JAMES A. TEILBORG, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendants'
The Tomkow Patents and Feldbau Patent claim, in broad terms, various systems and methods for tracking, authenticating, and verifying the transmission, delivery or non-delivery, opening, forwarding, content, and time events associated with an electronic message.
The Tomkow Patents are all rooted in the same parent application, which issued as U.S. Patent No. 7,966,372 ("`372 Patent"). Because the Tomkow Patents stem from the `372 Patent, they all share a similar specification and file history. The Field of Invention for each Tomkow Patent is directed to "a system and method for verifying delivery and content of an electronic message and, more particularly, to a system and method of later providing proof regarding the delivery and content of an e-mail message."`199 Patent col. 1 ll. 22-26.
As a general overview of the individual Tomkow Patents, the `104 Patent describes a system and method of verifying the opening of an electronic message sent from a sender to a recipient through a server. The `389 Patent furnishes a system and method to verify the receipt of an electronic message sent from a sender to a recipient through a server. The `913 Patent sets forth a system and method of verifying the delivery or non-delivery of an electronic message from a sender to a recipient through a server. The `198 Patent—a continuation of the `104 Patent—claims a system and method of verifying the opening and delivery of an electronic message sent from a sender to a recipient through a server. Finally, the `199 Patent—a continuation of the `389 Patent— provides a system and method of verifying the failure to deliver an electronic message sent from a sender to a recipient through a server.
In a similar manner, the Feldbau Patent is disclosed as "a method and apparatus for authenticating the dispatch and the contents of dispatched information in general." `219 Patent col. 1 ll. 6-8. In other words, the Feldbau Patent provides an apparatus and method of proving that the sender of a dispatch sent it to a particular recipient at a particular time and that it had a particular content.
A patent includes two basic components: (1) a written description of the invention, which is referred to as the "specification" of the patent, and (2) the patent claims. The claims of a patent define the scope of the invention to which the patentee is entitled. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). "The purpose of claim construction is to `determin[e] the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.'" See O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Claim construction is a question of law exclusively within the province of the Court. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372. The Court need only construe claims, however, when the parties raise a dispute about the proper scope of a claim. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362. Moreover, if a disputed claim term has a plain and ordinary meaning such that it needs no clarification or explanation, the Court need not adopt a construction beyond that plain meaning. See U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
When construing claims, the Court "look[s] to the words of the claims themselves," giving them "their ordinary and customary meaning" unless clearly stated otherwise. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Claims should be considered as a whole, and terms used in multiple claims should be construed consistently. See Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). "[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313; see also Tex. Dig. Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The terms used in the claims bear a `heavy presumption' that they mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.").
"[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. Rather, the Court "looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean." Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). "Those sources include the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art." Id. The Court is not "required to analyze [these] sources in any specific sequence," but may not use extrinsic evidence to contradict "claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (refining the holding of Vitronics).
The specification "is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term." Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). The patentee may "act as its own lexicographer," Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012), by defining a claim term in the specification as having "a different meaning than [it] would otherwise have to a person of ordinary skill in the art," Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116. See also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (a specification "acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication"). However, the Court will find the patentee to have acted as its own lexicographer only if the patentee "clearly express[es] an intent to redefine the term." Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the specification may narrow the scope of a disputed claim term if the patentee has "demonstrate[d] intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope." Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). In ascertaining whether the patentee has disavowed the full scope of a claim, the Court must not read limitations from the specification into the claims. See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 (citing Comark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). In other words, the claims are not necessarily limited to the embodiments disclosed in the specification and courts must not read limitations from the specification into the claims. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). To avoid importing limitations, the court must consider the purposes of the specification, which are to teach and enable those of skill in the art to make and use the invention and to provide the best way for doing so. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18.
In addition to the specification, the Court considers "the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence." Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). "The purpose . . . is to `exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.'" Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The prosecution history may reveal that the patentee "has unequivocally disavowed a certain meaning to obtain [its] patent." Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, the Court examines both the specification and prosecution history to ascertain whether the patentee has disavowed the full scope of a claim term.
The Court may also consider extrinsic evidence to aid in its construction of disputed claim terms. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18. For example, "[d]ictionaries are always available to the court to aid in the task of determining meanings that would have been attributed by those of skill in the relevant art to any disputed terms used by the inventor in the claims." Tex. Dig. Sys., 308 F.3d at 1202 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6). Technical dictionaries are worthy of special note and constitute evidence of understanding of persons of skill in the relevant art. See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Dictionaries are particularly helpful in claim construction because they "endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms," Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318, but the Court should not elevate dictionaries to prominence over the specification and claim language, see id. at 1319-24. If a term has more than one plausible ordinary meaning, the court must consult the intrinsic record to identify which of the possible meanings is most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor. Stephen Key Design LLC, v. Lego Sys., Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Other extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, is less helpful because it may suffer from bias, and the Court should "discount any expert testimony 'that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution history, in other words, with the written record of the patent.'" Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Key Pharm. v. Hereon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
Finally, dependent claims must be construed to "incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim[s] to which [they] refer[]." 35 U.S.C. § 112(d).
The following chart summarizes the disputed claim terms for the Tomkow Patents, each party's proposed construction, and the Court's construction.
The following chart summarizes the disputed claim terms for the Feldbau Patent, each party's proposed construction, and the Court's construction.
The Court adopts the parties' stipulated constructions of the four Feldbau Patent claim terms as set forth in the box below.
RPost argues that the claim term "message" should be construed as "an electronic message." (Doc. 191-1 at 1). RPost explains that Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas ("EDTX") construed "message" as "an electronic message" and urges the Court to adopt the same construction. (Doc. 114 at 7-8).
In response, GoDaddy agrees that "message" should be construed as "electronic" but disputes the adequacy of that description. (Doc. 117 at 6-7). Specifically, GoDaddy maintains that "message" should also be limited by how the message is transmitted ("through an electronic network") and by its singularity ("as a whole"). (Id.) To support these added limitations, GoDaddy observes that the shared specification discloses that the invention "may apply to any electronic message that can be transmitted through an electronic message network." (Id. at 7 (quoting `199 Patent col. 27 ll. 26-32)). GoDaddy further contends that a "message" must be sent "as a whole" because the term "message" is always preceded in the claims by the articles "a" or "the." (Id.) GoDaddy therefore proposes a construction of: "an electronic message that can be transmitted as a whole through an electronic network." (Doc. 191-1 at 1).
RPost replies that GoDaddy's "as a whole" limitation is unsupported by the intrinsic record and will confuse the jury. (Doc. 119 at 3). RPost also contends that GoDaddy's "cherry-picked" limitation of "through an electronic network" does not describe a feature of the message and also neglects to include a second transmission method disclosed in the same sentence of the specification. (Id. at 4).
The term "message" is used in all asserted claims of the Tomkow Patents. For example, the `199 Patent claims:
`199 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-65 (emphasis added). Another example is found in the `198 Patent which claims:
`198 Patent col. 28 ll. 6-16 (emphasis added).
Because the parties do not dispute that "message" should be construed as "electronic," the Court will, at a minimum, adopt RPost's proposed construction of "an electronic message." The remaining question is whether "an electronic message" should be cloaked with the limitations proposed by GoDaddy.
Regarding GoDaddy's first proposed limitation "as a whole," the Court is not persuaded by GoDaddy's argument that because certain articles precede "message" in the claim language, there is somehow a requirement that the message must be sent "as a whole." Beyond referencing the claims' use of "a" and "the," GoDaddy does not cite any other portion of the intrinsic record to show that "a message" cannot be transmitted in multiple components. Accordingly, the Court rejects this portion of GoDaddy's proposal because it would ambiguously construe a readily understandable term.
As to GoDaddy's second proposed limitation "through an electronic network," the Court finds that such a limitation is not supported by the intrinsic record. The asserted claims of the Tomkow Patents do not require that messages be transmitted only through electronic networks. In fact, the portion of the shared specification relied upon by GoDaddy actually sets forth two means of transmitting a message. See `199 Patent col. 27 ll. 26-32 ("Although the above generally describes a system and method of verifying that an e-mail was sent and/or received, the present invention may apply to any electronic message that can be transmitted through an electronic message network or through an electronic gate." (emphasis added)). GoDaddy, without explanation, severed the "electronic gate" transmission method in its proposal. In any event, the Court finds that appending this method of transmission limitation to "message" is needlessly redundant considering the parties agree that "message" must be "electronic." Thus, the Court rejects this portion of GoDaddy's proposed construction.
For these reasons, the Court adopts RPost's proposal and construes "message" as "an electronic message."
RPost recommends that the Court should shadow Judge Gilstrap and abstain from construing the term "server." (Doc. 114 at 8-9). Judge Gilstrap concluded that defining "server" was unnecessary because the term had been used by the asserted claim according to its plain and ordinary meaning. See RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *60. RPost also advances an alternative construction: "a computer(s), computer program(s), or computing device(s) that provides resources to other devices across a network." (Doc. 191-1 at 1). This alternative construction closely tracks RMail's proposal that Judge Gilstrap rejected as "not derived from intrinsic evidence." RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *60.
GoDaddy responds that "server" must be interpreted because there is "no plain meaning that resolves the parties' dispute." (Doc. 117 at 7-8). According to GoDaddy, "server" must: 1) be "outgoing"; 2) be "separate from the sender"; 3) "create an attachment"; 4) "transmit the attachment and message"; and 5) "store the portion of the mail transport dialog generated during transmission of the message." (Id.)
RPost replies that GoDaddy's limitations are improper because they "cannot apply to all of the claims." (Doc. 119 at 4). RPost also contends that GoDaddy's limitations are ambiguous and unsupported by the intrinsic record. (Doc. 114 at 8-9).
The term "server" is used by all asserted claims of the Towkow Patents but is not defined or explained within the intrinsic record. A few examples include:
`389 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-col 28 ll. 7 (emphasis added).
`198 Patent col. 30 ll. 7-25 (emphasis added).
`913 Patent col. 27 ll. 41-54 (emphasis added).
Initially, despite GoDaddy's argument that no "plain meaning" of "server" resolves the parties' dispute, GoDaddy does not raise an actual dispute concerning the plain meaning of the term. Particularly, GoDaddy's proposed construction includes the word "server" and shrouds it with five limitations. For example, GoDaddy's proposal states that "server" must be an "outgoing server." While this construction limits "server" as "outgoing," it does not raise an actual dispute as to the "plain meaning" of the word "server." Likewise, the balance of GoDaddy's proposal affixes several limitations to "server" without challenging the plain meaning of the term. Accordingly, the question presented by GoDaddy is not whether the plain meaning of "server" is disputed, but whether the proposed limitations should be levied upon the term.
The Court will review each of GoDaddy's proposed limitations in turn.
GoDaddy proposes that "server" must be construed as "outgoing server" but does not cite to the intrinsic record for support. See (Doc. 117 at 3-4). The Tomkow Patents, however, consistently specify that the server can both receive and transmit messages. See, e.g., `389 Patent col. 27 ll. 59-61 (claiming "steps at the server comprising: receiving the message at the server from the sender . . . ."). If GoDaddy intended to limit "server" to only servers that send messages and not ones that receive messages, such a construction violates the intrinsic record. In absence of more compelling evidence, the Court rejects GoDaddy's proposed limitation of "outgoing."
GoDaddy also proposes that "server" should be limited as "separate from the sender." (Doc. 117 at 7-8). RPost's sole dispute with this limitation is that it is redundant because "server" and "sender" are "distinct claim elements." (Doc. 114 at 9). RPost observes that several courts have spurned—on "redundancy" grounds—constructions that incorporate language from the claim itself. (Doc. 119 at 4 (citing Interdigital Commuc'ns., Inc. v. ZTE Corp., 2014 WL 3908771, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2014); Asetek Holdings, Inc. v. Coolit Sys., 2013 WL 6327691, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 2013 WL 499158, at *7 (D. Nev. Feb. 6, 2013)). The Federal Circuit, however, rejected the robotic application of such a stringent rule. See 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[Plaintiff] argues that because those functions are set forth expressly in the claim, it would be `redundant and unnecessary' to incorporate them into the construction of `location facility.' However, [Plaintiff] has not cited, and we have not discovered, any authority for the proposition that construction of a particular claim term may not incorporate claim language circumscribing the meaning of the term. The claim language makes clear that the location facility in fact does perform the functions in question. The district court correctly incorporated those functions into its claim construction."). Thus, RPost's "redundancy" argument, while persuasive, is not binding on the Court.
RPost never disputes that the claimed "server" is, in fact, "separate from the sender," and on balance, the Court concludes that construing "server" with the limitation "separate from the sender" would be more helpful to the jury than a plain meaning construction. The Court therefore adopts this portion of GoDaddy's construction.
As a third limitation, GoDaddy argues that the server "creates an attachment [and] transmits the attachment and the message." (Doc. 117 at 8). GoDaddy, however, does not point to claim language that requires the server to "create" or "transmit" an "attachment." The only claim language cited by GoDaddy concerns the role of the processor to "associate a link with the message" or "add[] a link to the message," but these claims are all dependent claims. (Id. (citing `198 Patent col. 28 ll. 6-25, col. 29 ll. 13-19; `104 Patent col. 27 ll. 66-col. 28 ll. 4, col. 31 ll. 24-37)). GoDaddy does not explain why the Court should interpret "link" as "attachment" or how "associate" or "add" is analogous to "creates." Without a more compelling reason for construing "server" with a limitation found only in dependent claims, the Court rejects this portion of GoDaddy's proposal. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he presence of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation raises a presumption that the limitation in question is not found in the independent claim." (citing Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
Regarding the balance of this third limitation, the claim language is clear that the server "transmits" the message. See, e.g., `198 Patent col. 28 ll. 15-16, col. 29 ll. 13-19. Accordingly, the Court rejects this part of GoDaddy's proposal as needlessly redundant.
As a fourth limitation, GoDaddy insists that the construction must include that the server "stores the portion of the mail transport dialog generated during transmission of the dispatch." (Doc. 117 at 8). During the Markman Hearing, GoDaddy explained that the server must store this information to later verify the message.
Only two asserted claims recite that the server stores any portion of the mail transport dialog, and both are dependent claims found in only one Tomkow Patent. See `389 Patent, Claims 12 and 14.
A claim term should be construed in a manner that can be applied to all claims. See Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH, 309 F.3d at 1371. Here, for all but two dependent claims, "server" is not limited to "storing" mail transport dialog. Moreover, none of the asserted claims from the `104 and `198 Patents even use the term "mail transport protocol dialog." Accordingly, the Court rejects this portion of GoDaddy's proposal.
For these reasons, the Court construes "server" as "a server that is separate from the sender."
RPost argues that "a link" should be construed as "a set of instructions that directs one computing resource to another." (Doc. 114 at 9-10). RPost claims that such an interpretation is "fully supported by the intrinsic record." (Id.)
GoDaddy responds that no construction is necessary because "a link" is a readily understandable term to a skilled artisan. (Doc. 117 at 8). GoDaddy further contends that RPost's construction broadens the scope of "a link" contrary to the intrinsic record. (Id.)
RPost replies that GoDaddy "completely ignores that the Tomkow patents describe links as akin to instructions." (Doc. 119 at 5). RPost also states that a "person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that links, such as URLs, may contain commands, or instructions, that direct one computing resource to another." (Id.)
The Court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the functions "a link" performs without additional construction. As RPost concedes: "[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that links, such as URLSs, may contain commands, or instructions, that direct one computing resource to another." (Doc. 119 at 5). The internal record also makes clear that "a link" is "added to the message by the server," is "configured to execute when the message is opened" in order to "provide an indication that the message has been opened."`104 Patent col. 28 ll. 1-4, col. 31 ll. 25-31; `198 Patent col. 28 ll. 11-14, col. 29 ll. 14-19. If a disputed claim term has a plain and ordinary meaning such that it needs no clarification or explanation, the Court need not adopt a construction beyond that plain meaning. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568. RPost failed to cite any portion of the intrinsic record to show that "a link" was used in a way other than its plain meaning.
For these reasons, the Court does not construe this term.
RPost argues that "indication" should be broadly interpreted as "information that indicates" and supports its position by citing the Meriam Webster Dictionary. (Doc. 114 at 10). RPost thus proposes a construction of "information that indicates that the message has been opened by (delivered to) a recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 1).
GoDaddy responds that RPost's "circular" definition should be rejected. (Doc. 117 at 9). Instead, GoDaddy proposes a construction of "confirmation (at the server) that the message content was viewed by the recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 1). To buttress its definition of "indication" as "confirmation," GoDaddy heavily relies on Figure 8 of the `199 Patent and its corresponding description. (Doc. 117 at 9). Figure 8—a preferred embodiment of the `199 Patent—depicts the invention as sending a "confirmation message" to the sender, which provides "verifiable confirmation" that the message was received at a certain time, by a certain network route, and with specific content. `199 Patent Fig. 8, col. 25 ll. 49-col. 26 ll. 5. GoDaddy insists that the claimed "indication" must have "certainty of content and provenance." (Doc. 117 at 9). GoDaddy also defines "opened" as "viewed" because, according to the specification, "the message is opened for reading," and GoDaddy argues that a message cannot be read without at some point being viewed. (Id. at 10).
RPost argues that GoDaddy's proposal is a shrewd and misguided attempt to narrow the plain meaning of the claimed "indication." See (Docs. 114 at 10; 119 at 5-6). According to RPost, the patentee intentionally claimed "indication" in a broad manner and "[a]bsent a clear disavowal in the specification or the prosecution history, the patentee is entitled to the full scope of its claim language." (Doc. 119 at 6 (citing Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). RPost contends that the patentee did not make a "clear disavowal" of the full meaning behind "indication," and thus, GoDaddy's proposal improperly imports a limitation from the specification into the claim. (Doc. 114 at 10). RPost further observes that Figure 8's corresponding description "undermines" GoDaddy's argument because "confirmation message 72" is an "optional message" that "may or may not include verifiable information" and can merely be a "simple text message indicating that a message was received." (Doc. 119 at 5). Finally, RPost complains that GoDaddy's construction of "opened" as "viewed" is improper because it narrows the meaning of the term without adequate intrinsic record support. (Doc. 114 at 10).
A fundamental principle for discerning a term's usage is the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words amongst artisans of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of invention. See Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Normal rules of usage suggest a "heavy presumption" that claim terms carry their accustomed meaning in the relevant community at the relevant time. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Johnson Worldwide Assocs. Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.1999)). Of course, the Federal Circuit acknowledges that a patent applicant may overcome this presumption by clearly using the words in the specification, prosecution history, or both "in a manner inconsistent with its ordinary meaning." Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 320 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325-26). In other words, an inventor may consistently and clearly use a term in a manner either more or less expansive than its general usage in the relevant community, and thus expand or limit the scope of the term in the context of the patent claims. See Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that an applicant may disclaim claim scope during prosecution); Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic Ave, Inc., 511 F.3d 1157, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("In order to constitute binding surrenders of claim scope, the statements in question must be such that a competitor would reasonably believe that the applicant had surrendered the relevant subject matter." (quotation omitted)).
This phrase is used in the `104 and `198 Patents as follows:
`104 Patent col. 27 ll. 63-col. 28 ll. 16 (emphasis added).
`198 Patent col. 28 ll. 6-25 (emphasis added). The term "indication" is similarly used in independent Claims 18 and 32 and dependent Claim 6 of the `198 Patent. See `198 Patent col. 28 ll. 39-41, col. 29 ll. 11-28, col. 30 ll. 7-25.
The parties dispute the interpretation of three terms: "indication," "opened," and "message." The Court will analyze each in turn.
GoDaddy maintains that to differentiate the invention from prior art, "indication" must be construed as "confirmation" because the specification states that the invention provides "proof" of the delivery and content of the message. (Doc. 117 at 10). According to GoDaddy, "RPost cites no authority for its bare proposition that the patentee `chose to claim the invention' as covering something more than `proof' of a message's delivery and content." (Id.) GoDaddy collaterally asserts that RPost's construction of "indication" defines the term by the term itself, thereby making the construction "circular" and altogether unhelpful to the jury. (Id.)
Contrary to GoDaddy's argument, RPost cites the most significant authority of all: the claim language. The "appropriate starting point" for "proper claim construction" is "always the language of the asserted claim itself." Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1186 (citations omitted). In the asserted claims here, the patentee claimed the invention to provide an "indication" not a "confirmation"—undisputedly a term with a narrower scope. Generally, an "indication" is a generic piece of information that tends to show (i.e., indicates) something else. See Random House Webster's College Dictionary 669 (1999) (defining "indication" as "something serving to indicate; sign; token" and "indicate" as "to be a sign of; betoken"). On the other hand, "confirmation" is verifying or establishing the "truth, accuracy, validity, or genuineness of" something. See id. 279 (defining "confirmation" as "the act of confirming" and "confirm" as "to establish the truth, accuracy, validity, or genuineness of; corroborate; verify"). The dispute here is whether the specification limits the claimed "indication" to the tapered boundaries of "confirmation."
To resolve this dispute, understanding the Tomkow Patents' two-step "verification" or "proof" process is essential. As an example, the `104 Patent claims a system and method for verifying, i.e., proving, the opening of a message and the message's content. The first step commences when the sender originates the message and transmits it to the recipient. Before the message reaches the recipient, however, it cyphers through an RPost server whereupon certain information is recorded, such as a hashed version of its contents. See `104 Patent col. 28 ll. 25-29. The RPost server also adds a "link" to the message that executes when the message is opened by the recipient, id. col. 28 ll. 1-4, and creates and stores "authenticatible information" about the message, which essentially identifies a particular message as unique, id. col. 28 ll. 10-12, col. 31 ll. 33-34. The RPost server then forwards the message to the recipient. See id. col. 28 ll. 5-6. When the recipient opens the message, the link executes and provides an "indication that the message has been opened by the recipient." See id. col. 28 ll. 7-9. To conclude the first step, the RPost server sends a receipt to the sender which includes the "indication" that the message was opened and other "authenticatible information." See id. col. 28 ll. 13-15.
The second step involves the actual verification of the opening of the message and its contents. This step is disclosed in the specification as follows:
Verification
`104 Patent col. 16 ll. 63-col. 17 ll. 55.
As readily seen, the invention "verifies" the opening of a message and its contents during the second step of the process—not the first step. The first step merely provides an "indication" to the sender that the message was opened by the recipient. This two-step process was claimed by the inventor and explained through the specification. Because the intrinsic record is clear that the invention "confirms" nothing during the first step, GoDaddy's proposed construction of "confirmation" is internally inconsistent.
Furthermore, GoDaddy's adoption of Figure 8's terminology is misplaced. Figure 8 is merely "another embodiment of the invention."`104 Patent col. 25 ll. 14-15. If the Court were to adopt GoDaddy's proposal, it would be reading a limitation from the specification into the claim—a "cardinal sin" according to the Federal Circuit. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 (citing Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1186); see Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("This court has cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification."). "To avoid importing limitations from the specification into the claims, it is important to keep in mind that the purposes of the specification are to teach and enable those of skill in the art to make and use the invention and to provide a best mode for doing so." Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Although "there is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification," Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1187, the Court believes that GoDaddy is pursuing the latter rather than the former. Figure 8 does not establish the patentee's "clear disavowal" of "indication" to the narrower meaning of "confirmation." See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325).
In short, notwithstanding the internal flaws within GoDaddy's proposal, the Court finds that if it were to construe "indication" as "confirmation," a limitation from the specification would be read into the claim. By focusing solely on the specification, GoDaddy improperly seeks to construe the claims as limited to a single embodiment, which goes against bedrock claim construction principles. See Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1187.
Nonetheless, the patentee did not merely claim "indication" as a nebulous indication without concern of later verification. The intrinsic record conveys that the primary purpose of the invention is to provide information regarding the delivery, opening, and content of an electronic message that can be "verified." For example, Claim 1 of the `104 Patent states that the "indication of the opening of the message at the recipient" is "includ[ed]" in the "authenticatible information" which is sent to the sender. `104 Patent col. 28 ll. 10-13; see also `198 Patent col. 28 ll. 20-22 ("providing an authenticatible information related to the message, including the indication of the delivery of the message at the recipient, at the server . . . ."). As construed below, "authenticatible information" is certain information that "can be verified." Accordingly, because the "indication of the opening of the message" is an element of "authenticatible information," the indication itself must be verifiable.
For these reasons, the Court construes "indication" as "verifiable information that indicates."
The parties also dispute the meaning of the term "opened" as used by the asserted claims. RPost argues that "opened" does not need to be construed because the words "opened," "viewed," and "read" all embody different meanings and the inventor claimed "opened." (Doc. 119 at 6). In response, GoDaddy defines "opened" as "viewed" because, according to the specification, "the message is opened for reading," and it would be impossible to read a message without at some point viewing it. (Doc. 117 at 10).
The Court finds that "opened" does not require further construction. In construing claim terms, the Court need not clarify a term if it has a plain meaning that requires no clarification. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568. Here, "opened" is a generic term that is readily understood within the context of the claims to connote that a message was "opened" by the recipient. A jury will have no trouble understanding this concept and GoDaddy has not raised an actual dispute as to the scope of the term. It would be illogical for the Court to force the jury to consider convoluted semantics of whether the message was "opened," "viewed," or "read" when the patentee already claimed the generic term "opened." Thus, this portion of GoDaddy's proposal is rejected.
The parties' final dispute is whether "message" should be interpreted as "message" or "message content." GoDaddy proposes "message content" but does not explain why such a construction is necessary. See (Doc. 117 at 9-10). In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, the Court elects not to construe this portion of the phrase. "Message" is a readily understandable term and GoDaddy has not brought to the Court's attention a valid dispute concerning the term's scope. Moreover, because the Court declined to define "opened" as "viewed," construing this phrase as "opened the message content" makes little sense. The Court therefore rejects this portion of GoDaddy's proposal.
For these reasons, the Court construes "an indication that the message has been opened by (delivered to) a recipient" as "verifiable information that indicates that the message has been opened by (opened at; delivered to) the recipient."
As with Term No. 4, the parties' dispute centers on the term "indication." RPost proposes a construction of "information that indicates that the message has been received by the recipient (recipient processor)." (Doc. 191-1 at 1-2). GoDaddy responds by proposing: "confirmation that the message content was received by the recipient." (Id.)
This phrase is used in the asserted claims of the `389 Patent as follows:
`389 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-col 28 ll. 3 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 28 ll. 33-52 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 29 ll. 17-col. 30 ll. 5.
The Court adopts its analysis for the terms "indication" and "message" as set forth for Term No. 4 and therefore construes this phrase as "verifiable information that indicates that the message was received by the recipient (recipient processor)."
RPost proposes a construction of "information that indicates that the message has failed to be delivered to the recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 2). GoDaddy responds that the phrase should be defined as "confirmation that the message content was not received by the recipient." (Id.)
This phrase is found in the asserted claims of the `199 Patent as follows:
`199 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-65 (emphasis added).
The parties again dispute the claim terms "indication" and "message." The Court adopts its analysis as set forth in Term No. 4 and construes "indication" as "verifiable information that indicates" and does not construe "message."
The parties also proffer different constructions for the balance of the phrase. GoDaddy suggests a construction that interprets "failure to deliver" as "not receiv[ing]" the message. (Doc. 191-1 at 2). However, the `199 Patent does not speak in terms of "receipt" of the message but claims whether the message failed to be "delivered." The Court finds that this portion of the claim uses plain language the jury will readily be able to understand without further construction.
The Court therefore construes Term No. 6 as "verifiable information that indicates the failure to deliver the message to the recipient."
RPost proposes a construction that closely tracks the claim language: "executing the link when the message is opened at the recipient to cause the server to provide an indication that the message has been opened at the recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 2).
GoDaddy responds by construing the phrase as: "action by the recipient when the message is opened at the recipient to control the server to provide proof that the message has been opened at the recipient, the proof providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Id.) GoDaddy argues that the "structure" of the asserted claims "makes clear that—once the message is opened at the recipient—it is the recipient (including the link at the recipient) that controls the server to provide the attendant proof that the message has been opened at the recipient." (Doc. 117 at 11). GoDaddy also maintains that the "core purpose of the claimed inventions is to provide not merely an `indication,' but `proof regarding the delivery and contents of an e-mail message.'" (Id. at 11-12). GoDaddy finally argues that RPost's proposed change from "control" to "cause" is flawed because the two words are not synonymous. (Id. at 12).
RPost criticizes GoDaddy's construction for three reasons. First, RPost argues that GoDaddy's proposal improperly limits the claim to actions performed by the recipient. (Doc. 114 at 10). RPost explains that the link is executed "at the recipient," not "by the recipient" as GoDaddy contends. (Doc. 119 at 6). Second, RPost asserts that GoDaddy's construction impermissibly narrows the claim's plain meaning by construing "indication" as "proof." (Doc. 114 at 10). Third, RPost insists that GoDaddy's proposed limitation regarding "legal or other evidentiary status" is not supported by the claim language and violates the intrinsic record. (Id. at 10-11).
This phrase is used in Claim 1 of the `104 Patent as follows:
`104 Patent col. 27 ll. 63-col. 28 ll. 9 (emphasis added). The Court will analyze the parties' proposals in turn.
The Court first reviews RPost's suggestion that "control" should be interpreted as "cause." GoDaddy complains that such a construction is improper because the two words have different meanings. (Doc. 117 at 12). To support its argument, GoDaddy cites to the American Heritage Dictionary which defines "control" as "[t]o exercise authoritative or dominating influence over; direct" and "cause" as "
It is apparent from the dictionary definitions that the two terms have entirely different meanings. While "cause" simply refers to one that is responsible for an action or result, "control" requires that one exercise some sort of dominion or authority over another. In other words, "cause" is broader than "control." This distinction is exemplified by the `198 Patent's usage of the two words in an unrelated claim. See `198 Patent col. 29 ll. 1-4 ("
The Court next reviews GoDaddy's proposal that "executing the link" should be construed as "action by the recipient." GoDaddy explains that the "structure" of the asserted claims "makes clear that—once the message is opened at the recipient—it is the recipient (including the link at the recipient) that controls the server to provide the attendant proof that the message has been opened at the recipient." (Doc. 117 at 11). GoDaddy further notes that "it is . . . the recipient (i.e., the link in the message) that performs the claimed function." (Id.) RPost replies that even though the recipient performs the opening of the message, that fact is irrelevant because "the disputed claim function is executing, which the link does on its own." (Doc. 119 at 6).
The Court finds that "executing the link" does not require the recipient to affirmatively act beyond opening the message. Rather, the function of the claim, "executing," occurs by the link itself "when the message is opened." Furthermore, GoDaddy's likening of the "recipient" to the "link" itself is baseless, as the two terms are clearly distinct. Consequently, this portion of GoDaddy's proposal is rejected.
The Court adopts a slightly amended version of this portion of RPost's proposal: "the link executing on its own when the message is opened at the recipient." This construction clarifies for the jury that the link executes on its own when the message is opened.
Finally, the Court examines GoDaddy's argument that "an indication" should be interpreted as "proof that the message has been opened at the recipient, the proof providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Doc. 191-1 at 2).
The portion of the shared specification from which GoDaddy plucks this limitation is found in the Summary of the Present Invention which reads as follows:
`199 Patent col. 3 ll. 8-17; `389 Patent col. 3 ll. 6-15 (same); `104 Patent col. 3 ll. 6-15 (same); `198 Patent col. 3 ll. 9-18 (same); `913 Patent col. 3 ll. 8-17 (same). Based on this language and references to prior art in the specification, GoDaddy maintains that the "indication" provided by the invention must have some level of evidentiary status—legal or otherwise—that is equal or superior to registered United States mail. (Doc. 117 at 11).
To begin, as the Court has already recounted, construing this term must be done in light of the Federal Circuit's frequent admonition against reading limitations from the specification into the claim. See Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1187. In ascertaining whether the patentee disavowed the full scope of a claim, the Court must refrain from committing the "cardinal sin" of reading limitations from the specification into the claims. Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 (citing Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1186). The only way a specification may narrow the scope of a disputed claim term is if the patentee "demonstrate[d] intent to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope." Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325). Here, because the proposed evidentiary limitation purportedly springs from the specification, GoDaddy must show that the inventor clearly disavowed the claim scope.
In this regard, the Court is not persuaded that GoDaddy's proposed evidentiary limitation exists. The specification flatly expresses that "it is not necessary to the invention that any particular legal status is accorded to messages sent according to the methods taught herein, as the invention provides useful information and verification regardless." GoDaddy nonetheless attempts to circumvent this language by arguing that its proposal affords two methods of attaining the evidentiary status of registered United States mail: (1) "legal" or (2) "other evidentiary status." As the inventor clearly disclosed that no "legal" status was required for the invention, the question becomes whether an "indication" must have an "evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail."
In response to this question, the Court finds that GoDaddy's proposal misses the mark. As discussed at length for Term No. 4, the "indication" provided by the invention is not the "proof" that is discussed in the specification. The second step of the process— the "verification" of a message—is when the invention arguably provides "proof" of certain aspects of the message. Consequently, even if the Court were to sidestep the "cardinal sin" of reading limitations from the specification into a claim and disregard the invention's express disclaimer that no legal status is vital to the invention, the Court would still reject this portion of GoDaddy's argument because the purported evidentiary limitation does not even concern the invention's initial step of providing an "indication."
Accordingly, the Court adopts its construction of "indication" as explained in Term No. 4.
For these reasons, the Court construes this phrase as: "the link executing on its own when the message is opened at the recipient to control the server to provide verifiable information that indicates that the message has been opened at the recipient."
Similar to its proposed construction for Term No. 7, RPost advances the following construction of Term No. 8: "the link programmed to execute automatically when the message is opened at the recipient to cause the server to provide an indication at the server that the message has been opened at the recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 2). As seen, RPost modifies the claim language in two ways: (1) defining "control" as "cause" and (2) construing "configured" as "programmed." RPost asserts that the minor linguistic change from "configured" to "programmed" clarifies for the jury that the term is "used in a computer programming sense." (Doc. 119 at 10).
In response, GoDaddy proposes a construction of: "[link configured to execute through] action by the recipient when the message is opened at the recipient to control the server to provide proof that the message has been opened at the recipient, the proof providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Doc. 191-1 at 2).
This phrase is used in Claim 27 of the `104 Patent as follows:
`104 Patent col. 31 ll. 20-32 (emphasis added).
For the reasons set forth in Term No. 7, the Court rejects GoDaddy's evidentiary proposal and its suggestion that the claim requires "action by the recipient." Likewise, the Court also rejects the portion of RPost's proposal that construes "control" as "cause."
As to RPost's argument that "configured" should be defined as "programmed," the Court finds that such a construction is unwarranted. The term "configured" has a plain and ordinary meaning that the jury will be able to understand within the context of this electronic messaging dispute. See U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568. RPost has not shown that the term is used in a manner that diverges from its plain meaning, and therefore the Court rejects this portion of RPost's proposal.
For these reasons, the Court construes this phrase as: "the link being configured to execute automatically when the message is opened at the recipient to control the server to provide verifiable information that indicates at the server that the message has been opened at the recipient processor."
Similar to its proposals for Term Nos. 7 and 8, RPost suggests that this phrase should be interpreted as "the link programmed to execute when the link is activated at the recipient to provide an indication that the message has been opened by (delivered to) a recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 3).
In response, GoDaddy argues that the claim should be construed as "[link configured to execute through] action by the recipient when the message is opened at the recipient to control the server to provide proof that the message has been opened at the recipient, the proof providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Id.)
This phrase is found in Claims 1, 18, and 32 of the `198 Patent as follows:
`198 Patent col. 28 ll. 6-14 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 29 ll. 11-20 (emphasis added); see id. col. 30 ll. 7-16 (same).
For the reasons set forth in Term No. 7, the Court rejects GoDaddy's evidentiary proposal and its suggestion that the claim requires "action by the recipient." For the reasons expressed in Term No. 8, the Court also rejects the portion of RPost's proposal that construes "configured" as "programmed."
The remaining dispute is whether "activated" should be construed as "opened at the recipient to control the server." The use of the term "activated" in the `198 Patent is different than the prior two disputed terms from the `104 Patent which claim "opened at the recipient." "Activated" is a readily-understandable term, and there is no evidence before the Court showing that the inventor of the `198 Patent intended the link to be activated only when the message is opened. While it could be argued that because the activation of the link causes an indication of the opening of the message to be sent to the recipient it is the opening of the message that activates the link, this is not necessarily true. In fact, the dependent claims of Claim 1 suggest other ways of activating the link. See `198 Patent col. 28 ll. 26-27. Thus, the Court rejects GoDaddy's proposal and does not construe the generic term "activated."
For these reasons, the Court defines Term No. 9 as "the link configured to execute when the link is activated at the recipient to provide verifiable information that indicates that the message has been opened by (delivered to) the recipient."
For Term No. 10, RPost asks the Court to adopt the following construction: "executing the link when the link is called at the recipient to cause the server to provide an indication that the message has been delivered to the recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 3-4).
In response, GoDaddy proposes a construction of "[executing the link through] action by the recipient when the message is opened at the recipient to control the server to provide proof that the message has been opened at the recipient, the proof providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Id.)
This phrase is used in Claim 1 of the `198 Patent as follows:
`198 Patent col. 28 ll. 6-19 (emphasis added).
Several of the modifications proposed by the parties have already been resolved in prior terms. As to GoDaddy's "evidentiary" and "action by the recipient" proposals, the Court adopts its reasoning for Term No. 7. Regarding GoDaddy's construction of the claim term "activated," the Court adopts its analysis as set forth for Term No. 9. Finally, the Court adopts its reasoning and rejection of RPost's construction of "control" as explained in Term No. 7.
RPost additionally proposes that the term "activated" should be interpreted as "called." RPost does not explain this construction in its briefing, and the Court is not persuaded that construction of this term is necessary for the reasons set forth in Term No. 9. Thus, the Court rejects this portion of RPost's proposal.
For these reasons, the Court construes Term No. 10 as "the link executing on its own when the link is activated at the recipient to control the server to provide verifiable information that indicates that the message has been delivered to the recipient."
RPost argues that Term No. 11 should be construed as "wherein the link executed when the link is called at the recipient to cause the server to provide an indication that the message has been opened at (delivered to) to the recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 4).
In response, GoDaddy proposes a construction of "[executing the link through] action by the recipient when the message is opened at the recipient to control the server to provide proof that the message has been opened at the recipient, the proof providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Id.)
This phrase is found in the `198 Patent as follows:
`198 Patent col. 29 ll. 11-24 (emphasis added). Asserted Claim 32 incorporates the same language as Claim 18, but replaces "delivered to" with "opened at." Id. col. 30 ll. 7-20.
The Court has already settled all of the parties' disputes for prior terms and incorporates those analyses and constructions here. The Court therefore defines this phrase as "wherein the link is executed when the link is activated at the recipient to control the server to provide verifiable information that indicates that the message has been opened at (delivered to) the recipient."
RPost proposes that "authenticatible information" should be broadly construed as "information regarding the content or delivery of a message that can be verified." (Doc. 191-1 at 4-5). RPost argues this construction is "consistent with the intrinsic record, which repeatedly refers to authentication in the context of verifying the content and delivery of an electronic message." (Doc. 114 at 11).
GoDaddy, on the other hand, proposes the following itemized construction: "information unique to the message, the digital signature of the message, and the portion of the mail transport dialog generated during transmission of the message." (Doc. 191-1 at 4-5). GoDaddy contends that its construction is grounded in the specification's disclosure of "digital signature." (Doc. 117 at 13). Specifically, GoDaddy explains that "authenticatible information" must include the message's digital signature, which it defines as a "digital code that uniquely identifies the message and/or its attachments." (Id.)
RPost replies that GoDaddy's proposal is problematic because GoDaddy did not cite any portion of the intrinsic record showing that the inventor intended to limit "authenticatible information" to three enumerated elements. (Doc. 119 at 7). RPost also points out that the term "digital signature" is not claimed in either the `104 or `198 Patents where "authenticatible information" is claimed. (Id.) RPost thus contends that GoDaddy is attempting to limit "authenticatible information" by terms from the specification. (Doc. 114 at 11).
The term "authenticatible information" is used by the `104 and `198 Patents. The `104 Patent claims as follows:
`104 Patent col. 27 ll. 63-col. 28 ll. 16 (emphasis added). The term is also claimed by the `198 Patent as follows:
`198 Patent col. 28. ll. 6-25 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 29 ll. 11-28 (emphasis added); see id. col. 30 ll. 7-25 (same).
GoDaddy argues that "digital signature" should be included within the construction of "authenticatible information." The term "digital signature" is disclosed in the specification as follows:
Id. col. 3 ll. 19-38 (emphasis added).
At the outset, the Court agrees with GoDaddy's argument that the information comprising "authenticatible information" must be "unique" to a particular message. If the information was not unique to a message, verification of the message would be infeasible thereby making the claims limitless. GoDaddy's proposed construction, however, is superfluous. Specifically, GoDaddy defines "digital signature" as a "digital code that uniquely identifies the message and/or its contents." (Doc. 117 at 13 (emphasis added)). GoDaddy then offers a construction that includes both "information unique to the message" and "the digital signature of the message." There is no need to use both phrases in the construction when the phrases purportedly mean the same thing. On balance, the Court finds that "unique" would be more helpful to the jury than "digital signature"—a term that is not in the claim language and that would require a separate definition.
GoDaddy also contends that authenticatible information must include "the portion of the mail transport dialog generated during transmission of the message." (Doc. 191-1 at 4-5). GoDaddy does not explain why this limitation is necessary, and the Court does not find it to be supported by the intrinsic record. In fact, the `104 and `198 Patents do not even recite the term "mail transport dialog." Thus, if the Court were to adopt this portion of GoDaddy's construction, it would be importing concepts from other Tomkow Patents into the `104 and `198 Patents.
Finally, the Court agrees with RPost that "authenticatible information" is information regarding either the "content or delivery" of a message that "can be verified." The information must be able to be verified due to the two-step verification process as explained in Term No. 4.
For these reasons, the Court adopts the following amalgam of the parties' proffered constructions for "authenticatible information": "information unique to the content or delivery of a message that can be verified."
RPost contends that Term No. 13 should be interpreted as "mail transport data including a sequence of at least one command and at least one response." (Doc. 191-1 at 5). RPost posits that this construction is "virtually identical" to Judge Gilstrap's construction of the same term. (Doc. 114 at 12).
In response, GoDaddy proposes a narrower definition: "a list of commands and responses exchanged between servers during transmission of the message that is sufficient to prove delivery of the message to the recipient, providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Doc. 191-1 at 5). GoDaddy explains that its proposal "make[s] clear that the commands and responses exchanged during transmission of the message must be sufficient to prove delivery of the message to the recipient." (Doc. 117 at 14). GoDaddy further argues that the inclusion of the phrase "or other evidentiary status" in its construction overcomes RPost's argument that the invention need not confer a legal status upon its messages. (Id.)
RPost complains that GoDaddy's proposal is "completely at odds with the intrinsic record, which expressly states that it is not necessary to the invention that messages be accorded legal status." (Doc. 114 at 12). RPost also contends that GoDaddy's proposal conflicts with Judge Gilstrap's definition of "dialog" and improperly imports limitations from the specification into the claim. (Id.; Doc. 119 at 7).
The term "mail transport protocol dialog" is used in the `389 Patent as follows:
`389 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-col. 28 ll. 3 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 28 ll. 33-52 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 29 ll. 16-col. 30 ll. 5 (emphasis added).
As used in the `372 and `557 Patents, Judge Gilstrap construed "mail transport protocol dialog" as: "data including a list of at least one command and at least one response exchanged between devices during the transmission of a message." RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *55. In doing so, Judge Gilstrap relied upon the patents' specification and prosecution history. Id. Specifically, Judge Gilstrap considered the following excerpt from the `372 Patent's specification:
Id. at *54. The `389 Patent shares this portion of the specification. See `389 Patent col. 12 ll. 65-col. 13 ll. 6.
Judge Gilstrap further explained that during prosecution of the patent, the inventor disclaimed that "a dialog, as that term is understood by one skilled in the relevant art, is a list of commands and responses exchanged between an outgoing server and a destination address or server to transmit a message." RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *54. Judge Gilstrap concluded that this statement rose "to the level of a `reasonably clear' lexicography defining `dialog' in the context of `mail transport dialog' as being data that includes a list of command and responses exchanged during transmission of a message." Id. (citations omitted).
The `389 Patent describes two primary mail transport protocols: SMTP and ESMTP. The `389 Patent describes an (E)SMTP "dialogue" between the sender's Mail Transport Agent ("MTA") and the recipient's MTA during which the message is delivered. See, e.g., `389 Patent col. 11 ll. 50-56, col. 12 ll. 65-67. A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand "at least a portion of a mail transport protocol dialogue" to include information from the dialogue between the MTAs (e.g., an SMTP command or an SMTP response), not merely information from the message itself. Moreover, the Court agrees with Judge Gilstrap's analysis and finds that the construction of this term should at least incorporate "data including a sequence of at least one mail transport protocol command and at least one mail transport protocol response exchanged between devices during transmission of the message."
As has been the case for several terms, GoDaddy raises an issue regarding the use of the invention. Specifically, GoDaddy insists that the data must be "sufficient to prove delivery of the message to the recipient, providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Doc. 117 at 14). As discussed for the "indication" terms above, however, even disregarding the "cardinal sin" of reading limitations from the specification into the claim, the Court finds no requirement that the invention bestow upon its messages an evidentiary status on par with or superior to registered United States mail.
For these reasons, the Court adopts RPost's proposed construction with minor changes. Term No. 13 means "data including at least one mail transport protocol command and at least one mail transport protocol response exchanged between devices during transmission of a message."
RPost contends that this phrase does not require further construction beyond construing "mail transport protocol dialog." (Doc. 191-1 at 5). GoDaddy appears to advance the same construction as it did for Term No. 13. See (Doc. 117 at 13).
This phrase is claimed in the `389 Patent as quoted in Term No. 13 and also in Claim 1 of the `199 Patent. The `199 Patent claims:
`199 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-col. 28 ll. 4 (emphasis added).
In 2014, Symantec Corporation filed a petition with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("Board") requesting inter partes review of several claims of the `372 Patent, of which the `389 and `199 Patents are continuations. See Symantec Corp. v. RPost Commc'ns Ltd., 2014 WL 3542162, at *1 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. July 15, 2014). RPost, as patent owner, filed a response. Id. One of the claims before the Board for construction was "at least a portion of a mail transport protocol dialog." Id. at *6-7. RPost proposed Judge Gilstrap's construction: "data including a list of at least one command and at least one response exchanged between devices during the transmission of a message." Id. at *7. The Board rejected the conjunctive nature of RPost's proposal and construed the phrase as "at least one mail transport protocol command or at least one mail transport protocol reply." Id. (emphasis added).
Because the claim recites "at least a portion," the Court rejects RPost's proposal that no construction is necessary because the jury could mistakenly conclude—as RPost did before the Board—that at least one command and one response is needed. Instead, the Court adopts the substance of the Board's construction and interprets this phrase to mean "data including at least one mail transport protocol command or at least one mail transport protocol response exchanged between devices during transmission of the message."
RPost advances a construction that closely mirrors its proposals for the preceding dialog terms. Specifically, RPost argues that "SMTP and ESMTP protocol dialog" should be construed as "SMTP or ESMTP data including a list of at least one command and at least one response generated by the electronic mail system during transmission of the message from the server to the recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 5-6).
GoDaddy proposes the same construction as it did for Term Nos. 13 and 14: "a list of commands and responses exchanged between servers during transmission of the message that is sufficient to prove delivery of the message to the recipient, providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Id.)
This phrase is claimed by the `913 Patent as follows:
`913 Patent col. 27 ll. 41-54 (emphasis added).
For the reasons expressed for Term No. 13, the Court finds that the majority of RPost's construction would assist the jury in understanding the concepts of this term. Thus, the Court construes "SMTP and ESMTP protocol dialog" as "SMTP or ESMTP data including a list of at least one protocol command and at least one protocol response exchanged between devices during transmission of a message."
For the final "dialog" term, RPost proposes a construction of "transport data including a list of at least one command and at least one response." (Doc. 191-1 at 6).
GoDaddy proffers the same construction as it did for Term Nos. 13, 14, and 15: "a list of commands and responses exchanged between servers during transmission of the message that is sufficient to prove delivery of the message to the recipient, providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Id.)
"Data transport protocol dialog" is used in Claim 1 of the `199 Patent as follows:
`199 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-col. 28 ll. 4 (emphasis added).
For the reasons set forth in Term No. 13, the Court finds that the majority of RPost's construction would be helpful to the jury. Thus, the Court construes this term as: "transport data including a list of at least one command and at least one response exchanged between devices during transmission of a message."
RPost contends that Term No. 17 should be construed as "before the content and delivery of the message is proved (proving the content and delivery of the message) by the server. The plain language of this phrase does not require that any authentication of the message be performed by the server." (Doc. 191-1 at 6-7). To support the latter part of its construction, RPost notes that Judge Gilstrap came to a similar conclusion. (Doc. 114 at 12-13).
GoDaddy agrees that this phrase requires providing proof of the content and delivery of a message but contends that the construction should also include "how" and "why" such proof is generated. (Doc. 117 at 14). Thus, GoDaddy proposes the following construction: "before proving the content and delivery of the message by comparing and matching authenticable information so as to provide a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Id.)
RPost replies that GoDaddy's proposal impermissibly imports limitations from the specification into the claim. (Doc. 119 at 8).
This disputed phrase is found in several claims of the `389 Patent and Claim 1 of the `199 Patent. The `389 Patent claims as follows:
`389 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-col. 28 ll. 7 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 29 ll. 16-col. 30 ll. 13 (emphasis added). Similarly, the `199 Patent claims:
`199 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-col. 28 ll. 7 (emphasis added). The general method of "authentication" is disclosed in the shared specification as follows:
`389 Patent col. 3 ll. 6-61.
Id. col. 24 ll. 66-col. 25 ll. 3.
To begin, GoDaddy's "comparing and matching" proposal is comparable to that of the defendants before Judge Gilstrap who proposed "a comparison of two digital fingerprints (hashes) to determine that they match." RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *59. Judge Gilstrap analyzed that proposal as follows:
Id. The Court agrees with Judge Gilstrap. While the specification of the invention does disclose that the server can compare and match certain information about the message to authenticate the message, the claim itself uses broad language not limited to comparing and matching. Thus, the Court refrains from reading limitations from the specification into the claim and rejects this portion of GoDaddy's proposal. See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326 ("[L]imitations from the specification are not to be read into the claims[.]" (citing Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1186)).
As to GoDaddy's proposed evidentiary limitation, the Court incorporates its analysis as set forth in Term No. 7 and rejects the proposal. Specifically, even though "authentication" is the second step of the "proof" process claimed by the Tomkow Patents, the Court does not agree with GoDaddy that the status of the message—even after authentication—must be tantamount to the evidentiary quality of registered United States mail. The specification explicitly eschews the notion that any legal status be afforded to a message, and the Court will not import any lingering evidentiary limitations from the specification into the claim, particularly when the limitations relate to the "use" of the invention.
Finally, RPost proposes that the jury be instructed that "the plain language of this phrase does not require that any authentication of the message be performed by the server." (Doc. 191-1 at 6). The Court finds that including this sentence in the construction is unnecessarily redundant as the phrase "before the message is authenticated" is readily-understandable.
For these reasons, the Court construes "before the message is authenticated (any authentication of the message) by the server" as "before the content and delivery of the message is proved (proving the content and delivery of the message) by the server."
RPost argues that MTA should be interpreted as "software that transfers electronic messages from one computer to another." (Doc. 191-1 at 7). RPost explains that this construction is consistent with "dictionary" definitions of MTA. (Doc. 114 at 13 (citing http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_transfer_agent)).
GoDaddy proposes that MTA should be construed as "software that resides on the server and that is dedicated to transferring and receiving electronic messages from one computer to or from another." (Doc. 191-1 at 7). GoDaddy stresses that its definition means that "the software, not the server" is "dedicated" to the transfer and receipt of messages. (Doc. 117 at 15). GoDaddy also argues that the MTA must be installed on the server "because the asserted claims are directed to servers that send and receive messages." (Id.)
RPost denounces GoDaddy's proposal because "[a]lthough MTA software may be installed on a server, the plain claim language and the intrinsic record do not require that MTA software always be installed on a server or that the server be dedicated to transferring electronic messages." (Doc. 114 at 13). RPost underscores that the server can also "record[] some portion of the selected one of the SMTP and ESMTP protocol dialog between the server and the recipient." (Id.) RPost further contends that construing MTA as residing on "the server" is redundant and confusing because the jury will not know on which server the MTA resides. (Doc. 119 at 8).
"Mail Transport Agent" is used in the `913 Patent as follows:
`913 Patent col. 27 ll. 41-54 (emphasis added). While the parties agree that MTA is software that can transfer messages, their proposals diverge in three respects.
The first dispute concerns whether the construction should state where the MTA software is located. In this regard, the Court agrees with GoDaddy that the construction should include the MTA software's location, but also finds merit in RPost's concern that if the construction reads "the server," the jury could be confused as to which server contains the MTA. Thus, the Court adopts a modified version of GoDaddy's proposal: "resides on a server."
Second, because the MTA software is acting as an intermediary between the sender and recipient, the Court agrees with GoDaddy that the MTA must be able to "receive" electronic messages. See `913 Patent col. 27 ll. 48-54.
Finally, the Court rejects GoDaddy's contention that the MTA software must be "dedicated to" transferring and receiving electronic messages. "Dedicated to" imports unnecessary ambiguity into the construction.
For these reasons, the Court construes MTA as "software that resides on a server and that transfers and receives electronic messages from one computer to or from another."
RPost argues that the terms "sender" and "recipient" have plain and ordinary meanings that require no further construction from the Court. (Doc. 191-1 at 7). RPost emphasizes that Judge Gilstrap gave these terms plain meaning constructions and urges the Court to adopt a similar plain meaning construction. (Doc. 114 at 13).
GoDaddy responds that no plain meaning of the terms resolves the parties' dispute and criticizes RPost's alternative constructions as "impermissibly vague." (Doc. 117 at 15-16). Instead, GoDaddy proposes that "sender" be construed as "the computer that originates the message" and "recipient" as "the computer that receives the message at its intended destination." (Doc. 191-1 at 7). According to GoDaddy, the Tomkow Patents "provide" that the terms are "computers" because the shared specification recites that the "sender" "create[s] the original messages" and "has both a name and Internet address, and only computers have .com Internet addresses as recited in the patents." (Doc. 117 at 15-16).
RPost replies that because the Tomkow Patents "repeatedly equate a user (i.e., a person) with `sender,'" GoDaddy's "computer" proposal violates the intrinsic record. (Doc. 119 at 8-9). RPost also protests that GoDaddy's construction violates the doctrine of claim differentiation because it defines "sender" and "recipient" in the same way as "originating processor" and "recipient processor." (Doc. 114 at 13-14). RPost contends that because the inventor used different words in the claims, there is a presumption that he intended the terms to have different meanings. (Id. (citing Comark Commc'ns, 156 F.3d at 1187)). For its part, GoDaddy argues that the claim differentiation doctrine should not be applied here "in light of the patents' disclosure of the meaning of these terms." (Doc. 117 at 16).
The claim terms "sender" and "recipient" are peppered throughout the Tomkow Patents. A few examples include:
`389 Patent col. 27 ll. 58-col 28 ll. 7 (emphasis added).
`104 Patent col. 27 ll. 63-col. 28 ll. 16 (emphasis added).
To support its position that "sender" and "recipient" should be defined as "computers," GoDaddy cites to the following sentence of the shared specification: "[f]or example, where the original sender of the message is user John Smith with Internet address jsmith@adomain.com . . . ."`199 Patent col. 9 ll. 53-54. GoDaddy explains that "sender" and "recipient" must be construed to mean "computers" because only computers have Internet addresses. (Doc. 117 at 15-16).
In this regard, the Court finds that the presence of the phrase "user John Smith" forecloses construing "sender" strictly as "computer." While it may technically be true that only computers have Internet addresses, a "user"—disclosed here as the "original sender"—is not necessarily a computer. Auxiliary disclosures in the specification equate "sender" with "user" and "originator." See `199 Patent col. 18 ll. 37-39 ("To register an e-mail message, in step
Correspondingly, the specification also forecloses construing "recipient" as "computer." For example, the specification discloses that "[n]otifications will not be generated, if ever, until the recipient opens his MUA e-mail client and takes some action with respect to the received mail." Id. col. 15 ll. 46-49 (emphasis added). The specification further explains that "MUA notices may report, among other things, that a message has been read by a recipient . . . ." Id. col. 15 ll. 63-64 (emphasis added). Thus, the intrinsic record compels defining "recipient" in a manner that includes both the user and the device.
Finally, GoDaddy proposes that "recipient" should be defined with the limitation "at its intended destination" but did not explain this modification in its briefing or during the Markman Hearing. See (Doc. 117 at 15-16). The Court finds this phrase to be ambiguous and therefore does not incorporate it in the construction.
For these reasons, the Court construes "sender" as "a combination of (1) the user that caused the computerized device to originate the message and (2) the computerized device itself" and "recipient" as "a combination of (1) the user that the sender intends to receive the message and (2) the computerized device that receives the message."
RPost argues that "originating processor" and "recipient processor" need not be construed because the terms are used according to their plain and ordinary meanings. (Doc. 191-1 at 7). Alternatively, RPost proffers that "originating processor" be construed as "a computing device where the message originates" and "recipient processor" as "a computing device where the recipient receives the message." (Id.) RPost explains that a skilled artisan would understand that electronic messages can be "sent and received using computing devices other than computers." (Doc. 119 at 9).
GoDaddy proposes the same respective constructions as it did for "sender" (Term No. 19) and "recipient" (Term No. 20). See (Doc. 191-1 at 7). Thus, GoDaddy defines "processor" as "computer." (Id.)
RPost attacks GoDaddy's proposal for "originating processor" as being "too narrow because it requires that the computer itself originate the message and excludes the [far] more . . . likely case of a user originating a message at a computer." (Docs. 114 at 14; 119 at 9). RPost also claims that GoDaddy's proposed language "at its intended destination" is flawed because it is unclear what such a limitation actually connotes in the electronic message context. (Docs. 114 at 14; 119 at 9).
These two terms are used in the `104 and `389 Patents as follows:
`104 Patent col. 31 ll. 20-32 (emphasis added).
`389 Patent col. 28 ll. 33-52 (emphasis added).
To begin, the Court finds that the jury would be aided by defining these terms. RPost's own argument proves construction is necessary. Namely, there is a semantical dispute as to whether the "originating processor" is a device "that" originates the message or if it is "where" the message originates. Likewise, there is a dispute whether the "recipient processor" is "where" the message is received by the recipient or if it is a device "that" receives the message. Absent construction, the jury could be confused on these issues.
In light of the Court's construction of "sender," the Court concludes that "originating processor" is "where" the message originates. A combination of the user interfacing with the originating processor originates the message, and this occurs at the originating processor. Thus, the Court adopts this portion of RPost's alternative proposal.
Conversely, the Court finds that "recipient processor" is best understood as the device "that" receives the message for the recipient. Unlike when a message originates through an interaction between the user and originating processor, when a message is received, it is the processor—not the user—"that" receives the message. The user may open the electronic message at the processor, but it is the processor that receives the message.
Finally, the Court must resolve whether "processor" should be construed as "computing device" or "computer." RPost complains that "computer" is too narrow, while GoDaddy laments that "computing device" is too vague. To resolve this dispute, the Court looks to how a skilled artisan would view the term "processor." On one hand, a skilled artisan would recognize that "processor" means a "computer," a "central processing unit" ("CPU"), or a "program that translates another program into a form acceptable by the computer being used." See Am. Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1398 (4th ed. 2006). On the other hand, a skilled artisan would also appreciate "CPU" to mean "the device that interprets and executes instructions." Microsoft Computer Dictionary 92 (5th ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
On balance, the Court finds that because the plain meaning of "processor" includes "computer," the word "computer" should be assimilated in the construction. However, it appears that a skilled artisan would understand that other types of devices with processors could send and receive messages. The Court, therefore, construes "originating processor" as "the computerized device where the message originates" and "recipient processor" as "the computerized device that receives the message."
The crux of the parties' disagreement over Term No. 23 is whether the phrase is limiting upon the claim. Because the phrase is found only in the preamble of Claim 7 of the `389 Patent, RPost contends that it is not limiting because it does not give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim. (Doc. 114 at 14). RPost argues that the inventor simply used the phrase to "state the purpose or intended use of the claimed system" and that the body of the claim is "structurally complete." (Id.)
In contrast, GoDaddy proffers a construction of "providing evidence that confirms receipt of the message by the recipient, the evidence providing a legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Doc. 117 at 10).
Whether a preamble limits a claimed invention is a question of law and is "resolved only on review of the entire patent to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim." Catalina Mktg., Int'l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 807-08 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). A preamble may limit the invention if it "recites essential structure or steps, or if it is `necessary to give life, meaning and vitality' to the claim." Id. (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). "When the preamble is essential to understand limitations or terms in the claim body, the preamble limits claim scope." Id. (citing Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1306).
Conversely, a preamble is not limiting "where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention." Id. (citing Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Furthermore, "preamble language merely extolling benefits or features of the claimed invention does not limit the claim scope without clear reliance on those benefits or features as patentably significant." Id. at 809 (citations omitted).
Finally, "preambles describing the use of an invention generally do not limit the claims because the patentability of apparatus or composition claims depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure." Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, "[t]he inventor of a machine is entitled to the benefit of all the uses to which it can be put, no matter whether he had conceived the idea of the use or not." Id. (quotation omitted). "Again, statements of intended use or asserted benefits in the preamble may, in rare instances, limit apparatus claims, but only if the applicant clearly and unmistakably relied on those uses or benefits to distinguish prior art." Id.
Term No. 23 appears only in the preamble of Claim 7 of the `389 Patent. Claim 7, in its entirety, reads:
`389 Patent col. 28 ll. 33-52 (emphasis added). The question before the Court is whether "providing proof of receipt of the message by the recipient processor" is necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to Claim 7 or else recites essential steps or structure.
As GoDaddy observes, unlike the rest of the asserted claims in the Tomkow Patents, Claim 7 does not include any "authentication" terminology. The invention's ability to authenticate, i.e., verify or prove, a certain aspect of a message—such as delivery or non-delivery—is necessary to differentiate the invention from prior art. In this regard, RPost argues that Claim 7 expresses "several proofs of receipt of the message, including `an indication of receipt of the message' and `a mail transport protocol dialog generated during transmission of the message.'" (Doc. 114 at 14-15).
As to the construction of Term No. 23, GoDaddy's proposal again requires the invention to provide proof with a "legal or other evidentiary status on par with, if not superior to, that of registered United States mail." (Doc. 191-1 at 8). As explained for Term Nos. 7 and 17, however, the Tomkow Patents do not impose that evidentiary limitation on its messages.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Term No. 23 limits Claim 7 of the `389 Patent and adopts a construction of: "proving that the message was received by the recipient processor."
RPost argues that "the link configured to execute when the message is opened at the recipient" should be construed as "the link programmed to execute when the message is opened at the recipient." (Doc. 191-1 at 8). RPost insists this slight modification is necessary to clarify for the jury that the term is "used in a computer programming sense." (Doc. 119 at 10).
GoDaddy responds that RPost has not shown that "configured" is synonymous with "programmed" and complains that RPost's proposal changes the scope of the claim term. (Doc. 117 at 16). Instead, GoDaddy contends that the phrase is "plain on its face" and needs no construction. (Id.)
As explained for Term Nos. 8 and 9, "configured" is a term that has a plain meaning that the jury will be able to understand. RPost has not shown that the term is used in a manner that is contrary to that plain meaning. Consequently, the Court does not construe Term No. 24.
For the twenty-fifth disputed term of the Tomkow Patents, RPost recommends a construction of "the server (being) logically displaced from the recipient (recipient processor)." (Doc. 191-1 at 8). RPost contends this construction will "clarify the meaning of the plain language of the claim[] for the benefit of the jury [and does] not otherwise change the meaning of the claim[]." (Doc. 114 at 15).
GoDaddy responds that RPost's proposed construction is not synonymous with the claim language and "changes the meaning and scope of the term." (Doc. 117 at 16). Instead, GoDaddy argues that no construction is needed because the term is used according to its plain and ordinary meaning. (Id.)
RPost replies that construing the term "displaced" as "logically displaced" would simplify for the jury that the server and recipient are separated "in a computer architecture sense but not necessarily physically separate." (Doc. 119 at 10).
This phrase is used in Claims 1 and 23 of the `104 Patent; Claims 1, 7, 14, and 15 of the `389 Patent; all asserted claims for the `199 Patent; and Claim 1 of the `198 Patent. For example, the `104 and `198 Patents claim:
`104 Patent col. 27 ll. 63-67 (emphasis added); see `198 Patent col. 28 ll. 6-10 (same).
RPost's proposal injects "logically" before the claim term "displaced." Contrary to RPost's argument, such a construction adds ambiguity to a readily understandable term. RPost has not shown that the jury would be confused as to the meaning of the generic term "displaced." Accordingly, the Court will not construe Term No. 25 and adopts GoDaddy's proposal of ordinary meaning.
RPost argues that the claim term "constructs" should be construed as "assembles" because such a construction would "clarify the meaning of the plain language of the claim[] for the benefit of the jury [and does] not otherwise change the meaning of the claim[]." (Doc. 114 at 15). Thus, RPost proffers a construction of: "the server assembles authenticatible information related to the message." (Doc. 191-1 at 8).
GoDaddy responds that RPost has not shown that "assembles" is synonymous with "constructs" and asks the Court to reject RPost's proposal. (Doc. 117 at 16). According to GoDaddy, "constructs" is a "readily-understood" term that the jury will be able to apply without further construction. (Id.)
RPost replies that its construction is necessary because it clarifies for the jury that "constructs" means the "assembling of information, such as described in the creation of a delivery receipt." (Doc. 119 at 10). At the Markman Hearing, RPost further explained its position by noting that the jury could misinterpret "constructs" as creating from new or from scratch, versus taking and assembling information that already exists. According to RPost, "constructs" as used in the `104 Patent does not require the server to create new information.
This disputed phrase is used in Claim 27 of the `104 Patent as follows:
`104 Patent col. 31 ll. 20-34 (emphasis added).
The Court agrees with GoDaddy that RPost failed to show that "constructs" should be construed as "assembles." The Meriam-Webster Dictionary defines "construct" as "to make or form by combining or arranging parts or elements." The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/construct (last visited January 19, 2016). On the other hand, "assemble" is defined as "to bring together" or "to fit together the parts of." Id., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assemble (last visited January 19, 2016). As readily seen, these two words have different meanings.
As used in Claim 27, "constructs" requires that the server take certain information and "construct" something else, namely, "authenticatible information." The server does not merely "assemble" the pre-existing information to form the authenticatible information. A simple example makes this distinction clear. When a builder "constructs" a backyard patio, he combines various pre-existing items—such as wood, paint, and nails—in a way that creates a new item comprised of the pre-existing items: the patio. If the builder simply were to "assemble" the wood, paint, and nails by gathering them into one place, without more, he would have "constructed" nothing.
Here, Claim 27 does not merely state that the server "assembles" together various forms of pre-existing information, but claims that the server "constructs authenticatible information." Because RPost has not shown that the inventor unequivocally chose to define "constructs" in a manner different from the term's plain meaning, the Court rejects RPost's proposed construction and does not construe the term. See Omega Eng'g, 334 F.3d at 1324.
RPost urges the Court to adopt the construction of this phrase as crafted by Judge Gilstrap. (Doc. 114 at 13). Judge Gilstrap reasoned that the claim and specification language make clear that the patent's objective is to provide "evidence" that "can" be used by the sender to later prove aspects related to the dispatch. See RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *7-8. Espousing this reasoning, RPost contends that "authenticating a dispatch and contents of the dispatch" should be construed as "provide evidence capable of being used to prove the contents of the dispatch." (Doc. 114 at 13).
GoDaddy responds that RPost's proposed construction is flawed in multiple respects. (Doc. 117 at 17). First, GoDaddy explains that RPost's construction forsakes the "conjunctive structure" of the phrase. (Id.) Namely, by providing evidence concerning only the contents of the dispatch, GoDaddy argues that RPost's construction reads out claim language requiring proof that the message was dispatched. (Id.) Second, GoDaddy contends that RPost's construction is "too loose" a standard for the higher level of "proof" purportedly embodied in the Feldbau Patent. (Id.) GoDaddy therefore proposes a construction of "proving the contents and the receipt of a dispatch by using reliable evidence on par with that used to notarize documents or to admit as evidence in a court of law." (Id.)
RPost replies that GoDaddy's proposed construction improperly incorporates limitations from the specification into the claim. (Doc. 119 at 10).
The phrase "authenticating a dispatch and contents of the dispatch" is disclosed in Claims 60 and 82 of the Feldbau Patent. Claim 60 discloses:
`219 Patent col. 2 ll. 56-col. 3 ll. 7 (amended version) (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are shown with additions underlined; deletions in bolded square brackets; italics added for emphasis). Similarly, Claim 82 discloses:
Id. col. 4 ll. 4-18 (emphasis added).
Initially, the Court agrees with Judge Gilstrap that the specification makes clear that "authenticating"—as the term is used by the Feldbau Patent—merely means storing evidence of the dispatch and its content without simultaneous verification or validation of the dispatch and its content. For example, the specification describes the Feldbau Patent's objective as providing "evidence" that "can" be used by the sender:
`219 Patent col. 2 ll. 57-61 (emphasis added). The specification also discloses:
Id. col. 5 ll. 63-col. 6 ll. 6 (emphasis added). The Court therefore rejects GoDaddy's argument that "authenticating" should be construed as "proving."
Moreover, as Judge Gilstrap explained, to "authenticate" a message, the invention does not speak in terms of the recipient's "receipt" of the message. See RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *7-9. Rather, the claim relates only to the "dispatch" of the information while "receipt" is part of the later optional aspect of "verification." Id. Thus, the Court rejects GoDaddy's proposal of "proving the . . . receipt of a dispatch."
On the other hand, the Court gives credence to GoDaddy's argument that the phrase "authenticating the dispatch and contents of the dispatch" is facially conjunctive. The specification emphasizes the conjunctive nature of the claim by disclosing that the invention will "provide the sender with evidence he can use to prove both the dispatch and its contents."`219 Patent col. 2 ll. 60-61 (emphasis added); see id. col. 3 ll. 22-24 ("Thus, the present invention provides a sender with the capability to prove both the dispatch and the contents of the dispatched materials." (emphasis added)). Providing evidence capable of proving both the dispatch and its contents is plainly the objective of the Feldbau Patent and distinguishes the invention from prior art. See id. col. 2 ll. 30-42; id. col. 2 ll. 50-53. Accordingly, the Court's construction requires that the invention provide evidence that "can" be used to prove both (1) the dispatch itself and (2) the contents of the dispatch.
GoDaddy also contends that, as embodied by the Feldbau Patent, the quality of evidence provided by the invention must rise to a higher level of "proof" than mere "evidence." (Doc. 117 at 17). To supports its argument, GoDaddy references the entirety of the specification's Background of the Invention and Summary of the Present Invention. (Id. (citing `219 Patent col. 1 ll. 30-col. 2 ll. 17; id. col. 2 ll. 50-col. 4 ll. 39)). RPost responds that such a construction would improperly read limitations from the specification into the claim, and, in any event, rejects the contention that GoDaddy's proposed limitation language is even disclosed in the specification. (Doc. 119 at 10).
The Court agrees with RPost that GoDaddy's proposal requiring the claimed "evidence" to be "reliable evidence on par with that used to notarize documents or to admit as evidence in the court of law" would improperly import limitations from the specification into the claim. Throughout the claims, the inventor chose merely to claim "evidence" or "proof," not the higher level of proof that GoDaddy contends is embodied in the specification. For example, the specification discloses:
`219 Patent col. 2 ll. 57-61 (emphasis added). The section of the specification upon which GoDaddy so heavily relies does not convince the Court that the inventor chose to forego the broader meaning of the term "evidence" by limiting the term to "reliable evidence on par with that used to notarize documents or to admit as evidence in the court of law." Specifically, the Background of the Invention merely provides the reader with context as to the state of the present art, see id. col. 1 ll. 30-col. 2 ll. 17, while the Summary of the Present Invention is best understood as offering an example of how the evidence might be used, see id. col. 2 ll. 50-col. 4 ll. 39. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 ("To avoid importing limitations from the specification into the claims, it is important to keep in mind that the purposes of the specification are to teach and enable those of skill in the art to make and use the invention and to provide a best mode for doing so."). These disclosures do not evidence the inventor's "clear disavowal" of claim scope. See Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (quoting Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325).
In fact, these portions of the specification provide additional support that the inventor intended only to claim the term "evidence." See id. col. 2 ll. 50-56 ("The literature does not provide a comprehensive solution that directly addresses the problem in question: what information has been sent to whom and when. Accordingly, there is a need for a method and system to provide the sender with a convenient means for authenticating both the dispatch and the contents of the documents, electronic information and other information during the normal flow of daily activities."); id. col. 3 ll. 22-24 ("Thus, the present invention provides a sender with the capability to prove both the dispatch and the contents of the dispatched materials."). The distinguishing feature of the invention concerns not—as GoDaddy asserts—the quality of the evidence, but the combination of providing evidence capable of being used to prove both the dispatch and its contents.
For these reasons, the Court construes "authenticating a dispatch and contents of the dispatch" as "providing evidence that is capable of being used to prove both the dispatch and the contents of the dispatch."
The parties agree that the majority of Judge Gilstrap's construction of "authentication data" should be adopted, but RPost proposes a modified construction due to a difference in the asserted claims. RPost argues that the term should be construed as "information that is associated with the contents of the dispatch by generating a representation of at least content data, an indicia of a time of successful transmission of the dispatch to the recipient, and an indicia relating to the destination of the dispatch, the representation comprising one or more elements." (Doc. 114 at 16). In contrast, GoDaddy parrots Judge Gilstrap's construction of "information that is associated with the contents of the dispatch by generating a representation of at least a1, a2, and a3, the representation comprising one or more elements." (Doc. 117 at 17).
RPost replies that GoDaddy's construction is flawed because Claim 30—where a1, a2, and a3 are defined—was being asserted in the dispute before Judge Gilstrap but has not been asserted against GoDaddy here. (Doc. 119 at 11). Because a1, a2, and a3 have not been defined by an asserted claim, RPost argues that construing this term with "a1, a2, and a3" would only confuse the jury. (Id.) RPost therefore proposes a construction that replaces the a1, a2, and a3 language with the elements as listed in the asserted claims. (Id.)
The term "authentication data" is used in Claims 60 and 82 of the Feldbau Patent. Claim 60 states as follows:
`219 Patent col. 2 ll. 56-col. 3 ll. 13 (amended version) (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are shown with additions underlined and deletions in bolded square brackets; italics added for emphasis). The term is also used in Claim 82 as follows:
Id. col. 4 ll. 4-39 (emphasis added).
While GoDaddy proposes Judge Gilstrap's exact construction, it goes without saying that "a1, a2, and a3" do not appear in either Claim 60 or 82. GoDaddy insists, nonetheless, that because the specification discloses a1, a2, and a3, the jury will understand that together these three elements compose "authentication data." (Doc. 117 at 18). The only portion of the specification that GoDaddy cites for its argument is the Abstract, which states:
`219 Patent (57). Two other portions of the specification disclose elements a1, a2, and a3, but both expressly relate to other claims. See id. col. 2 ll. 62-col. 3 ll. 20 (relating to Claim 1); id. col. 3 ll. 37-49 (relating to Claim 27). Two other claims—Claim 1 and Claim 30—include elements a1, a2, and a3 with accompanying definitions, but RPost does not assert either claim here. See `219 Patent col. 1 ll. 26-45, col. 2 ll. 11-27 (amended version).
When interpreting a term, the Court begins with the particular claim language used in the patent. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Here, Claims 60 and 82 expressly disclose the types of information that are "associated" together to "generate authentication data." Id. col. 3 ll. 1-7, col. 4 ll. 31-36. In generalized terms, this information includes content data and certain indicia related to transmission of the dispatch. Id. Claims 60 and 82 do not, however, mention or refer to elements a1, a2, and a3.
The Court's next step is to review the specification. See Compuserve, 256 F.3d at 1331. The only reference in the specification to the a1, a2, and a3 terms is found in the Abstract. Beyond remaining faithful to Judge Gilstrap's construction, GoDaddy provides no other reason for the Court to stray from the express limitation language used in Claims 60 and 82 in order to introduce "a1, a2, and a3"—terminology that is not incorporated in either asserted claim and is referenced only once in the specification—into the construction. The Court finds that, in the context of this case, using elements "a1, a2, and a3" to define "authentication data" would be confusing and overall unhelpful to the jury. Thus, the Court rejects GoDaddy's proposed construction.
At the Markman Hearing, GoDaddy argued that RPost's proposed construction is "broader" than Judge Gilstrap's construction because it would allow "authentication data" to include information not authorized by the Patent. Regarding RPost's proposed construction elements of "content data" and "indicia relating to the destination of the dispatch," the Court finds no merit in GoDaddy's argument because both elements are appropriated verbatim from Claims 60 and 82.
Claims 60 and 82 do, however, expressly limit "indicia of a time of successful transmission of the dispatch to the recipient." Specifically, the "time related indicia must be recorded by an authenticator and provided in a manner resistant to or indicative of tampering by either of the sender and the recipient."`219 Patent col. 2 ll. 64-67, col. 4 ll. 27-30 (amended version) (emphasis added). The Court agrees with GoDaddy that this element as currently listed in RPost's proposal is too broad because it does not account for these limitations.
For these reasons, the Court construes "authentication data" as "information that is associated with the contents of the dispatch by generating a representation of at least (1) content data; (2) an indicia of a time of successful transmission of the dispatch to the recipient, said indicia being recorded by an authenticator and provided in a manner that is resistant to or indicative of tampering by either sender or recipient; and (3) an indicia relating to the destination of the dispatch; where the representation is comprised of one or more elements."
The parties' primary dispute over the term "dispatch record data" concerns the breadth of the term. RPost asserts that the term should be broadly interpreted as "information relating to the dispatch." (Doc. 114 at 16). GoDaddy, on the other hand, proposes a narrower construction: "data recorded by the authenticator during the transmission of the dispatch, which includes at least the time related indicia and the indicia relating to the destination of the dispatch, and which does not include the content data representative of the contents of the dispatch." (Doc. 117 at 18).
In reply, RPost argues that because the four limitations in GoDaddy's construction are already recited in the claim, incorporating them in the construction would be redundant and unnecessary. (Doc. 119 at 11 (citing various cases)).
The term "dispatch record data" is disclosed in Claims 60 and 82 and their dependent claims. Claim 60 states as follows:
`219 Patent col. 2 ll. 56-col. 3 ll. 7 (amended version) (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are shown with additions underlined and deletions in bolded square brackets; italics added for emphasis). Similarly, Claim 82 discloses:
Id. col. 4 ll. 4-36 (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are shown with additions underlined and deletions in bolded square brackets; italics added for emphasis).
GoDaddy's proposed construction includes four limitations, requiring dispatch record data to: (1) be recorded by the authenticator during the transmission of the dispatch, include both (2) time related indicia and (3) indicia relating to the destination of the dispatch, and (4) not include the content data representative of the contents of the dispatch. (Doc. 117 at 18). It is clear that the claim language already limits "dispatch record data" by GoDaddy's second, third, and fourth proposed limitations. On this point, RPost observes that several courts have spurned—on "redundancy" grounds— constructions that incorporate language from the claim itself. (Doc. 119 at 11 (citing Interdigital Commuc'ns., Inc. v. ZTE Corp., 2014 WL 3908771, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 8, 2014); Asetek Holdings, Inc. v. Coolit Sys., 2013 WL 6327691, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); Ferring B.V. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 2013 WL 499158, at *7 (D. Nev. Feb. 6, 2013)). As noted above, however, the Federal Circuit rejected the robotic application of such a stringent rule. See 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[Plaintiff] argues that because those functions are set forth expressly in the claim, it would be `redundant and unnecessary' to incorporate them into the construction of `location facility.' However, [Plaintiff] has not cited, and we have not discovered, any authority for the proposition that construction of a particular claim term may not incorporate claim language circumscribing the meaning of the term. The claim language makes clear that the location facility in fact does perform the functions in question. The district court correctly incorporated those functions into its claim construction."). Thus, RPost's "redundancy" argument, while persuasive, is not binding on the Court.
Regarding GoDaddy's first limitation that dispatch record data must be "recorded by the authenticator during the transmission of the dispatch," the Court finds that such a limitation is not warranted given the claim language. Specifically, the claim requires only that "time related indicia" be recorded by the authenticator during the transmission of the dispatch. See `219 Patent col. 2 ll. 63-67 (amended version). The "recorded by the authenticator" limitation does not relate to all forms of "dispatch record data," which, as GoDaddy points out, is comprised of at least "time related indicia" and "an indicia relating to the destination of the dispatch." See id. col. 3 ll. 3-5, col. 4 ll. 31-34. In other words, Claims 60 and 82 do not require that "indicia relating to the destination of the dispatch" be recorded by the authenticator. Consequently, the Court rejects this portion of GoDaddy's proposed construction.
As to GoDaddy's second and third proposed limitations, the Court concludes that it unnecessary to construe "dispatch record data" as including at least indicia relating to the time and destination of the dispatch. The sentence from which GoDaddy lifts this unambiguous language follows immediately behind the term "dispatch record data" in the claims. See id. col. 3 ll. 3-5, col. 4 ll. 27-30. It is therefore apparent from the claim language that "dispatch record data" must include both indicia.
Regarding GoDaddy's fourth proposed limitation, however, the Court finds that the claim language does not clearly articulate that "dispatch data" and "content data" are distinct types of data. Further, RPost's proposal is vague because it fails to distinguish between (1) data that concerns the event of the dispatch and (2) data that relates to the contents of the dispatch. The jury would be aided by including this portion of GoDaddy's proposal in the construction.
For these reasons, the Court construes "dispatch record data" as "information relating to the dispatch but not relating to content data representative of the contents of the dispatch."
The parties' proposed constructions for the next phrase are again quite similar. RPost urges the Court to adopt Judge Gilstrap's construction of "data that represents the time at which the dispatcher forwarded the dispatch for delivery such that the recipient may later be able to receive the dispatch and where the data is obtained without any cooperation from the recipient." (Doc. 114 at 16-17).
GoDaddy responds that while the majority of Judge Gilstrap's construction is correct, two slight modifications should be incorporated: "data that represents the actual time at which the dispatcher completed transmission of the dispatch for delivery, such that the recipient may later be able to receive the dispatch and where the data is obtained without any cooperation from the recipient." (Doc. 117 at 18-19) (emphasis added).
RPost replies that Judge Gilstrap expressly rejected both of GoDaddy's proposed revisions and asks this Court to do the same. (Doc. 119 at 11).
This phrase is disclosed in Claim 60 as follows:
`219 Patent, col. 2 ll. 56-67 (amended version) (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are shown with additions underlined and deletions in bolded square brackets; italics added for emphasis).
While both of the parties' proposed constructions are substantially based on Judge Gilstrap's construction, GoDaddy proposes two alterations. First, GoDaddy argues that the "indicia" must indicate the "actual time" at which the dispatch was forwarded, not merely the "time." (Doc. 117 at 18-19). Second, GoDaddy asserts that the "indicia" must express when the dispatcher "completed transmission of the dispatch for delivery," rather than when the dispatcher "forwarded the dispatch for delivery." (Id.)
Judge Gilstrap expressly rejected GoDaddy's proposed construction of "actual time" and so does this Court. See RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *21. The Court agrees with Judge Gilstrap that if "time" were construed as "actual time," such a construction could be read too narrowly by the finder of fact as requiring absolute proof. Id.
Moreover, the Court agrees with Judge Gilstrap's construction of "forwarded the dispatch for delivery." As Judge Gilstrap explained, the claim language of "successful transmission" is focused on the relevant time at which the "dispatch was released from the control of the non-interested third party." Id. GoDaddy proposes that "successful transmission" should be construed as "completed transmission," but offers no compelling reason to justify this revision of Judge Gilstrap's construction. In any event, the Court finds that construing "successful transmission" as "completed transmission" does little to aid the jury's understanding of the term.
For these reasons, the Court adopts Judge Gilstrap's construction and construes "an indicia of time of successful transmission of the dispatch to the recipient" to mean "data that represents the time at which the dispatcher forwarded the dispatch for delivery such that the recipient may later be able to receive the dispatch and where the data is obtained without any cooperation from the recipient."
RPost requests that the Court adopt Judge Gilstrap's conclusion that "sender" and "recipient" are readily understandable terms requiring no construction. (Doc. 114 at 17).
GoDaddy responds that the terms should be defined as "the computer that originates the message" and "the computer that receives the dispatch at its intended destination," respectively. (Doc. 117 at 19).
In reply, RPost complains that GoDaddy's arguments conflict with the intrinsic record because such constructions would improperly define the terms with the "same meaning as originating processor and recipient processor from the Tomkow Patents" without justification. (Doc. 119 at 11-12).
The terms "sender" and "recipient" are found in all asserted claims of the Feldbau Patent. A few examples include:
`219 Patent col. 2 ll. 56-col. 4 ll. 12 (amended version) (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are shown with additions underlined; italics added for emphasis).
The Court finds that the terms "sender" and "recipient" have "plain and ordinary meanings." However, "[a] determination that a claim term `needs no construction' or has a `plain and ordinary meaning' may be inadequate when a term has more than one `ordinary' meaning or when reliance on a term's `ordinary' meaning does not resolve the parties' dispute." O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361. GoDaddy correctly posits that "sender" and "recipient" have "ordinary" meanings that include natural persons—a method of transmission not asserted against GoDaddy. (Doc. 117 at 19). For this reason, the Court agrees that construction is necessary because the "plain and ordinary meanings" of these terms "do not resolve the parties' dispute." See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361.
The Court now turns to defining the terms. GoDaddy proffers constructions that define "sender" and "recipient" as "computers." (Id.) RPost replies that such constructions would be unduly narrow as the asserted claims do not limit "sender" and "recipient" to only "computers," but allow for other types of computerized devices. (Doc. 119 at 11-12). In this regard, the Court agrees with RPost. The asserted claims are not limited to "computers" per se but leave available the use of other forms of computerized devices. See, e.g., `219 Patent col. 4 ll. 4-8 (
Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that limiting "sender" as the computerized device that "originates" the dispatch is appropriate. GoDaddy's proposed construction requires that the "computer" itself "originate" the dispatch, possibly leading to the conclusion that the user interfacing with the computer does not create the message. Thus, the Court's construction will clarify that "sender" incorporates some level of user intervention to originate a message.
Finally, the Court finds that GoDaddy's proposed limitation "at its intended destination" regarding the "recipient" is vague and requires the jury to engage in unnecessary additional inquiry.
For these reasons, the Court construes "sender" as "a combination of (1) the user that caused the computerized device to originate the dispatch and (2) the computerized device itself" and "recipient" as "a combination of (1) the user that the sender intends to receive the message and (2) the computerized device that receives the message."
The parties' next dispute centers on whether "processor for associating" is subject to means-plus-function ("MPF") claim construction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(6). RPost argues that "processor for associating" need not be construed because the term has a plain and ordinary meaning that the jury will be able to understand and apply. (Doc. 114 at 17-18). RPost additionally contends that because the disputed phrase does not include the term "means," there is a presumption that the patentee did not engage in MPF claiming. (Id.) RPost explains that the phrase recites sufficient structure—a processor—that "is a well-known reference in the electrical arts to a microprocessor or microcontroller and connotes structure." (Id.) If the Court were to determine that "processor" does require MPF claim construction, RPost asserts that the specification discloses corresponding structures—controller 56 and function executor 102—and algorithms that make the term definite. (Id.; Doc. 119 at 12).
GoDaddy responds that despite the absence of the word "means" in the claim, "processor for associating" is still subject to MPF claim construction because it "fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function." (Doc. 117 at 19-20). Pursuant to the two-step approach to MPF claim construction, GoDaddy proposes that the claim's function is "associating the content data with dispatch record data and generating the authentication data." (Doc. 117 at 15). As to corresponding structure, however, GoDaddy argues the claim is indefinite because if fails to disclose adequate corresponding structure for the claimed functions via an algorithm. (Id.)
MPF claim construction is necessary when a patent claim term is drafted in a manner that invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(6),
35 U.S.C. § 112(6) (emphasis added). By enacting this statute, "Congress struck a balance between allowing patentees to express a claim limitation by reciting a function to be performed rather than by reciting structure for performing that function, while placing specific constraints on how such a limitation is to be construed." Williamson v. Citrix Online, LCC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Namely, scope of coverage of the claimed functions is limited only to the corresponding structure, materials, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. See Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The Federal Circuit has long held that use of the word "means" within a claim is significant in the analysis of whether a claim limitation should be interpreted in accordance with § 112(6). Specifically, there is a "rebuttable presumption" that § 112(6) applies when the claim language includes the word "means," and a similar "rebuttable presumption" that § 112(6) does not apply when "means" is absent from the claim term. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347-49.
To determine whether the presumption has been rebutted, the Court must consult relevant intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. See Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("In cases where the claims do not recite the term `means,' considering intrinsic and extrinsic evidence is usually helpful, as the litigated issue often reduces to whether skilled artisans, after reading the patent, would conclude that a claim limitation is so devoid of structure that the drafter constructively engaged in [MPF] claiming."); Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that courts must consider the entire intrinsic record when assessing whether a claim term invokes § 112(6)).
The term "processor for associating" is disclosed in Claim 82 as follows:
`219 Patent col. 4 ll. 4-41 (amended version) (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are shown with additions underlined and deletions in bolded square brackets; italics added for emphasis).
To begin, the term "processor for associating" does not include the word "means." Therefore, there is a rebuttable presumption that the term is not subject to § 112(6). The question before the Court is whether that presumption has been overcome. Specifically, the Court must determine whether the term "processor" (1) fails to "recite sufficiently definite structure" or (2) recites "function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function." Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (citations omitted).
RPost argues that "processor" has a sufficiently definite meaning because the term "is a well-known reference in the electrical arts to a microprocessor or microcontroller and connotes structure." (Doc. 114 at 17-18). GoDaddy's argument concentrates not on the initial inquiry of whether the term itself recites sufficient structure to avert § 112(6), but assumes that § 112(6) applies and explains that computer-related claim limitations "must include the algorithm needed to transform the general purpose computer or processor disclosed in the specification into the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm—or else be indefinite." (Doc. 117 at 19-20).
In support of its argument, GoDaddy relies on Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Aristocrat, however, the disputed claim included the term "control means," which both parties agreed invoked § 112(6). 521 F.3d at 1331. The court applied traditional MPF claim construction principals, requiring the scope of the claim limitation to be defined by the structure disclosed in the specification plus any equivalents of that structure. See id. The patent-holder argued the structure corresponding to the recited functions was a standard microprocessor-based gaming machine with appropriate programming. See id. The Federal Circuit held,
Id. at 1333 (emphasis added). GoDaddy's argument is based on the reverse legal theory, arguing that if "processor" is an insufficient structure to define the scope of an MPF limitation, it cannot describe sufficient structure when recited directly in a claim limitation itself. See (Doc. 117 at 19-20).
The Court is not persuaded that Aristocrat is applicable or binding in this case. Initially, Aristocrat analyzed claim language that expressly used the term "means," and as such, there was a presumption that MPF claim limitations were at issue. In fact, the parties stipulated that the term invoked § 112(6). The Aristocrat rule that GoDaddy argues should apply here was therefore derived from a determination as to whether sufficient structure was disclosed in the specification so as to avoid a finding of indefiniteness. GoDaddy is effectively treating as equivalent the standard used to prove sufficient structure to avoid MPF treatment initially, with the standard used to identify corresponding structure in the specification when MPF construction is necessary. GoDaddy does not cite any cases that apply Aristocrat in this manner, and other courts have declined to do so. See eWinWin, Inc. v. Groupon, Inc., 2011 WL 6012194, at *14-15 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2011) (declining to apply Aristocrat to find that "computer code" was written as an MPF limitation, and noting that "the law on this issue goes both ways, and the Federal Circuit has not had an opportunity to take a clear stance on facts similar to those in the instant case"); Markem-Imaje Corp. v. Zipher Ltd., 2011 WL 5837087, at *4 n.7 (D.N.H. Nov. 21, 2011) ("The structural disclosure required in the specification when a party chooses to employ [MPF] claiming is not the same structural disclosure required to avoid [MPF] treatment."); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 756 F.Supp.2d 938, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (noting that Aristocrat only applies when § 112(6) has been invoked).
For the first inquiry of the Williamson analysis, the Federal Circuit only requires— contrary to GoDaddy's argument—that the claim recite some structure to avoid § 112(6) and has repeatedly rejected as "unduly restrictive" the argument that "specific structure" is necessary. See Lighting World, 382 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Williamson, 792 F.3d 1339. For example, the Federal Circuit explained:
Id. (citing Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Apex Inc. v. Raritan Comput., Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Watts, 232 F.3d at 880; Personalized Media Commc'ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 704-05 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added). While the term "processor" may not bring to mind a specific structure, that point is not dispositive for this first inquiry. See Personalized Media Commc'ns, 161 F.3d at 704 ("[N]either the fact that a `detector' is defined in terms of its function, nor the fact that the term `detector' does not connote a precise physical structure in the minds of those of skill in the art detracts from the definiteness of structure."). What is important is whether "processor" is a term that is understood to describe structure, as opposed to a term that is simply a nonce word not recognized as the name of structure and merely substitutes for "means for." Id.
In this case, the Court finds that "processor," albeit a term that might cover a broad class of structures, designates at least some structure. For example, one technical dictionary defines "processor" as "a device that (a) executes instructions, usually automatically and under computer program control, and (b) consists of at least an instruction control unit and an arithmetic unit." Martin H. Weik, Fiber Optics Standard Dictionary 789 (3d ed. 1997); see also American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1398 (4th ed. 2006) (defining "processor" as "2. Computer Science
The Court agrees with RPost that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that "processor" encompasses a microprocessor or microcontroller—structural terms. While "processor" "does not connote a precise physical structure in the minds of those of skill in the art[, that does not] detract[] from the definiteness of structure." Personalized Media Commc'ns, 161 F.3d at 704 (citing Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583).
Although the Court concludes that the term "processor" connotes at least some structure, this does not end the Williamson analysis. The Federal Circuit also allows a challenger to overcome the presumption against application of § 112(6) if the claim recites "function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function." Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Watts, 232 F.3d at 880). Here, Claim 82 provides that the "processor" is "for associating the content data with dispatch record data which includes at least said time related indicia and an indicia relating to the destination of the dispatch, to generate authentication data."`219 Patent col. 4 ll. 31-36 (amended version). Thus, the Court must determine whether "processor" connotes "sufficient structure for performing" the claimed associating and generating functions.
The Court first reviews how one skilled in the art would understand "processor" as used in Claim 82. Based on a review of dictionary definitions, the Court concludes that a skilled artisan would not recognize "processor" as a name of a sufficiently definite structure for "associating" two distinct types of data in order to "generate" a third class of data. Rather, one skilled in the art would understand "processor" to mean a general purpose computer, a central processing unit ("CPU"), or a program that translates another program into a form acceptable by the computer being used. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1398.
Of course, if the functions performed by the processor are functions typically found in a commercially available off-the-shelf processor, then a skilled artisan might understand the term "processor" to provide sufficient structure for performing those functions. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig. ("Katz"), 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that functions such as "processing," "receiving," and "storing" that can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming do not require disclosure of more structure than the general purpose processor that performs those functions). In this case, however, the Court concludes that "associating" two sets of data in order to "generate" a third set of data is not a typical function found in a general purpose processor and requires additional programming of the processor to implement. Accordingly, the claimed "processor" alone is not sufficient structure to perform the functions in Claim 82.
Finally, the term "processor" is different from claim terms "circuit" and "circuitry," which the Federal Circuit has found to denote sufficiently definite structure to avoid application of § 112(6). See Mass. Inst. of Tech. & Elec. for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software ("MIT"), 462 F.3d 1344, 1354-56 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Linear Tech., 379 F.3d at 1320-21; Apex, 325 F.3d at 1374. These decisions hold that the term "circuit" coupled with a description in the claims of the circuit's operation generally conveys the structural arrangement of the circuit's components. See MIT, 462 F.3d at 1355; Linear Tech., 379 F.3d at 1320; Apex, 325 F.3d at 1373. In this case, however, the claimed "processor" and other claim language does not convey to a skilled artisan anything about the internal components, structure, or specific operation of the processor.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the term "processor" as used in Claim 82 is a term that would not be understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan as having sufficient structure for performing the recited functions of "associating the content data with dispatch record data . . . to generate the authentication data" and therefore invokes the application of § 112(6). See Ex parte Smith, No. 2012-007631, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/ex_parte_smith_ fd2012007631.pdf (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2013) (holding that the claim "a processor . . . programmed to . . . generate an opinion timeline" invoked § 112(6) because the claim recited function without sufficient structure to perform the function).
When § 112(6) applies to a claim, the Court follows a two-step construction approach. First, the Court identifies the particular claimed functions using traditional tools of claim construction. See Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Omega Eng'g, 334 F.3d at 1330. The Court may not adopt functions that are different from those explicitly recited in the claim language. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Second, the Court reviews the specification and identifies the corresponding structure that performs those functions. See Elekta, 344 F.3d at 1210. A disclosed structure is "`corresponding' . . . only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim," id. (quotation omitted), and only if the structure can perform the claimed function, see Cardiac Pacemakers, 296 F.3d at 1113. These inquiries are made from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 296 F.3d at 1113.
To avoid purely functional claiming in cases involving computer-implemented inventions, the Federal Circuit has "consistently required that the structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor." Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333. "Because general purpose computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very different ways, simply disclosing a computer as the structure designated to perform a particular function does not limit the scope of the claim to `the corresponding structure, material, or acts' that perform the function, as required by section 112 paragraph 6." Id. Thus, for a computer or processor-implemented claim limitation interpreted under § 112(6), the corresponding structure must disclose the algorithm needed to transform the disclosed general purpose computer or processor into the special purpose computer. Id. Failure to disclose the corresponding algorithm for a computer-implemented MPF term renders the claim indefinite. Id. at 1337-38.
An algorithm is a "sequence of computational steps to follow." Ibormeith IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 732 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). "For a claim to be definite, a recited algorithm . . . need not be so particularized as to eliminate the need for any implementation choices by a skilled artisan; but it must be sufficiently defined to render the bounds of the claim—declared by section 112(6) to cover the particular structure and its equivalents—understandable by the implementer." Id. (citing AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc'ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1245-46 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). An algorithm may be expressed as a mathematical formula, in prose, as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure. Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Nonetheless, the purported algorithm cannot "merely provide[] functional language" and must provide a "step-by-step procedure" for accomplishing the claimed function. Ergo Licensing, 673 F.3d at 1365. Further, "[i]t is well settled that simply disclosing software, however, without providing some detail about the means to accomplish the function, is not enough." Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted).
Finally, in a means-plus-function claim "in which the disclosed structure is a computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm, the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm." WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. Thus, "the corresponding structure for a § 112 ¶ 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification." Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed Cir. 2005).
The Court finds that GoDaddy's functionality proposal is supported by the claim language and accurately recites the function of the processor. See `219 Patent col. 4 ll. 31-36 (amended version). Thus, the Court construes the claim's function as "associating the content data with dispatch record data and generating the authentication data."
In its Opening Brief, RPost argues that the specification discloses two corresponding structures: "controller 56" and "function executor 102, which may be a Microchip Technology Inc.'s PIC16C5x series EPROM-based micro-controller." (Doc. 114 at 18). GoDaddy responds that the specification does not disclose a corresponding structure because no algorithm is provided that transforms the general purpose processor into a special purpose processor that can perform the claimed functions. (Doc. 117 at 19-20). Thus, GoDaddy contends that the claim is indefinite. (Id.)
RPost replies that the specification "discloses numerous mathematical formulas that may be used by function generator 102 to perform the claimed `associating.'" (Doc. 119 at 12 (citing `219 Patent col. 10 ll. 13-col. 13 ll. 7)).
Initially, the Court concludes that an algorithm must be disclosed in the specification. The processor's claimed functions are to "associate" data to "generate" authentication data. `219 Patent col. 4 ll. 31-36 (amended version). As discussed above, these functions cannot be performed solely by a general purpose computer or processor, but require a special purpose computer. See EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient structure only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other computer-implemented functions require disclosure of an algorithm."). Accordingly, the algorithm that transforms the general purpose processor into a special purpose processor that performs the claimed function is required. See Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333.
The relevant portions of the specification disclose:
`219 Patent col. 7 ll. 59-64.
Id. col. 10 ll. 13-col. 13 ll. 7 (brackets in original; italics added for emphasis).
Id. col. 13 ll. 8-41 (brackets in original; italics added for emphasis). RPost argues that the specification discloses two embodiments that perform the claimed functions: (1) controller 56 and (2) function executor 102, which may be a Microchip Technology Inc.'s PIC16C5x series EPROM-based micro-controller. (Doc. 114 at 17-18).
Regarding controller 56, the Court concludes that the specification does not disclose a sufficient algorithm for this embodiment. While an algorithm to perform the claimed function of "associating" has likely been disclosed for this embodiment, no algorithm has been disclosed for the second function of "generating." See `219 Patent col. 7 ll. 59-64. Specifically, the portion of the specification discussing controller 56 only speaks to "associating" data, but never discusses how controller 56 is to "generate" data. Nor does the specification relate controller 56 to the algorithms that function executor 102 has the capacity to perform. Because the algorithm must disclose how controller 56 performs all claimed functions, this embodiment does not disclose sufficient corresponding structure. See Media Rights, 800 F.3d at 1374 ("Where there are multiple claimed functions . . . the patentee must disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform all of the claimed functions." (citing Noah, 675 F.3d at 1318-19)).
As to function executor 102, however, the Court finds that the two methods of associating and generating data disclosed in the specification—"mathematical association" and "indirect association"—adequately set forth mathematical algorithms that perform the claim's functions of "associating" and "generating." See Noah, 675 F.3d at 1312 ("The specification can express the algorithm `in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.'" (quoting Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340)). Although the specification describes the associating and generating processes in lengthy detail, the algorithm for performing the two functions can be boiled down to the following section of the specification:
`219 Patent col. 10 ll. 25-29.
Specifically to Claim 82, the processor "associates" the content data with dispatch record data (set A) by applying mathematical association function (F) to "generate" authentication data (set B). The same foundational equation (i.e., B=F(A)) is used by both "mathematical association" and "indirect association," and both methods expound on the algorithm See id. col. 10 ll. 13-29; id. col. 12 ll. 55-col. 13 ll. 7. The specification also discloses various association functions, such as encryption and C.R.C. functions, which need not be recited in full here. Rather, for purposes of providing a "step-by-step procedure" that a skilled artisan would understand constitutes sufficient structure to perform the claimed functions, the recited mathematical algorithm satisfies that requirement. See EON Corp. IP Holdings, 785 F.3d at 624 (citing Noah, 675 F.3d at 1313); Ibormeith, 732 F.3d at 1379 ("For a claim to be definite, a recited algorithm . . . need not be so particularized as to eliminate the need for any implementation choices by a skilled artisan; but it must be sufficiently defined to render the bounds of the claim— declared by section 112(6) to cover the particular structure and its equivalents— understandable by the implementer." (citation omitted)).
Consequently, the Court rejects GoDaddy's argument that the claim is indefinite for lack of corresponding structure, see Cardiac Pacemakers, 296 F.3d at 1113-14 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Alternative embodiments may disclose different corresponding structure, and the claim is valid even if only one embodiment discloses corresponding structure." (citation omitted)), and construes the corresponding structure for this claim term as "a function executor 102, which may be a Microchip Technology Inc.'s PIC16C5x series EPROM-based micro-controller, that associates a set of information elements ("A") by applying an association function ("F") to generate another set of information elements ("B"), i.e., B=F(A); and its equivalents." See Ericsson, 417 F.3d at 1249 ("[T]he corresponding structure for a § 112 ¶ 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification.").
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that "processor for associating" is subject to § 112(6) thereby compelling MPF claim construction. The Court construes the claim's function to be: "associating the content data with dispatch record data and generating the authentication data." As to structure, the Court construes the claim's corresponding structure as: "a function executor 102, which may be a Microchip Technology Inc.'s PIC16C5x series EPROM-based micro-controller, that associates a set of information elements ("A") by applying an association function ("F") to generate another set of information elements ("B"), i.e., B=F(A); and its equivalents."
The parties agree that this phrase is subject to MPF claim construction pursuant to § 112(6) and stipulate as to the claim's functionality but dispute the corresponding structure. Namely, RPost asks the Court to adopt the corresponding structure as found by Judge Gilstrap: "(1) internal clock 50 (2) communications network server (3) Secure time generator 104 (4) Digital Notary System (DNS); and their equivalents." (Doc. 114 at 18).
GoDaddy contends the corresponding structure should be "a secure clock internal to the authenticator or a time stamping service such as the Digital Notary System (DNS) external to the authenticator that is secured from being set or modified by an interested party such as the sender." (Doc. 117 at 20). GoDaddy explains that "it agrees with RPost's construction with one exception: the time generator must be secured from being set or modified by an interested party such as the sender." (Id.) GoDaddy argues this limitation is "expressly recited" in the specification as part of the structure for providing the time source indicia. (Id.)
RPost replies that GoDaddy's construction excludes two express corresponding structures from the specification: communications network server and secure time generator 104. (Doc. 119 at 12). RPost further argues that GoDaddy's proposal limiting the time generator as "secured from being set or modified by an interested party such as the sender" is flawed because that limitation is "only mentioned in the specification describing the communication network server, not the other three structures." (Id.)
Because this claim is subject to § 112(6), the Court will apply the two step approach for MPF claim construction as set forth in Term No. 7.
This disputed phrase is found in Claim 82 as follows:
`219 Patent col. 4 ll. 4-30 (amended version) (amendments by Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate are shown with additions underlined and deletions in bolded square brackets; italics added for emphasis).
Because the parties do not dispute the functionality of this claim, the Court adopts the stipulated construction of "providing an indicia of a time of successful transmission of the dispatch to the destination receiving system, said time related indicia being recorded by the authenticator and provided in a manner resistant to or indicative of tampering by either of the sender and the recipient."
The Court has identified the following passages from the specification as disclosing corresponding structure for the claimed function:
`219 Patent col. 6 ll. 66-col. 7 ll. 3 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 7 ll. 12-28 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 13 ll. 8-18 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 16 ll. 60-col. 17 ll. 7 (brackets in original; italics added for emphasis).
As found by Judge Gilstrap, the specification discloses the following corresponding structures: internal clock 50, a communication network server, secure time generator 104, and a Time Stamping Service such as the Digital Notary System. GoDaddy does not dispute that an internal clock and a time stamping device should be incorporated in the corresponding structure, and states that it "agrees with RPost's construction with one exception: the time generator must be secured from being set or modified by an interested party such as the sender." (Doc. 117 at 20). GoDaddy's proposed construction, however, appears to exclude both "communications network server" and "secure time generator 104." See (id.) Based on the express language of the specifications, these two methods of producing an "indicia" of time are preferred embodiments, and the Court agrees with Judge Gilstrap that all of "[t]hese structures should be included in the Court's construction as alternatives." RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *30 (citing Ishida Co., Ltd. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
On the other hand, the Court concludes that RPost's proposed construction is deficient in four areas. First, the specification expressly discloses that clock 50 "is securable (to ensure the veracity of the produced time indication 66)."`219 Patent col. 7 ll. 14 (emphasis added). The specification also discloses how clock 50 is securable:
Id. col. 7 ll. 21-28. Implicit in RPost's argument that "communications network server" is the only structure with a "secured" limitation is that the express "securable" limitation does not apply to clock 50. See (Doc. 114 at 18). While the inventor did not use the term "secured" to limit clock 50—which he readily could have done—the specification does disclose that clock 50 is at least "securable." By doing so, the inventor chose to limit the nature of clock 50 as able to be secured. Accordingly, the Court's construction includes "securable" as a limitation for clock 50.
Second, as expressly set forth in the specification, "communications network server" is limited as "secured from being set or modified by an interested party such as the sender."`219 Patent col. 7 ll. 18-21. RPost does not dispute this limitation applies and notes that it is "amenable to a construction that adds this limitation to the communication network server." (Doc. 119 at 12-13). Accordingly, the Court incorporates this limitation in its construction.
Third, the Court finds that the jury would be better served by defining the four corresponding structures by their location in relation to the authenticator, i.e., internal or external. As GoDaddy argues here and as RPost argued before Judge Gilstrap, the location of the time generator with respect to the authenticator is determinative of whether the generator must be "secured from being set by an interested party such as the sender."
Finally, the specification discloses that time generator 104 is "secure." The Court finds that the jury would be aided by a construction that defines "secure." The specification defines a "secure" external time generating structure as one that is "secured from being set or modified by an interested party such as the sender." Id. Because the specification discloses that time generator 104 is "secure," the Court finds that the "secure" limitation applicable to "external" structures equally applies to time generator 104.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the corresponding structure for "means for providing an indicia of a time of successful transmission" is "either a (1) securable clock 50 and equivalents thereof; (2) time generator 104 and equivalents thereof; (3) communications network server and equivalents thereof; or (4) Time Stamping Service, such as the Digital Notary System, and equivalents thereof; where structures (1) and (2) are internal to the authenticator, structures (3) and (4) are external to the authenticator, and structures (2), (3) and (4) are secured from being set or modified by an interested party such as the sender."
Like Term No. 8, the parties agree that this claim is subject to MPF construction, stipulate as to the claim's functionality, but dispute the corresponding structure. As to structure, RPost contends that the Court should adopt Judge Gilstrap's construction of "storage unit 54 or storage device 106, and their equivalents." (Doc. 114 at 18-19).
GoDaddy responds that the corresponding structure should be "using a compression, private or public key encryption or scrambling technique, a password, or a combination thereof, such as those employed by the widely used RSA encryption method, and by the PKZIIP(tm) program from PKWARE Inc., Glendale, Wis., U.S.A., and where the `securing' procedure, key or password are unknown to any interested party." (Doc. 117 at 20-21). During the Markman Hearing, GoDaddy argued that RPost's proposal should be rejected because "storage unit 54" and "storage device 106" are nonce terms that disclose no structure. GoDaddy also asserted that an algorithm is necessary for a processor to perform the claimed function and that its proposed structure is the only algorithm disclosed in the specification.
RPost replies that GoDaddy's proposed structure is merely an alternative to storage unit 54 in the claim specification and not the only structure providing a means for securing the information. (Doc. 119 at 13). By excluding storage unit 54 and storage device 106 from the corresponding structure, RPost contends that GoDaddy's proposal should be rejected for conflicting with the intrinsic record. (Id.)
Because this claim is subject to § 112(6), the Court will apply the two step approach for MPF claim construction as set forth in Term No. 7.
This disputed phrase is found in Claim 82 as follows:
`219 Patent col. 4 ll. 4-41 (amended version) (emphasis added)
Because the parties do not dispute the functionality of this claim, the Court adopts the stipulated construction of "securing at least part of the authentication data against tampering by either the sender or the recipient."
The parties have identified the following passages from the specification as disclosing corresponding structure:
`219 Patent col. 6 ll. 66-col. 7 ll. 2 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 7 ll. 41-col. 8 ll. 5 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 9 ll. 56-67 (emphasis added).
Id. col. 13 ll. 8-41 (emphasis added).
Judge Gilstrap construed the corresponding structure of the claimed function as "storage unit 54 or storage device 106, and equivalents thereof." RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *35. During the Markman Hearing, GoDaddy argued that the specification is required to disclose an algorithm because the claimed function of "securing" cannot be performed by a general purpose computer, but requires a special purpose computer. Although Judge Gilstrap did not analyze whether the Feldbau Patent needed to disclose an algorithm to perform the claimed function, the Court finds that such an analysis is necessary because the claims asserted against GoDaddy involve computer-implemented functions. See Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333.
In this case, there is no dispute that the claimed function of "securing" is disclosed as part of a computer-implemented invention. The question before the Court, therefore, is whether "securing" can be performed by a general purpose computer.
As set forth in the Court's analysis for Term No. 7, Aristocrat requires that for computer or processor-implemented claim terms interpreted under § 112(6), the corresponding structure must disclose the algorithm needed to transform the general purpose computer or processor into the special purpose computer. 521 F.3d at 1333. The Aristocrat requirement is limited, however, to cases where an inventor has claimed "a specific function performed by a special purpose computer." Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. Where the inventor has merely recited general computer functions such as "processing," "receiving," or "storing," he need not "disclose more structure than the general purpose processor that performs those functions." Id.
As employed by the Feldbau Patent, RPost's proposed corresponding structures of "storage device 54" and "storage unit 106" do not—despite their labels—merely perform the general computer function of "storing." Rather, the claim language requires that the devices "secure" data from tampering by interested parties. See `219 Patent col. 4 ll. 37-38.
The Federal Circuit recently provided guidance on this particular issue. In Spa Syspatronic AG v. United States, the disputed claim involved a means for producing a secret microcode or access code for communications between a control unit and specific data. 117 Fed. Cl. 375, 390 (2014). The functionality of the claim was to "secur[e] the data from unauthorized access." Id. at 390-92. The patent holder argued that separate algorithms were not required for the code limitations due to the Katz exception for "processing, receiving, and storing" data that general purpose computers could inherently perform. Id. at 391. The Federal Circuit rejected the patent holder's argument, explaining:
Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
In this case, the "securing" functionality of Claim 82 is nearly identical to the functionality of the disputed claim in Spa Syspatronic. Specifically, like in Spa Syspatronic, Claim 82 asserts a method of "securing" certain data from unauthorized access or tampering by interested parties. See `219 Patent col. 4 ll. 37-38 (amended version). For this reason, the Court finds that Claim 82's "securing" function cannot be implemented by a general purpose computer but instead must be implemented in a special purpose computer.
Because a special purpose computer is necessary to perform the functionality of Claim 82, Aristocrat applies and the Feldbau Patent must disclose an algorithm that performs the particular function of securing at least part of the authentication data against tampering by interested parties. See Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333; Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
GoDaddy asserts that the specification discloses only one algorithm and endorses that algorithm as the corresponding structure. (Doc. 117 at 20-21). In its briefing, rather than discussing whether an algorithm is required, RPost merely advocates that the Court should adopt Judge Gilstrap's construction. See (Docs. 114 at 18-19; 119 at 18). During the Markman Hearing, RPost stated that it offered GoDaddy's current proposal as an alternative method before Judge Gilstrap, but did not in this case because Judge Gilstrap rejected the method as too detailed. See RMail, 2013 WL 968246, at *31-35.
Initially, the Court finds that RPost's current proposal is flatly deficient. The Federal Circuit has long held that "[s]imply disclosing a black box that performs the recited function is not a sufficient explanation of the algorithm required to render the [MPF] term definite." Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., 755 F.3d 1326, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 518 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Both "storage unit 54" and "storage device 106" are merely "black box" terms found in Figures 2, 3, and 4 of the specification and do not provide an algorithm as required by Aristocrat. Therefore, the Court rejects RPost's proposed construction.
Beyond "storage unit 54" and "storage device 106," the specification discloses several methods of "securing" authentication-information. Namely, the specification provides three separate and "relatively secure" methods of storing authentication-information via storage unit 54 and a fourth "secure" method as an alternative. The "relatively secure" methods disclose storage unit 54 as being (1) a "Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) device such as an optical disk or a Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM) device"; (2) "enclosed within a securable device"; or (3) "provided with read-only access privilege."`219 Patent col. 7 ll. 46-51. The alternative "secure" method requires "using a compression, private or public key encryption or scrambling technique, a password, or a combination thereof such as those employed by the widely used RSA encryption method, and by the PKZIP(tm) program from PKWARE Inc., Glendale Wis., U.S.A., and where the "securing" procedure, key or password are unknown to any interested party." Id. col. 7 ll. 51-58. The question before the Court is which, if any, of these methods set forth a sufficient algorithm that satisfies Aristocrat.
The first method discloses storage unit 54 as a "Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) device such as an optical disk or a Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM) device." Id. col. 7 ll. 46-48. As to the securing process, the specification explains that controller 56 "stores" and "retrieves" the information from storage unit 54, and "unsecures" the information if it is "secured." Id. col. 7 ll. 59-col. 8 ll. 5. Under Federal Circuit law, "[i]t is well settled that simply disclosing software . . . without providing some detail about the means to accomplish the function, is not enough." Function Media, 708 F.3d at 1318 (citation and quotations omitted). This first method of "securing," however, does not simply disclose the generic term "software," but provides particular types of software that inherently assure that the data written on the device cannot be tampered with once it is written on the device. See Dictionary of Computer Science Engineering and Technology 534 (Philip A. Laplante ed., 2000) (defining "write once read many" as "used to refer to memory devices that allow data to be written once after device fabrication, and to be read any number of times. A typical example is PROM."); Dictionary of Information Technology 505 (Ramesh Bangia ed., 2d 2010) (defining WORM as "Storage device that uses an optical medium that can be recorded only once. Updating requires destroying the existing data . . . .").
The Court finds that the disclosed step of storing the authentication data on a WORM device properly limits the scope of the "corresponding structure, material, or acts" that perform the function of "securing," as required by § 112(6). Due to the innate "secured" characteristic of a WORM device, the single step of storing the data on such a device is all that is required to perform the claimed function of "securing at least part of the authentication data against tampering by either the sender or the recipient." See Noah, 675 F.3d at 1313 (finding that a specification set forth a sufficient algorithm by disclosing "that authorized agents are provided with passcodes and that agents cannot enter, delete, review, adjust or process data inputs within the master ledger unless the passcode is verified"). Consequently, the Court concludes that this method of "securing" data from tampering by an interested party adequately sets forth an algorithm and therefore constitutes corresponding structure. See Ericsson, 417 F.3d at 1249 (Fed Cir. 2005) ("[T]he corresponding structure for a § 112 ¶ 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification.").
As to the second method, the Federal Circuit holds that a purported algorithm cannot "merely provide[] functional language." Ergo Licensing, 673 F.3d at 1365. Moreover, simply reciting the claimed function in the specification, while including nothing about how the computer or processor ensures that those functions are performed, is not a sufficient disclosure for an algorithm. See Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Here, the specification simply discloses that storage device 54 is "enclosed within a securable device."`219 Patent col. Such nonce terminology merely discloses functional language without any form of structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350 (citing MIT, 462 F.3d at 1354); Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On, Inc., 769 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding that the word "device" is generally a non-structural, nonce term (citing cases)). For this reason, the Court finds that a sufficient algorithm has not been disclosed for this method.
The third disclosed method to "secure" the authentication data via storage unit 54 is "it may be provided with read-only access privilege."`219 Patent col. 7 ll. 50-51. The specification devotes only one other sentence to this method: "[o]ne embodiment of secure storage is that which has read-only privileges." Id. col. 9 ll. 56-67. Unlike the first disclosed method of storing the data on a WORM or PROM device, the sole step of "[p]rovid[ing the data] with read-only privilege" does not set forth a step-by-step procedure for how the claim's function of "securing" is to be performed. See Triton Tech of Texas, LLC v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 753 F.3d 1375, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("However, merely using the term `numerical integration' does not disclose an algorithm—i.e., a step-by-step procedure—for performing the claimed function [of integrator means]." (citing Ergo Licensing, 673 F.3d at 1365)). For example, the specification does not explain how the data is "provided" with read-only access or who has access to the data. For these reasons, the Court finds that this method fails to disclose a sufficient algorithm.
The fourth method of "securing" authentication data is "using a compression, private or public key encryption or scrambling technique, a password, or a combination thereof, such as those employed by the widely used RSA encryption method, and by the PKZIIP(tm) program from PKWARE Inc., Glendale, Wis., U.S.A., and where the `securing' procedure, key or password are unknown to any interested party." The Court finds that this method sufficiently describes an algorithm to accomplish the claimed function of securing data against unauthorized access. See Noah, 675 F.3d at 1313.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the corresponding structure for "means for securing at least part of the authentication data against tampering of the sender and the recipient wherein the processor is combined with the means for securing" is "securing the authentication data either (1) by storing the data on a write-once read-many ("WORM") device such as an optical disk or a Programmable Read-Only Memory ("PROM") device; or (2) by storing the data using a compression, private or public key encryption or scrambling technique, a password, or a combination thereof, such as those employed by the widely used RSA encryption method, and by the PKZIIP(tm) program from PKWARE Inc., Glendale, Wis., U.S.A., and where the `securing' procedure, key or password are unknown to any interested party." See Ericsson, 417 F.3d at 1249.
The primary difference between the parties' proposed constructions for these disputed claim terms involves the word "system." RPost proposes that "source transmitting system" be construed as "system for transmitting a dispatch for a sender" and "destination receiving system" as "system for receiving a dispatch for a recipient." (Doc. 114 at 19). RPost insists that its constructions are "consistent with the plain claim language." (Id.)
Parroting its proposed constructions for "sender" (Term No. 5) and "recipient" (Term No. 6), GoDaddy proposes that "source transmitting system" be construed as "the computer that originates the dispatch" and that "destination receiving system" be defined as "the computer that receives the dispatch at its intended destination." (Doc. 117 at 21). GoDaddy explains that its proposed constructions are necessary to clarify that the two systems are computer-based. (Id.) GoDaddy cautions that if the Court were to adopt RPost's "ambiguous" constructions, the jury could misinterpret "system" to mean any "system" regardless of whether it is computer-based. (Id.) Further, during the Markman Hearing, GoDaddy argued that "system" is a nonce word that discloses no structure.
RPost replies that GoDaddy's ambiguity argument is "unfounded" because GoDaddy stipulated to a construction of "sub-system" for another term. (Doc. 119 at 13); see infra at 26. RPost also stresses that the "computer-based" limitation is already disclosed in the claim, making a recitation of "computer" in either construction unnecessary. (Doc. 119 at 13).
These two terms are disclosed in Claim 82 as follows:
`219 Patent col. 4 ll. 4-9 (amended version) (emphasis added).
The Court finds little merit in GoDaddy's fear that the jury could misinterpret "system" to be something other than a "computer-based" system. Claim 82's preamble expressly states that both "source transmitting system" and "destination receiving system" must be "in an electronic communication network." Id. col. 4 ll. 4-5 (emphasis added). Moreover, Claim 82 requires that each "system" be "coupled to the electronic communication network." Id. col. 4 ll. 6; id. col. 4 ll. 9. As a result, neither "system" could be interpreted as anything other than a computer-based system. Moreover, while the Court agreed with GoDaddy that the terms "recipient" and "sender" have "plain and ordinary meanings" that include natural persons, the same does not hold true for "source transmitting system" or "destination receiving system"—particularly when both systems are "in an electronic communication network." The Court nevertheless concludes that the jury would be aided by a construction that limits "system" as being "computerized."
Furthermore, the Court finds that limiting the term "system" to "computer" as GoDaddy proposes would be improper. GoDaddy has not persuaded the Court that Claim 82 only embodies "computers" per se. While it is undisputed that each claimed "system" must be "electronic" or "computerized," construing "system" simply as "computer" could imply to the jury that the "transmitting" and "receiving" systems can only be "computers" and not another type of computerized system.
Additionally, the Court is not convinced that GoDaddy's proposed language of "originates" is accurate. Specifically, the claim does not disclose that the "source transmitting system" originates the message. In fact, the parties stipulated that the "sender originates" the entire content of the message. (Doc. 191-1 at 14) (emphasis added). GoDaddy has not shown that "sender" and "source transmitting system" are synonymous such that the doctrine of claim differentiation is overcome. See Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that the doctrine of claim differentiation is based on "the common sense notion that different words or phrases used in separate claims are presumed to indicate that the claims have different meanings and scope." (quoting Karlin Tech. Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
GoDaddy's proposed construction for "destination receiving system" also includes the limitation "at its intended destination." (Doc. 117 at 21). GoDaddy does not discuss this proposed limitation in its briefing but explained at the Markman Hearing that "[t]he whole point of the invention is to confirm or verify that the message was delivered at its intended destination hence that aspect of GoDaddy's claim construction." As it found for Term No. 6, the Court concludes that including this limitation requires the jury to engage in unnecessary additional inquiry.
For these reasons, the Court construes "source transmitting system" as "computerized system for transmitting a dispatch for a sender" and "destination receiving system" as "computerized system for receiving a dispatch for a recipient."
For the foregoing reasons,
One of the disputed terms in the Feldbau Patent was also construed by Judge James Selna of the Central District of California in Propat Int'l Corp. v. RPost Inc., 2005 WL 6287844 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2005) ("Propat"). All substantive rulings in Propat were subsequently vacated, however, when the court determined that the plaintiff, Propat International Corporation, lacked standing. See Propat Int'l Corp. v. RPost Inc., 2005 WL 6233792 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2015).
For many of the thirty-seven disputed terms in this case, a party advocates that the Court should adopt a construction as crafted by Judge Gilstrap or Judge Selna. Even if these constructions were from this district, however, they would not be binding on the Court. The cases before Judge Gilstrap and Judge Selna involved different defendants, making issue preclusion inapplicable here. There is, nonetheless, an interest in stare decisis and uniformity in treatment of the same patent. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390-91. Prior constructions may be used as persuasive precedent, but that does not foreclose the Court from reaching a different conclusion. See Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Licensing, L.P., 326 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 80 F.Supp.2d 921, 924 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Consequently, the Court will consider the prior constructions of Judge Gilstrap and Judge Selna but only for their persuasive value.
Additionally, GoDaddy's proposal substitutes "servers" for "devices." The Court finds that the claims' plain language does not require transmissions between servers and rejects this proposal.