J. THOMAS RAY, Magistrate Judge.
The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Judge J. Leon Holmes. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the United States District Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact.
If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the United States District Judge, you must, at the same time that you file your written objections, include a "Statement of Necessity" that sets forth the following:
From this submission, the United States District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional evidentiary hearing, either before the Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge.
Mail your objections and "Statement of Necessity" to:
Pending before the Court is a § 2241 habeas Petition filed by Petitioner, John Earl Jordan, Jr.
Before addressing the merits of Petitioner's claims, the Court will review the relevant procedural history of this case, which arises from Petitioner receiving a disciplinary conviction on February 2, 2011, and losing seven days of good-time credit. At the time Petitioner received this disciplinary, he was incarcerated in FCI, Forrest City, Arkansas.
According to Petitioner, on June 10, 2009, the BOP wrongfully withdrew $133.00 from his inmate trust account, without first having him sign an Inmate Financial Responsibility Program ("IFRP") contract, as required by BOP Program Statement 5380.08.
On September 22, 2009, Petitioner was released from the SHU. However, he refused to return to the general population unless he was placed in "protective custody" from Mr. Brown. (Docket entry #8-1 at 28). It appears this resulted in Petitioner remaining in the SHU.
According to an "Inmate Investigative Report," dated August 24, 2010, the BOP determined that there was no threat to Petitioner's safety, and that he must return to the general population. (Docket entry #8-1 at 29). The Report recommended that Petitioner be "ordered out of special housing and back to general population," and concluded that "if inmate Jordan refuses to return to General Population, he should receive an incident report for Refusing Programs." (Docket entry #8-1 at 29).
On November 17, 2010, Petitioner was charged with "refusing to accept a program assignment." (Docket entry #8-1 at 16-17). In the November 17, 2010 Incident Report, Senior Officer B. Hanks stated the following:
(Docket entry #8-1 at 16). The Incident Report was delivered to Petitioner on November 18, 2010, at 3:10 p.m. (Docket entry #8-1 at 16).
On November 19, 2010, the Unit Disciplinary Committee ("UDC") met and referred the charge to a Disciplinary Hearing Officer ("DHO"). (Docket entry #8-1 at 16). On December 9, 2010, Petitioner appeared for his disciplinary hearing. (Docket entry #8-1 at 12). He waived his right to staff representation. (Docket entry #8-1 at 12). When asked if he wished to make a statement, he "deferred to the three hand written statements [he] provided at the UDC hearing." (Docket entry #8-1 at 12).
In one of Petitioner's statements, titled "Offer," he said he would "gladly return to the compound [general population] whenever you will produce to me the valid and active contract which allowed staff to legally take the $133.00 on 6-10-09." (Docket entry #8-1 at 19). In another document, titled "Statement of Facts," he wrote in part: "No, I will not return to general population at any Outlaw run facility — ever. But it is for my own safety, and the order [to return to general population] is invalid as such." (Docket entry #8-1 at 20). In a third statement, Petitioner requested videotape from the SHU hall camera that would establish that Officer B. Hanks "did not give me a direct order to return to the compound."
In the DHO's February 2, 2011 decision, he found that Petitioner committed the offense of refusing to accept a program assignment:
(Docket entry #8-1 at 14).
The sanctions imposed by the DHO included: (1) disallowance of seven days of good conduct time; and (2) the loss of certain commissary, telephone, and visitation privileges. Id.
After pursuing an administrative appeal, Petitioner filed this federal habeas action on June 1, 2011.
Respondent argues that Petitioner's claims either fail on the merits or are not cognizable in a § 2241 habeas action. (Docket entry #8).
For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with Respondent's arguments. Thus, the Court recommends that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied, and that the case be dismissed, with prejudice.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a disciplinary conviction which results in a prisoner losing good time credits implicates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-58 (1974).
In Petitioner's habeas papers, he does not develop any argument explaining how the disallowance of his good-time credits violated the minimum due process requirements of Wolff and Hill. Instead, all of his claims are premised on a convoluted argument that, following his placement in the SHU, the BOP was required to either grant him "protective custody" or give him a disciplinary transfer to another facility.
The DHO's February 2, 2011 decision, which caused Petitioner to lose seven days of good-time credit, was supported by "some evidence in the record." Under Hill, federal courts are required to defer to the judgment of prison officials as long "as some evidence in the record" supports the disciplinary conviction and the due process requirements of Wolff are satisfied. This limited review does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of evidence. Id. at 455. Prison officials can permissibly rely on violation reports and hearsay to find inmates guilty of disciplinary infractions. See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir.2008); Moore v. Plaster, 313 F.3d 442, 444 (8th Cir. 2002). Finally, the Eighth Circuit has held that, as long as the disciplinary proceeding is conducted by an impartial decision maker, a report from a correctional officer constitutes "some evidence" upon which to base a disciplinary decision. See Hartsfield, 511 F.3d at 831.
The record in this case clearly demonstrates that the disciplinary hearing satisfied the due process requirements of Wolff and that "some evidence in the record" supports the disciplinary conviction as required by Hill. Accordingly, Petitioner's due process claims are without merit.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (docket entry #1) be DENIED, and that the case be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE.
All of the various actions by the BOP (from June 10, 2009, through February 2, 2011), which Petitioner is challenging in this case, took place while he was incarcerated in FCI, Forest City, Arkansas.
When the Petition was filed, Petitioner was incarcerated at FCI Forrest City. Thus, the Court has jurisdiction over this § 2241 habeas action. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (the proper respondent in a habeas action is the petitioner's "immediate custodian" at the time of filing). A habeas petitioner's post-filing transfer does not, in and of itself, defeat jurisdiction. See Copley v. Keohane, 150 F .3d 827, 830 (8th Cir.1998).
Eleven years later, in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), the Court held that the decision of the prison DHO officer is only required to be supported by "some evidence in the record." Where the record contains some evidence to support the decision of the DHO, the decision cannot be characterized as arbitrary. Id. at 457.
Insofar as Petitioner purports to challenge his placement in the SHU, that claim is not cognizable in a § 2241 habeas action. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) (constitutional claims that challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement "fall outside of [the] core" of habeas relief). Rather, a federal prisoner may raise a challenge to his conditions of confinement in a civil rights action brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
