OPINION AND ORDER
MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.
Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank filed this lawsuit against defendants Humphrey Lumber Corporation and Steven J. Humphrey (collectively, Humphrey) seeking collection on a note and guaranty. The court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo and ordered Humphrey to pay damages, interest, and the reasonable expenses actually incurred by Wells Fargo in enforcing its rights under the note and guarantee. Now before the court is Wells Fargo's motion to amend that judgment to incorporate a specific finding as to the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees and costs. For the following reasons, that motion will be granted, and Humphrey will be ordered to pay $14,290.73 in legal fees and costs to Wells Fargo.
I. Background
This straightforward action arose from Humphrey's default on a promissory note. Wells Fargo filed its complaint on July 20, 2011. No substantial discovery occurred. On November 4, 2011, Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment. Humphrey's cursory reply to that motion admitted liability and "some indebtedness to Wells Fargo," Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 15) at 1, and did not contest any of Wells Fargo's factual allegations.
On December 8, 2011, this court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo and ordered Humphrey to pay, among other things, the reasonable expenses Wells Fargo actually incurred prosecuting this case. In its evidentiary submission in support of its motion to amend that judgment, Wells Fargo submits that it accrued legal fees totaling $10,797.00 and costs totaling $4,290.73, for a total of $15,087.73.1 Humphrey responded to that motion by attacking the sufficiency of Wells Fargo's evidentiary submissions and insisting that those inadequacies prevented him from making "a meaningful response" to the motion. Defs.' Resp. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend (Doc. No. 20) at 2. Wells Fargo then provided additional evidentiary support for its motion to which Humphrey has not responded.
II. Legal Standard
In calculating attorneys' fees, the court should determine the "lodestar" figure or "the product of the number of hours reasonably expended to prosecute the lawsuit and the reasonable hourly rate for work performed by similarly situated attorneys in the community." Simpleville Music v. Mizell, 511 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1161 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Thompson, J.) (citing Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988)). In determining the lodestar, the court applies the 12-factor test set forth in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)),2 and then proceeds to analyze "whether any portion of this fee should be adjusted upwards or downwards." Simpleville Music, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19).3
The fee applicant bears the burden of "establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate hours and hourly rates." Id. at 1162 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303). The applicant may meet this burden by producing either direct evidence of the rates charged under similar circumstances or by opinion evidence as to the reasonable rate. However, the court "is itself an expert on [this issue] and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment . . . as to value." Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Discussion
This case is one of many similar disputes where Wells Fargo seeks the reasonable costs of collection on what amounts to uncontested debt. In determining the reasonable fees and costs, the court finds persuasive, both for its reasoning and for its ability to bring predictability and consistency to the resolution of these motions, the approach highlighted in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Southern Boys Investment Group, LLC, 2011 WL 2446594 (M.D. Fla. May 26, 2011) (Richardson, M.J.), adopted by 2011 WL 2436062 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2011) (Dalton, J.). In Southern Boys Investment, Wells Fargo, which was represented by the same firm and, indeed, some of the same lawyers representing it in this court, requested $16,836.00 in attorneys' fees and $2,715.02 in expenses for work materially similar to that which was undertaken in this case. The court noted that Wells Fargo failed to explain its fee request in terms of the Johnson factors and therefore "used its own judgment regarding the attorneys' fee award." Id. at *4. Since "the Defendants made no appearance, there were no hearings, and no discovery was conducted," the court concluded that, "absent special circumstances and without any evidence as to the Johnson factors, a fee over $10,000.00 would not be reasonable." Id. (citing Textron Fin. Corp. v. Longstreet, 2010 WL 331901, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2010) (Antoon, J.) (holding that attorneys' fees should be limited to $10,000 in a simple contract dispute where the plaintiff failed to provide the court with an itemization of the tasks performed)). It therefore awarded Wells Fargo $10,000 in legal fees and $2,715.02 in expenses.
A similar approach is warranted in this case. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 719 (encouraging courts to consider awards in similar cases when setting attorneys' fees). As in Southern Boys Investment, this is a straightforward breach-of-contract claim in which there was little or no discovery conducted, no hearings held, and no substantive disagreement about liability. The court can therefore see no reason why attorneys' fees related to this litigation should exceed $10,000, and Wells Fargo has submitted no documentation that would justify a higher award. Id. Moreover, Wells Fargo has failed to explain whether this case was any more novel or difficult than other similar cases in which it received only $10,000 in attorneys' fees; what the customary fee for similar work would be; or anything else about this case that might justify an award higher than the one it received in Southern Boys Investment. Id. at 717-19 (identifying factors this court should consider when determining an appropriate fee). The court therefore concludes, based on its own experiences handling similar disputes, that, while Humphrey is liable for the reasonable attorneys' fees associated with this litigation, Humphrey is not liable for the full amount requested by Wells Fargo. See Wells Fargo v. Blount, No. 11cv296, (M.D. Ala. Apr. 3, 2012) (Thompson, J.) (limiting fees in a similar case to $10,000). Put simply: it would be unreasonable for those fees to exceed $10,000.
* * *
It is therefore the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the court as follows:
(1) Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank's motion to amend judgment (doc. no. 18) is granted.
(2) Defendants Humphrey Lumber Corporation and Steven J. Humphrey, jointly and severally, are to pay $14,290.73 in fees and costs associated with this litigation. That total is comprised of $10,000 in attorneys' fees and $4,290.73 in costs.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
Rev.: 4/04
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
