MEMORANDUM OPINION
BARRY A. BRYANT, Magistrate Judge.
Raymond Lee Kyle ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social Security Act ("The Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying his applications for a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Act. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 5.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
1. Background:
Plaintiff protectively filed his disability applications on April 22, 2010. (Tr. 8, 125-136). In these applications, Plaintiff claims to be disabled due to "severe lower back pain, kidney pain & bleeding, swollen feet & hands, shortness of breath, crunch in knee." (Tr. 177). Plaintiff alleges an onset date of February 1, 2008. (Tr. 8, 125, 132). These applications were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 60-63).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his applications, and this hearing request was granted. (Tr. 80-112). Plaintiff's administrative hearing was held on April 5, 2011 in Fort Smith, Arkansas. (Tr. 31-59). Plaintiff was present and was represented by Fred Caddell at this hearing. Id. Plaintiff and Vocational Expert ("VE") Dale Thomas testified at this hearing. Id. As of the date of this hearing, Plaintiff was forty-eight (48) years old, which is defined as a "younger person" under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (DIB) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(c) (SSI). (Tr. 35). Plaintiff also testified he had completed the eighth grade in school. Id.
On May 9, 2011, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff's applications for DIB and SSI. (Tr. 8-18). In this decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through March 31, 2013. (Tr. 10, Finding 1). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity ("SGA") since February 1, 2008, his alleged onset date. (Tr. 10, Finding 2). The ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity, back disorder, depression, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and hypertension. (Tr. 10, Finding 3). The ALJ also determined Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulations No. 4 ("Listings"). (Tr. 10-12, Finding 4).
In this decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints and determined his RFC. (Tr. 12-16, Finding 5). First, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints and found his claimed limitations were not entirely credible. Id. Second, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the following:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to occasionally lift/carry ten pounds, frequently lift/carry less than ten pounds, sit for six hours during an eight-hour workday, and stand/walk for two hours during an eight-hour workday. The claimant can occasionally climb, balance, crawl, kneel, stoop, and crouch, but he must avoid concentrated exposure to dusts, odors, gases, and chemicals. The claimant can do work where interpersonal contact is incidental to the work performed, complexity of tasks is learned and performed by rote, with few variables and little judgment required, and supervision required is simple, direct, and concrete.
Id.
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's Past Relevant Work ("PRW"). (Tr. 16-17, Finding 6). The ALJ found Plaintiff's PRW included work as a press operator and a furniture assembly line worker. Id. The ALJ also found this PRW was performed at the light to medium level of exertion. Id. Because Plaintiff only retained the capacity to perform sedentary work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform any of this PRW. Id.
The ALJ then evaluated whether Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy considering his age, education, work experience, and RFC. (Tr. 17-18, Finding 10). The ALJ heard testimony from the VE on this issue. (Tr. 55-59). Based upon that testimony, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform work as a patcher with 15,500 such jobs in the nation and 500 such jobs in the region and as an interviewer with 37,000 such jobs in the nation and 500 such jobs in the region. (Tr. 17). Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Act, from February 1, 2008 through the date of his decision or through May 9, 2011. (Tr. 18, Finding 11).
Thereafter, Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council's review of the ALJ's unfavorable decision. (Tr. 25-26). The Appeals Council declined to review this unfavorable decision. (Tr. 1-3). On September 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. ECF No. 1. The Parties consented to the jurisdiction of this Court on September 16, 2011. ECF No. 5. Both Parties have filed appeal briefs. ECF Nos. 11-12. This case is now ready for decision.
2. Applicable Law:
In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently. See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).
It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines a "physical or mental impairment" as "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a "substantial gainful activity"; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff's age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).
3. Discussion:
In his appeal brief, Plaintiff raises the following three arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion evidence in this case; (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated his RFC; and (3) the ALJ erred in evaluating his credibility. ECF No. 11 at 1-16. Because this Court agrees with Plaintiff's third argument and finds the ALJ improperly performed his Polaski evaluation and improperly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints, this Court will only address the third issue Plaintiff raised.
In assessing the credibility of a claimant, the ALJ is required to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See Polaski, 739 at 1322.
The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant's subjective complaints of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor as long as the ALJ acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant's subjective complaints. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as the ALJ properly applies these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff's subjective complaints are not entirely credible, the ALJ's credibility determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints "solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]." Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.
When discounting a claimant's complaint of pain, the ALJ must make a specific credibility determination, articulating the reasons for discrediting the testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel, 159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the present action, the ALJ did not comply with Polaski. (Tr. 12-16). Instead of analyzing the Polaski factors and noting inconsistencies in the record, the ALJ only briefly discussed Plaintiff's daily activities. Id. Then, it appears he relied entirely upon the findings contained in Plaintiff's medical records to determine Plaintiff's subjective complaints were not credible. Id. Notably, instead of performing a careful analysis, he stated the following perfunctory language:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.
(Tr. 14). Because the ALJ did not properly evaluate Plaintiff's subjective complaints and did not comply with the requirements of Polaski, this case must be reversed and remanded.3 See Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (holding that the ALJ cannot discount Plaintiff's subjective complaints "solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them [the subjective complaints]").
4. Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits to Plaintiff, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed and remanded. A judgment incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.
