VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.
Plaintiff Annie Thomas, representing herself pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Ms. Thomas seeks a review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), who denied her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). Ms. Thomas exhausted the administrative remedies available before the Commissioner. This case is now ripe for judicial review under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Court carefully reviewed the record in this case and
The alleged onset date is August 20, 2013. (Tr. 104). Mr. Thomas suffers from numerous impairments, but none that the ALJ found to disable her. (See id. at 106, 114). On August 20, 2013, Ms. Thomas filed an application for Social Security benefits. (Id. at 104). The Social Security Administration denied that application on November 27, 2013. (Id.). On April 23, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Cynthia W. Brown held a hearing. (Id.). Attorney George Harris represented Ms. Thomas at the administrative level. (Id.). The ALJ issued her decision on July 30, 2015, which was unfavorable to Ms. Thomas. (Id. at 114). In that opinion, the ALJ found that Ms. Thomas did not meet the disability standard at Steps Three and Five. (Id. at 107, 113). Ms. Thomas requested the Appeals Council review the claim. (Id. at 97). They refused. (Id.). Ms. Thomas filed her complaint in the Northern District of Alabama on June 5, 2017. (Doc. 1). She is proceeding pro se. (See id. at 4).
The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is narrowly circumscribed. The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must "scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). This court will determine that the ALJ's opinion is supported by substantial evidence if it finds "such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id. Factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence must be upheld by the court.
The ALJ's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo, because no presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ's determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ's application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted, the ALJ's decision must be reversed. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Id.
After considering the record, the ALJ made the following findings:
(Tr. 106-14) (emphasis omitted).
Ms. Thomas's first argument is that "the ALJ failed to explain how the standards of SSR 96-7P were applied." (Doc. 11 at 5) (capitalization and emphasis omitted). In support, Ms. Thomas cites to various portions of the medical record. (See id. at 6-7). She contends that she "should have been found disabled based upon her symptoms alone." (See id. at 7).
In response, the Commissioner argues that the medical records "[do] not document the presence of disabling limitations." (See Doc. 13 at 5) (citing another source). The Commissioner also posits that the ALJ properly evaluated Ms. Thomas's subjective complaints. (See id. at 7-14). After carefully reviewing the arguments, the Court agrees with the Commissioner.
First, the ALJ stated she applied SSR 96-7P and actually did apply that rule. (Tr. 107). SSR 96-7P states, in relevant part:
SSR 96-7P. The ALJ considered the first factor (Tr. 111) (discussing Ms. Thomas's daily activities), the second factor (id. at 107-12) (discussing Ms. Thomas's pain in the course of the medical record discussion), the third factor (id. at 107, 110) (noting Ms. Thomas's struggle with obesity), the fourth factor (id. at 108) (discussing Ms. Thomas's medication), the fifth factor (id. at 110) (discussing Ms. Thomas's medical treatment such as x-rays and a steroid injection), the sixth factor (id. at 108) (discussing Ms. Thomas's sitting versus standing), and the seventh factor (id. at 107-08) (discussing Ms. Thomas's limitations).
Ms. Thomas makes no argument that the ALJ ignored any one piece of evidence here. (See Doc. 11 at 5-7). Even if she did, "there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing another source). Further, it appears that the ALJ discussed all, or almost all, of the medical records cited in Ms. Thomas's brief. (See Doc. 11 at 5-7); (see Tr. 108) (discussing the 2010 carpal tunnel syndrome tests and diagnosis); (see id. at 108-09) (discussing the June 2011 MRI); (see id. at 109-10) (discussing the October 2014 medical records and the December 2014 MRI); (see id. at 110) (discussing Dr. Thomason's medical records). Here, it is clear that the ALJ reviewed the entire record and made findings in accordance with the law and supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not commit reversible error when she declined to find Ms. Thomas disabled based on her symptoms alone. To the contrary, the ALJ's opinion refers to the record often and her conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
Ms. Thomas's second argument is that "the ALJ failed to properly consider [her] impairments in combination." (Doc. 11 at 7) (emphasis and capitalization omitted). She believes that the ALJ did not consider her entire condition beyond Step Three and "fail[ed] to properly consider [her] diagnosed bilateral upper and lower radiculitis, at all." (See Doc. 11 at 7).
However, the record reflects that the ALJ did consider all of Ms. Thomas's impairments in combination. The ALJ specifically stated that "[t]he claimant does not have an impairment
Later on in the opinion — beyond Step Three — the ALJ noted that she "consider[ed] . . . the entire record." (Tr. 107) (emphasis omitted); (see id.) ("[T]he undersigned has considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted."); (see also id. at 110). The ALJ also noted that she did so in accordance with the relevant regulations and Social Security rules. (See id. at 107). The ALJ's opinion reflects a detailed recitation of Ms. Thomas's medical history. (See id. at 108-112). On review, it would be inappropriate for the Court to disturb this decision.
Ms. Thomas specifically complains that the ALJ entirely ignored the bilateral upper and lower radiculitis. (See Doc. 11 at 7). However, the ALJ's decision shows differently. The ALJ discussed the perfect motor strength in upper and lower extremities from the physical consultative examination done by Dr. Robertson. (See Tr. at 109). She discussed Ms. Thomas's visit with Dr. Thomason where she complained of radiating pain in her extremities. (See id. at 110). The ALJ discussed Dr. Thomason's findings of strength in Ms. Thomas's "bilateral upper and lower extremities." (See id. at 111). Further, Ms. Thomas has not identified a medical record that the ALJ overlooked that would change the outcome here. (See Doc. 11 at 7-8). For these reasons, this Court can find no reversible error under Ms. Thomas's second argument.
Ms. Thomas filed a copy of her "Application For Disability Access Parking Privileges." (Doc. 15 at 2). She did not include any argument along with this filing. (See generally id.). The Commissioner responded. (See Doc. 16). First, the Commissioner argues that the filing was not timely. (See id. at 2). Second, the Commissioner argues that Ms. Thomas waived any arguments stemming from the filing. (See id. at 2). Third, the Commissioner argues that the supplemental filing does not compel a remand on the merits. (See id. at 3). Ms. Thomas replied to the Commissioner by arguing that the Appeals Council did have her application, contrary to the Commissioner's contention. (Doc. 17 at 1); (Doc. 16 at 3-4).
The briefing order states that "Plaintiff's reply brief, if any, [is] to be filed within 14 days after [the] expiration of time for defendant's brief." (Doc. 8 at 1). The Commissioner brief was due on December 14, 2017. (See id.); (Doc. 10). That means that Ms. Thomas had to file a reply by December 28, 2017. Ms. Thomas filed her supplemental evidence on January 18, 2018. (Doc. 15). The filing is untimely. Additionally, Ms. Thomas makes no argument why this application compels a ruling in her favor. (Doc. 8).
Additionally, the Court has not ignored the filing and has considered it fully. It simply does not compel a different ruling in this case. The application was from February 2017. (See Doc. 15 at 2). It consists of little more than three checked boxes on a standard application form. (See id.). Additionally, the form gives no indication that these checked boxes relate back to the period before the ALJ's decision (July 30, 2015) — i.e., that it is chronologically relevant. (See id.); see Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2018) (discussing chronological relevance). For these reasons, the application is not material to the analysis here and does not change the result of this case. See Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Under the Cherry standard, the claimant must establish that: (1) there is new, noncumulative evidence; (2) the evidence is `material,' that is, relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative result, and (3) there is good cause for the failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level.") (citing Wright v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 696 (11th Cir.1984)).
The Court has carefully reviewed the record and considered all of Ms. Thomas's arguments. Ultimately, there is no reversible error through which the Court can disturb the ALJ's decision. While today's decision is undoubtedly disappointing to Ms. Thomas, a litigant proceeding pro se, this Court is restrained by the law and the deference afforded to the Commissioner. Accordingly, the Commissioner is due to be, and hereby is,
