Filed: Mar. 19, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. IT IS HEREBY stipulated between the United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Michael D. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Erik Hermann Green, John R. Manning, Esq., that the status conference presently set for March 20, 2014 be continued to April 3, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., thus vacating the presently set status conference. Acco
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge. IT IS HEREBY stipulated between the United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Michael D. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Erik Hermann Green, John R. Manning, Esq., that the status conference presently set for March 20, 2014 be continued to April 3, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., thus vacating the presently set status conference. Accor..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
IT IS HEREBY stipulated between the United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Michael D. Anderson, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Erik Hermann Green, John R. Manning, Esq., that the status conference presently set for March 20, 2014 be continued to April 3, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., thus vacating the presently set status conference. Accordingly, the Parties hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on March 20, 2014.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until April 3, 2014 and to exclude time between March 20, 2014 and April 3, 2014 under the Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a relatively complex financial document case, including in excess of 1,500 pages of discovery. The defendants are alleged to have participated in a mortgage fraud scheme involving several homes. The Government has additional documents (approximately 40 "bankers" boxes) available for review at the IRS office in Oakland, Ca. Counsel for Mr. Green has reviewed many of the documents located at the IRS office, but a substantial amount have yet to be reviewed, indexed and analyzed. Counsel for Mr. Green is continuing to review and analyze the documents "housed" in/at the Oakland IRS office. The Government has recently provided 400 (+) pages additional discovery they believe to be relevant either as the basis for additional charges, or as 404(b) evidence. Counsel for Mr. Green needs additional time to review and investigate the new material. Moreover, additional time is needed to meet with Mr. Green and discuss the significance of this material in terms of resolution and/or trial.
b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery; review investigation reports; and, discuss USSG calculations and possible resolution scenarios with the defendant.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of March 20, 2014 to April 3, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED
