THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz.R.Sup.Ct. 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.24
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SAMUEL A THUMMA, Judge.
¶1 Derek Don Chappell ("Defendant") was convicted in superior court of first-degree murder and child abuse and sentenced to death for the murder. Defendant's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Chappell, 225 Ariz. 229, 236 P.3d 1176 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1485 (2011). After the mandate issued on his direct appeal, Defendant filed a notice of post-conviction relief ("PCR") in superior court pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 32.4. Defendant has not yet filed a Rule 32 PCR petition.
¶2 Defendant filed a "Motion for Release of Juror Biographical and Contact Information, and for Court's Permission to Contact Jurors" in this Rule 32 PCR proceeding. Citing A.R.S. § 21-312 and Rule 18.3, the motion sought an order directing the Jury Commissioner to release to counsel "the Jury List, as well as all forms containing biographical and contact information, such forms as were filled out by the final Jurors and Alternates. . . [and] for permission to contact the final Jurors and Alternates." The State objected to the motion.
¶3 The superior court found there was no "requirement for a prima faci[e] showing before" Defendant is "entitled to investigate aspects of" his Rule 32 PCR petition. Accordingly, the superior court granted the motion and directed the Jury Commissioner to release to counsel "all forms containing biographical and contact information, as were filled out by the final 12 Jurors who deliberated" and allowed counsel for Defendant "to initiate contact with the Jurors who deliberated his case via the form of letter" previously submitted. The State filed a Petition for Special Action ("Petition"), seeking to vacate the order.1
DISCUSSION
¶4 The State argues the superior court abused its discretion or exceeded its legal authority, issues that are properly raised in a special action. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3(b), (c). We agree that the State has no "equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" by appeal to address the superior court's order. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion and accept special action jurisdiction over the Petition. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a); State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage, 200 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶¶ 8-10, 30 P.2d 649, 652 (App. 2001).
¶5 Citing Chambers v. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm., AFL-CIO, 25 Ariz.App. 104, 541 P.2d 567 (1975), Defendant argues the State lacks standing to bring this special action. We disagree. Standing "requires that each party possess an interest in the outcome of the litigation" so the court will not be giving an advisory opinion. Id. at 106, 541 P.2d at 569. The State is a party with a clear interest in the outcome of the case and we are not asked to provide an advisory opinion. Accordingly, applying Chambers, we hold the State has standing to seek special action relief.
¶6 Turning to the relief requested in the Petition, we first address what we are not deciding. Among other things, we are not deciding: (1) what constitutes jury misconduct or what information may be relevant or admissible for a jury misconduct claim; (2) what claims are cognizable in a Rule 32 PCR proceeding; (3) what information may be discoverable for any claims made after Defendant files a Rule 32 PCR petition; (4) whether Defendant has a constitutional right to the juror contact he seeks; or (5) when or how jurors may be contacted immediately after they are discharged from their deliberations. See State v. West, 176 Ariz. 432, 446-47, 862 P.2d 192, 206-07 (1993) (affirming, on direct appeal, trial court's refusal to release to defendant "names and addresses of the trial jurors"), overruled in part on other grounds in State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 64, ¶ 30, n.7, 961 P.2d 1006, 1012, n.7 (1998). Instead, we address only the proper procedure for discovery requests in a Rule 32 PCR proceeding. As such, our discussion is limited to the propriety of the superior court's order challenged in the Petition.
¶7 The propriety of the order turns on two issues: (1) the showing required before the superior court could grant Defendant's motion and (2) whether Defendant made that showing. We address these issues in turn.
¶8 Defendant filed the motion seeking to obtain information in this Rule 32 PCR proceeding to use in a Rule 32 PCR petition that has not yet been filed. The parties do not genuinely dispute that obtaining such information is proper only upon a showing of "good cause." See Canion v. Cole, 210 Ariz. 598, 600, ¶ 10, 115 P.3d 1261, 1263 (2005) ("trial judges have inherent authority to grant discovery requests in PCR proceedings upon a showing of good cause") (citing cases).
¶9 Although the parties cite various sources for the "good cause" requirement,2 we hold Canion sets forth the applicable standard and, in doing so, reject Defendant's argument that Rule 15.1 governs. Canion made clear that "Rule 15 applies only to the trial stage, not to PCR proceedings." Id. at 599, ¶ 9, 115 P.3d at 1262. We also find Canion applies even though Defendant seeks discovery from non-parties. Although the Canion defendant sought disclosure from the State, the Arizona Supreme Court found "trial judges have inherent authority to grant discovery requests in PCR proceedings upon a showing of good cause." Id. at 600, ¶ 10, 115 P.3d at 1263. The reasoning and analysis in Canion apply with full force to requests for discovery from non-parties like Defendant seeks here. Accordingly, we hold Canion's "good cause" requirement applies to requests for disclosure and discovery from parties as well as non-parties made in Rule 32 PCR proceedings.
¶10 Whether good cause has been shown is contextual. In a Rule 32 PCR proceeding, good cause can only be shown in the context of the claims made in a Rule 32 PCR petition. Canion crisply held that pre-petition discovery could not properly be compelled:
This case raises the question whether a convicted defendant who has filed a notice of post-conviction relief ("PCR"), but has not filed a petition seeking relief, has a right to compel discovery for his PCR proceedings. We hold that he does not.
Id. at 598, ¶ 1, 115 P.3d at 1261. Until the Rule 32 PCR petition is filed, "we do not know the basis for [a defendant's] claim for Rule 32 relief and cannot assess whether any violation he might allege would state a colorable claim." Id. at 600, ¶ 14, 115 P.3d at 1263. As applied, before Defendant "may be permitted to show good cause" for court involvement seeking discovery about and from the jurors, "he must file a PCR petition to provide context for his request." Id. at 600, ¶ 10, 115 P.3d at 1263. Absent the filing of a Rule 32 PCR petition, the court "lack[s] any context in which to assess" his request; "[o]nly when a petition has been filed can the trial judge — and reviewing courts — properly consider" his request "in light of his asserted grounds for relief." Id. at 600-01, ¶ 14, 115 P.3d at 1263-64.
¶11 Defendant suggests meaningful discovery is a prerequisite to filing a proper Rule 32 PCR petition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5 (Rule 32 PCR petition "shall include every ground known to [a defendant] for vacating, reducing, correcting or otherwise changing all judgments or sentences imposed."). We disagree. A Rule 32 PCR petition may be amended "upon a showing of good cause," a standard reflecting "a liberal policy toward amendment of PCR pleadings." Canion, 210 Ariz. at 601, ¶ 16, 115 P.3d at 1264 (citation omitted). If, after filing a Rule 32 PCR petition, Defendant "uncovers new evidence or exculpatory evidence as a result of his discovery requests, the trial court may allow amendment of the petition." Id. Formal discovery, however, is not a prerequisite to filing a proper Rule 32 PCR petition. Id.
¶12 Because Defendant's motion sought an order exceeding the superior court's authority at this stage of the Rule 32 PCR proceeding, we vacate that order without prejudice to Defendant seeking such relief after filing a Rule 32 PCR petition. In doing so, we note that neither party appears to have cited Canion to the superior court. Accordingly, the superior court did not have the benefit of the opinion we find dispositive.
CONCLUSION
¶13 We accept jurisdiction of this special action and grant relief. We vacate the superior court's order granting Defendant's Motion for Release of Juror Biographical and Contact Information, and for Court's Permission to Contact Jurors, without prejudice to Defendant seeking such an order after filing a Rule 32 PCR petition. We remand this case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum decision.
PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge, DONN KESSLER, Judge, concurs.
