GAIL J. STANDISH, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Cecil Cohn ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint seeking review of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security's ("Commissioner") denial of his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge [Dkts. 10, 12] and briefs addressing disputed issues in the case [Dkt. 22 ("Pltf.'s Br.") and Dkt. 23 ("Def.'s Br.").] The Court has taken the parties' briefing under submission without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the decision of the ALJ and orders judgment entered accordingly.
On December 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI and DIB. [Dkt. 15, Administrative Record ("AR") 59, 223-238.] The Commissioner denied his initial claim for benefits on July 19, 2013 and upon reconsideration on October 30, 2013. [AR 165-173; AR 177-186.] On February 18, 2015, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Katherine Loo. [AR 76-109.] On April 17, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's request for benefits. [AR 56-75.] Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council, which denied review on August 9, 2016. [AR 1-4.]
Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(g)(1); 416.920(b)-(g)(1). At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2012, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2012, his date last insured. [AR 61.] At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: obesity, hypertension, diabetes, mellitus type II, and left ventricular hypertrophy. [Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).] Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. [AR 63 (citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926).]
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following residual functional capacity (RFC):
[AR 63-39.] Applying this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work, but determined that based on his age (46 years old), high school education, and ability to communicate in English, he could perform representative occupations such as warehouse worker (Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") 922.687-058), hand packer (DOT 753.687-038), and small products assembler (DOT 739.687-030) and, thus, is not disabled. [AR 70-71.]
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine if: (1) the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1074.
Plaintiff's sole claim is that the ALJ improperly found Plaintiff's testimony not fully credible. [Pltf.'s Br. at 2-10.]
Plaintiff's first challenges whether the ALJ provided specific reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony about her symptoms. "[T]o ensure our appellate review is meaningful, . . . we require the ALJ to specifically identify the testimony [from a claimant] she or he finds not to be credible and . . . explain what evidence undermines the testimony." Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, "[g]eneral findings are insufficient." Id. (internal quotation omitted). And as the Ninth Circuit held in Treichler, "boilerplate statement[s]" and "introductory remark[s]," without more, "fall[] short of meeting the ALJ's responsibility to provide `a discussion of the evidence' and `the reason or reasons upon which' [her] adverse determination is based." Id. at 1103.
Here, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ violated her duty to provide specific reasons because the ALJ, according to Plaintiff, gave only the following boilerplate explanation:
[Pltf.'s. Br. at 4 (quoting AR 65).] And this Court would agree if that were the only thing the ALJ said about Plaintiff's credibility. But the ALJ said far more.
Plaintiff's own brief further undercuts his position. After claiming that the ALJ's decision does not present specific reasons for discounting his testimony, Plaintiff attacks the ALJ's reasons for finding him not to be credible. [See, e.g., Pltf.'s. Br. at 5 ("it appears that the ALJ simply rejects Mr. Cohn's testimony based on a belief that the testimony is not credible because it lacks support in objective medical evidence."); id. at 8 ("Mr. Cohn's description of her [sic] activity level is far short of what is needed to demonstrate the capacity to perform work activity on a sustained basis."). Accordingly, the ALJ provided specific reasons for the credibility determination.
"Where, as here, an ALJ concludes that a claimant is not malingering, and that []he has provided objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms alleged, the ALJ may `reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of h[is] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.'" Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492-93 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). Even if "the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for disbelieving a claimant's testimony," if he "also provided valid reasons that were supported by the record," the ALJ's error "is harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision and the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ's ultimate conclusion." Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (internal quotation omitted).
"The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant's credibility, including (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities." Tomasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that acceptable bases for credibility determination include (1) the claimant's reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in the claimant's testimony or between his testimony and conduct; (3) claimant's daily living activities; (4) claimant's work record; and (5) testimony from physicians or third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of claimant's condition).
Plaintiff testified that he was unable to work because of his migraine headaches, back pain, swelling in his wrists, and high blood pressure. [AR 64, 85-90.] Plaintiff also stated that he has depression.
The ALJ found Plaintiff's testimony less than fully credible. [AR 65.] The ALJ gave the following reasons for partially discounting Plaintiff's testimony:
In his brief, Plaintiff attacks only the first two of these reasons—that Plaintiff's activities of daily living are inconsistent with a finding of disability and that Plaintiff's testimony was not supported by the medical record—as insufficient bases for the adverse credibility determination. [Pltf.'s Br. at 2-10.] The two additional reasons set forth by the ALJ are not even mentioned by Plaintiff, other than where he condemns all of the ALJ's "reasons"—plural—as not "clear and convincing." [Id.] It is Plaintiff's brief that is neither specific nor convincing. Plaintiff's unexplained failures to take prescribed hypertension and diabetes medication on a regular basis and to keep his appointments for medical tests (including the renal ultrasound), as well as Plaintiff's conservative treatment despite his allegedly disabling symptomatology are clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff's testimony. Given these two valid reasons that support the ALJ's ultimate determination that Plaintiff was less than credible (which are not disputed by Plaintiff), the Court need not address the two issues Plaintiff argues were improper.
The Court concludes that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for finding Plaintiff less than fully credible, and thus, there is no error warranting reversal and remand.
For all of the foregoing reasons,