NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

NORRIS, Judge.

¶ 1 Rex Carl Sagely timely appeals from his convictions and sentences for aggravated driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and aggravated driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 or more, class four felonies in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 28-1383(A)(1) and -1381 (Supp. 2007). After searching the record on appeal and finding no arguable question of law that was not frivolous, Sagely's counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), asking this court to search the record for fundamental error. This court granted counsel's motion to allow Sagely to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, and Sagely did so. We reject the arguments raised in Sagely's supplemental brief and, after reviewing the entire record, find no fundamental error. Therefore, we affirm Sagely's convictions and sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶ 2 On August 6, 2008, a Mohave County Sheriff's deputy stopped Sagely for speeding and for driving without functioning taillights. Sagely told him he lost his driver's license and gave the deputy a letter from the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division ("MVD") stating Sagely's license had been canceled at his request. Sagely's driving record, which the State admitted into evidence at trial, confirmed Sagely had canceled his license effective April 16, 2008, after the MVD had suspended it in December 2007. Sagely's eyes were "red and watery" and his breath smelled of alcohol. After Sagely stepped out of the car for field sobriety tests, his walking was "labored" and imbalanced. Sagely did not complete the field sobriety tests because he would not follow the deputy's instructions and had "bad knees." Sagely also refused to submit to an Intoxilyzer breath test.

¶ 3 The deputy obtained a search warrant, took Sagely to a hospital to draw a blood sample, and sent the sample to the lab for a blood alcohol content test. At trial, the criminologist from the crime lab testified Sagely's blood alcohol content was.137 two hours after the deputy stopped Sagely, which exceeded the legal limit of .08.

¶ 4 On January 15, 2009, a grand jury indicted Sagely on one count of aggravated driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and one count of aggravated driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 or more. After a trial, at which Sagely represented himself with court-appointed advisory counsel, a jury found Sagely guilty of both counts. The superior court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Sagely on eight years of supervised probation with four months' incarceration as one of the conditions of probation.

DISCUSSION

¶ 5 In his supplemental brief, Sagely argues the superior court should have granted his motions to dismiss the indictment for violation of his speedy-trial rights. We disagree. The superior court denied these motions because it found Sagely had not been prejudiced by the delay and, as it summarized in the hearing on the second motion to dismiss, "most of the delays have been attributable to the defense in their discovery requests, in the motions that have been filed, which do require delays so that we can have evidentiary hearings and oral arguments on them." The record amply supports the reasons given by the superior court in denying Sagely's speedy-trial motions. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions. State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 136, 945 P.2d 1260, 1267 (1997) (superior court's speedy-trial ruling will be upheld unless defendant "demonstrates that the court abused its discretion and that prejudice resulted").

¶ 6 Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 8.2, when a defendant is not in custody the court must try the defendant's offenses within 180 days of arraignment, subject to the time exclusions enumerated in Rule 8.4. However, "a defendant may waive speedy trial rights by not objecting to the denial of speedy trial in a timely manner." Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 138, 945 P.2d at 1269.

¶ 7 Here, Sagely was arraigned on March 4, 2009, and, in the absence of intervening events, he should have been tried by August 31, 2009. His trial actually began on July 6, 2010, 489 days after arraignment. Between those dates, however, Sagely filed numerous motions requiring evidentiary hearings or oral arguments, including a motion to exclude blood evidence. See id. at 140, 945 P.2d at 1271 (if "defendant fights to exclude DNA evidence, the delay resulting from hearings necessary to determine admissibility is necessarily attributable to the defense"). Moreover, on at least seven separate occasions, including a hearing on the speedy-trial violations, Sagely said he was not ready to proceed and requested more time before trial.2 Although he contends these delays were justified so he could receive the State's "charging instrument[s]," the court explained no traffic complaints existed in the case because a grand jury had indicted him, and there was no "logical basis" to continue the trial based on that request.

¶ 8 Furthermore, Sagely first moved to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation on November 20, 2009 — nearly three months after the Rule 8 time limits should have expired — which was the same day that he requested the court continue the trial date until March 2010. A defendant may not "wait until after the [Rule 8.2 time limit] has expired and then claim a Rule 8 violation after it is too late for the trial court to prevent the violation." Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 138, 945 P.2d at 1269 (brackets in original) (quoting State v. Swensrud, 168 Ariz. 21, 23, 810 P.2d 1028, 1030 (1991)). Even assuming Sagely was not the cause of the delays, he failed to show he suffered prejudice. Id. at 136, 945 P.2d at 1267.

¶ 9 Sagely also argues the court violated his speedy-trial rights under the United States and Arizona Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. "Neither the United States nor the Arizona Constitution requires that a trial be held within a specified time period." Spreitz, 190 Ariz. at 139, 945 P.2d at 1270. Rather, whether the delay warrants reversal of a conviction depends on four factors: "(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has demanded a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant." Id. (quoting State v. Lukezic, 143 Ariz. 60, 69, 691 P.2d 1088, 1097 (1984)). "In weighing these factors, the length of the delay is the least important, while the prejudice to the defendant is the most significant." Id. at 139-40, 945 P.2d at 1270-71. Here, the delays did not violate Sagely's constitutional speedy-trial rights because the record demonstrates Sagely caused almost all of the delays and did not suffer prejudice. Accordingly, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sagely's motions to dismiss based on speedy-trial violations.

¶ 10 Second, Sagely argues the superior court deprived him of a fair trial because it refused to provide him with its "points and authorities" when it denied his motions challenging the court's jurisdiction. This argument is without merit; the court adequately explained its ruling on the record. Furthermore, Sagely's challenges to the superior court's jurisdiction were and are also without merit.

¶ 11 Third, Sagely argues the superior court should have granted his "motion to exclude all evidence obtained by the prosecutor from other agencies that violated the Privacy Act of 1974," namely, his driving record obtained from the MVD. We disagree. Consistent with federal law, the MVD may properly disclose an individual's motor vehicle record:

A.R.S. § 28-455(C)(1), (4) (Supp. 2007); see 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), (4) (Supp. 2007). Thus, the prosecutor was not required to make a written request for the records, and the court properly admitted the evidence.

¶ 12 Fourth, as we understand his argument, Sagely contends the State agreed not to controvert any of the facts of the March 22, 2009 "agreement" and, based on these fact stipulations, it had no viable case and the superior court should have granted his motion to dismiss. This argument is without merit. The "agreement" referenced in his supplemental brief was attached to his omnibus hearing form, and the State never signed this statement of facts nor stipulated to any facts proffered by Sagely.

¶ 13 In addition to reviewing those portions of the record necessary to address Sagely's arguments, we have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. Sagely received a fair trial. After Sagely began to represent himself, he was assisted by advisory counsel at all remaining stages of the proceedings. Sagely was also present at all critical stages.

¶ 14 The evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports the verdicts. The jury was properly comprised of eight members and the court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charges, Sagely's presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and the necessity of a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and considered a presentence report, Sagely was given an opportunity to speak at sentencing, and his sentences were within the range of acceptable sentences for his offenses.

CONCLUSION

¶ 15 We decline to order briefing and affirm Sagely's convictions and sentences.

¶ 16 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel's obligations pertaining to Sagely's representation in this appeal have ended. Defense counsel need do no more than inform Sagely of the outcome of this appeal and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984).

¶ 17 Sagely has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court's own motion, we also grant Sagely 30 days from the date of this decision to file an in propria persona motion for reconsideration.

JOHN C. GEMMILL, Judge, PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge, concurring.