). The police chief then responded with: "Yes. That's what Mr. Steah told me." (Id.). Thus, Petitioner's first ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not supported by the facts in the record.
Petitioner continues to argue in his objection to the R&R that his counsel did not elicit the statement from the police chief and that this undermined Petitioner's self-defense argument. (Doc. 41 at 12-13). This assertion is simply not supported by the record. Therefore, the Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court's decision denying this claim on post-conviction relief was contrary to, or an objectively unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the trial court. Ground one is denied.
"Petitioner alleges in ground two that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to protect Petitioner's right to [a] unanimous jury verdict on his claim of self-defense." R&R at 10. Petitioner claims that his counsel "failed to request a jury instruction requiring a unanimous verdict on the affirmative defense and failed to inquire after the verdict whether the jury unanimously rejected the defense." R&R at 10.
Here, the trial court judge instructed the jury as to the Petitioner's burden of proof for self-defense by stating: "[t]he defendant must prove the defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence." (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1411). Furthermore, the trial judge also instructed the jury to the State's burden of proof in regards to the elements of the charged offense by stating: "the burden of proof with regard to the elements of the charged offense is with the state. The burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt as defined in these instructions." (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1412). The trial judge then proceeded to define self-defense and explain what the jury would need to find to conclude that the Petitioner committed the act in self-defense. (Doc. 19, Exh T at 1412-13). Finally, the trial judge instructed the jurors that their verdicts "do need to be unanimous." (Doc. 19, Exh. U at 1487). The trial judge then explained that this means "all twelve of you must agree upon a verdict." (Id.).
Petitioner cites to a number of cases to support his argument that the trial court should have instructed the jury with a specific unanimity instruction for Petitioner's affirmative defense. (Doc. 32 at 9-11). Petitioner then argues that because his trial counsel failed to seek this jury instruction, his counsel provided ineffective assistance. (Doc. 32 at 11). While some of these cases are indeed Supreme Court cases, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03 (2000) (whether a state court ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of "clearly established" Federal law, is determined only by the Supreme Court of the United States in the context of habeas cases), other cases cited by Petitioner are not and will not be taken into consideration. (Doc. 32 at 9-11). Looking exclusively at the Supreme Court cases, none of these cases addresses the issue of specific unanimity instruction for an affirmative defense. Furthermore, as stated in United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005), the Supreme Court has not resolved the question of whether a specific unanimity instruction is needed for an affirmative defense. Therefore, there is no clearly established Federal law—as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States—on this question. Petitioner cannot show that the trial court's denial of this ineffective assistance of counsel claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent.
Additionally, Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Based on the instructions that the trial judge gave, the jury knew they had to unanimously convict Petitioner. They also knew the burdens that both the State and Petitioner had to meet regarding the charged offense and the affirmative defense. The jury implicitly indicated that they unanimously rejected Petitioner's self-defense argument by finding Petitioner unanimously guilty. For these reasons, ground two is denied.
"Petitioner alleges in ground three that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to seek a jury instruction on the shifting burden of proof for an affirmative defense." R&R at 12. Petitioner further explains that the jury needs to be instructed as to the precise burden that the "defense was legally required to bear in order to make a prima facie case for self-defense. (Doc. 6 at 8). Petitioner seems to be confused as to the jury instruction provided by the trial judge. The trial judge instructed the jury that "[t]he defendant must prove the defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that the defense of self-defense is more probably true than not." (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1411). Furthermore, as stated in the above section, the trial judge instructed the jury that "the burden of proof with regard to the elements of the charged offense is with the state. The burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt as defined in these instructions." (Id. at 1412).
Therefore, Petitioner's belief that there was no jury instruction on the shifting burden of proof for an affirmative defense is not supported by the record. The trial court instructed the jury as to the burden of proof for Petitioner's affirmative defense and as to the State's higher burden of proof to the charged offense. Because there is no factual basis behind Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not seeking a jury instruction on the shifting burden of proof for an affirmative defense, ground three is denied.
Petitioner alleges in ground four that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel "entered into a stipulation without Petitioner's knowledge or consent, that was: a) false and b) allowed the prosecution to introduce highly prejudicial and inflammatory expert testimony that was otherwise inadmissible." (Doc. 6 at 9). Petitioner further asserts that "[t]he stipulation entered into by defense counsel held that the marriage between Petitioner and his wife was abusive and that he was controlling her." (Id.). The two stipulations at issue in ground four are:
(Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1401-02). There is nothing in the record as to the reasons that parties entered into the stipulations. Furthermore, there is nothing on the record that indicates Petitioner was unaware of, or opposed to the stipulations.
Strickland provides that there is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in the context of an ineffective assistance claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Additionally, acts or omissions that "might be considered sound trial strategy" do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 689.
The timeline of events in this case leading up to the stipulations shown above are informative as to Petitioner's trial counsel's strategy and could prove the soundness of such a strategy. Initially, Petitioner filed a motion in limine to stop the State from introducing evidence of five prior acts of violence "alleged to have been directed against [Petitioner] at [Petitioner's wife]. . . ." (Doc. 19, Exh. F). The Court granted the Petitioner's motion in limine and then moved to bar admission of trial testimony by the State's expert witness about "battered spouse syndrome." (Id.). The State then moved in limine to introduce prior acts of the Petitioner on June 14, 2005 in response to Petitioner's introduction of his intention to present a claim of self-defense. (Doc. 19, Exh. E). The State alleged that these prior acts of violence were admissible to refute Petitioner's claim of self-defense. (Id.).
In response to the State's motion in limine filed on June 14, 2005, Petitioner argued that no alleged prior acts of violence by Petitioner against Petitioner's wife should be admitted. (Doc. 19, Exh. G). The State's response to Petitioner's motion to preclude the State's expert testimony was that the prior acts of violence were admissible and provided a proper foundation for the expert testimony. (Doc. 19, Exh. H). During a pre-trial motions hearing on June 27, 2005, Petitioner's wife testified that she was physically and emotionally abused during their twenty-five years of marriage. (Doc. 19, Exh. I at 49, 57). On a June 30, 2005 continuation of the pre-trial motions hearing, before the Court issued a ruling on the motions, the State withdrew its "404B Motion regarding prior bad acts." (Doc. 19, Exh J).
As stated above under Strickland, acts or omissions that might be considered sound trial strategy do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. It is plausible to the Court that Petitioner's trial counsel stipulated to the abusive marriage to eliminate the risk of an adverse ruling by the trial court on the State's motion in limine. And Petitioner's trial counsel may also have stipulated to the abusive marriage to eliminate the risk of the jury hearing damaging testimony from Petitioner's wife about several specific incidents of domestic violence. Petitioner's trial counsel could have agreed to a more general stipulation of an "abusive marriage" rather than risk this damaging testimony.
Further evidence of this potential agreement is that Petitioner's wife did not testify at trial about any specific incidents of domestic violence, (Doc. 19, Exh. M at 479-514, Exh. N at 519-623, Exh. O at 628-684) and the prosecutor, during Petitioner's cross examination, did not ask any specific domestic violence questions. (Doc. 19, Exh. S at 1300-1323, Exh. T at 1348-1379). The State's expert witness only testified about general abusive relationships, and not specifically about Petitioner's relationship with his wife. (Doc. 19, Exh. P at 936-965).
Petitioner argues that the R&R did not properly address whether the trial strategy was sound trial strategy and that "numerous other family members who had lived with Petitioner" would testify that Petitioner's wife was the actual abuser. (Doc. 41 at 14). Petitioner then claims that with this testimony, the stipulations at issue cannot reasonably be considered sound trial strategy. (Id.). However, as shown above, there is a plausible reason as to why Petitioner's trial counsel stipulated to the "abusive marriage." Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that the trial court applied Strickland to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner in light of this potential strategy. Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99. It was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the stipulations at issue made by Petitioner's trial counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. As stated above, Petitioner's counsel prevented Petitioner's wife from giving damaging testimony about Petitioner's abusive marriage, and prevented Petitioner from being cross examined as to the same. For these reasons, ground four is denied.
Petitioner alleges in ground five that his "trial counsel failed to adduce testimony from available witness[es] refuting the stipulation and other testimony." (Doc. 6 at 10). Petitioner further states that Petitioner's children would testify that it was Petitioner's wife, not Petitioner, who was "controlling and argumentative." (Id.). Furthermore, Petitioner's children would also testify that Petitioner would diffuse hostile situations by leaving. (Id.).
As stated in the above section, the Court found that the trial court's decision that trial counsel's decision to stipulate to an "abusive marriage" did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court also found that it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the stipulation was sound trial strategy by Petitioner's trial counsel by limiting potentially damaging testimony about Petitioner's abusive marriage. The primary purpose of the "abusive marriage" stipulation was to prevent the jury from hearing specific evidence of Petitioner's domestic violence against Petitioner's wife. This purpose would be undermined by having Petitioner's children testify to refute the stipulation. The testimony would then allow the prosecution to cross-examine Petitioner and question Petitioner's wife as to specific evidence of Petitioner's domestic violence against Petitioner's wife.
Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that his trial counsel was objectively deficient. Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court's decision "applied Strickland to the facts of the case in an objectively unreasonable manner." Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99. For this reason, ground five is denied.
Petitioner alleges that his "[a]ppellate counsel [provided ineffective assistance when she] failed to challenge the trial court's constitutional error, preserved by objection, in failing to sup[p]ress Petitioner's statements that were made after he was in custody but prior to being Mirandized." (Doc. 6 at 11). Petitioner further alleges that his trial counsel preserved the issue by objecting at trial. (Id.).
The trial court, in an order filed on May 26, 2005, ruled on "Defendant's Motion to Suppress certain Statements." (Doc. 19, Exh. C). Within this order the trial court attempted to separate different statements based upon the timeframe. (Id.). The trial court ruled that statements by Petitioner made to the initial arriving officer were admissible because the Petitioner "was not in custody at the time and the statements were made in response to questions from the officer" determining the "status of the scene and the safety risks to the officer and others." (Id.). The trial court also ruled that statements made to the police chief "while [Petitioner] was in the back of the ambulance [were] admissible" because the chief was asking questions related to the Petitioner's well-being and the statements were "clearly voluntary." (Id.). Finally, the trial court ruled that the only statements not admissible were those made after Petitioner invoked his Miranda rights at the police station, but before Petitioner "clearly withdrew" the invocation of his Miranda rights and "agreed to talk to the officers." (Id.).
Petitioner fails to identify in his Amended Petition, Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and his objection to the R&R, the specific statements he is claiming should have been suppressed and should have then been addressed on direct appeal. In Petitioner's objection to the R&R, he asserts that "it is the height of absurdity to assert that Petitioner was not in custody immediately" upon the first police officer's arrival at the scene. (Doc. 41 at 16). The Court interprets this statement as an assertion that none of Petitioner's statements to police were admissible. Petitioner further supports this statement by asserting that Petitioner was in custody immediately after the initial handcuffing by the arriving officer at the scene and assumedly for the rest of the police's questioning. (Doc. 41 at 17). Petitioner cites to several Miranda-related Supreme Court cases supporting his assertion that he was in custody for all of the questioning. (Id.).
As noted above, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the high standards for habeas relief have been met. See Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25. Petitioner has not met this burden here. While Petitioner does argue generally that he was in custody, he does not address the different times or situations specifically and how these different circumstances affect his general custody argument. The trial court ruled that various statements were admissible for a variety of reasons, including that the questioning was not a custodial interrogation, the statements were clearly voluntary, and that the Petitioner withdrew his invocation of his Miranda rights. (Doc. 19, Exh. C). Without an analysis tailored to the different times or statements made to police, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court's decision denying his post-conviction relief was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Strickland, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the trial court. For these reasons, ground six is denied.
Petitioner alleges in ground seven that his direct appeal counsel provided ineffective assistance when she failed to "assert a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for impeaching the Petitioner with an alleged statement that had not been disclosed by the prosecution" and when she failed to seek "appellate review of the trial court's ruling on the issue." (Doc. 6 at 12). Petitioner is referring to a statement made by the police chief stating that Petitioner had told the police chief that he "pulled the knife." (Id.). Petitioner further asserts that the alleged statement was not found on any recordings or transcripts and was not disclosed by the prosecution. (Id.).
The statement at issue occurred when the police chief testified on rebuttal that he reviewed the audio recording that morning of Petitioner's statements during the booking process. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1381-82). The police chief then testified that after a detective commented on eating too much pizza, Petitioner stated "I should have just kicked his ass. I shouldn't have pulled the knife. I just should have kicked his ass." (Id. at 1383). The police chief further testified that the above statement by Petitioner was exactly what was on the audio recording. (Id. at 1384). Before this rebuttal testimony, Petitioner initially testified that he told the police chief that he picked the knife up off the table after he and the victim started fighting. (Doc. 19, Exh. S at 1311). Petitioner, on cross-examination, also denied telling the police chief that he "pulled the knife" during the booking process. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1365). This is where the statement comes under dispute.
Petitioner's trial counsel initially objected on the ground that the prosecutor was asking the same questions he asked when the police chief was previously on the stand. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1383). The trial court overruled the objection. (Id.). Petitioner's trial counsel did not object on the basis of non-disclosure or prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.). On a later motion for a new trial, Petitioner's trial counsel argued that the prosecution failed to disclose this statement about Petitioner pulling the knife instead of picking the knife up off the table. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 14-15). Petitioner's trial counsel explained that the audio recording was of poor quality and that the statement was neither on the initial transcript, nor the police chief's annotated version of the transcript. (Id.). Petitioner's trial counsel then argued that the first mention of this statement was when the police chief testified that he heard Petitioner state it based off the audio recording the police chief reviewed that morning. (Id.).
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial by finding that the police chief's rebuttal testimony was proper impeachment evidence, and the statement was properly admitted. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 23-24). The trial court also found that the transcripts and recording were "troublesome," but both parties knew that going into trial, and the officers were available before trial to resolve any problems prior to trial. (Id. at 24). Finally, the trial court found that the state did not err in regards to the statement. (Id.). Furthermore, the trial court, on post-conviction review, rejected Petitioner's claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective when she did not pursue this issue on direct appeal. (Doc. 19, Exh. JJ).
The Court finds no basis to conclude that the trial court's denial of this ground on post-conviction relief was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland to the facts of this case. Therefore it is unlikely that the Arizona Court of Appeals would have concluded that the trial court erred in its ruling on the police chief's rebuttal testimony, even if Petitioner's appellate counsel had raised it. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a futile argument. Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (In evaluating counsel's performance, counsel's failure to take action that would have been futile can never be deficient performance.).
Petitioner states in his objection to the R&R that the prosecution must have had advanced knowledge of the content of the statement because they used the statement to impeach Petitioner. (Doc. 41 at 18). Petitioner further argues that this is prosecutorial misconduct and the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded that it was highly unlikely Petitioner would have prevailed on direct appeal. (Id.). While Petitioner disagrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion, he fails to argue how the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland to the facts of this case. Strickland requires that Petitioner shows his counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and that this performance prejudiced Petitioner. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Here, as stated above, at trial both sides knew about the "troublesome" audio recording and the trial judge found that the State did not err in regards to the statement made by the police chief. Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that his direct appeal counsel's performance was objectively deficient for not seeking review of the issue on appeal. For these reasons, ground seven is denied.
Petitioner alleges in ground eight that his direct appeal counsel provided ineffective assistance when she "failed to challenge the trial court's denial of trial counsel's objection to the state's introduction of a prior bad act that the trial court had precluded." (Doc. 6 at 13). Petitioner further alleges that a statement the police chief, made in regards to a prior knife fight Petitioner was involved in, denied Petitioner a fair trial and was preserved for appellate review. (Id.).
Due to a pre-trial motion in limine, the trial court granted Petitioner's request to preclude the State from introducing evidence of a prior knife fight between Petitioner and his brother in 1982. (Doc. 19, Exh. D at 5-8). During the police chief's questioning, the prosecution asked the police chief about his initial questioning of Petitioner's wife at the scene of the alleged crime. (Doc. 19, Exh. R at 1168). The police chief stated that Petitioner's wife said "he was a very violent man. This is not his first knife fight." (Id.). Petitioner's trial counsel promptly objected and moved for a mistrial, which the trial judge denied. (Id. at 1168-69). The trial court offered to order the testimony stricken, but Petitioner's trial counsel declined. (Id. at 1169). Petitioner's trial counsel again raised the issue in the trial judge's chambers that the statement by the police chief was deeply prejudicial and warranted a mistrial. (Id. at 1180). The trial court clarified its ruling that while it had excluded the evidence of the previous knife fight, the statement that the police chief attributed to Petitioner's wife "probably reflects more on her state of mind." (Id.). The trial court then found that there had been a lot of testimony on Petitioner's wife's state of mind, and the statement did not warrant a mistrial (Id. at 1180-81). Petitioner's trial counsel raised this issue for a third time at the end of the trial in another motion for a new trial. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 13). The trial court again denied the motion for a new trial, finding that any error was cured by the trial court's ruling. (Id. at 24).
The Arizona Court of Appeals also addressed the argument in their memorandum decision on Petitioner's direct appeal. (Doc. 19, Exh. EE at 7-11). The Court of Appeals explained that the statement "could not be so prejudicial as to tip the scale against [Petitioner] because that statement alone does not suggest [Petitioner] was the aggressor in the fight or that [Petitioner] was acting in ways other than self-defense." (Id. at 10). This shows that Petitioner's direct appeal counsel did indeed raise the issue on appeal. Thus, Petitioner has not shown that his direct appeal counsel was objectively deficient, as required under Strickland.
Petitioner argues in his objection to the R&R that his direct appeal counsel only argued the "prejudicial effect of the statement, not the trial court's improper basis for denying the trial attorney's objection or the trial court's improper basis for denying the defense motion for mistrial." (Doc. 41 at 19). Petitioner also argues that the Arizona Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statement was not significantly prejudicial, "flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent." (Id.). Neither of these arguments show deficient performance of Petitioner's direct appeal counsel nor prejudice under Strickland. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland to the facts of this case. For these reasons, ground eight is denied.
Petitioner filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 6 at 15). In order to be entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing, Petitioner needs to show that "(1) he has alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle him to habeas relief, and (2) he did not receive a full and fair opportunity to develop those facts in a state court." Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 586 (9th Cir. 2002). As shown by the analysis above, Petitioner has not alleged facts that, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief. Therefore, the Court denies the request for an evidentiary hearing.
