Filed: Sep. 08, 2014
Latest Update: Sep. 08, 2014
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24. MEMORANDUM DECISION ESPINOSA, Judge: 1 In this appeal from his convictions on multiple counts of theft by control and trafficking in stolen property, Reynaldo Vidal argues the trial court erred in submitting to the jury an interrogatory that was unsupported by the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm. 2
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24. MEMORANDUM DECISION ESPINOSA, Judge: 1 In this appeal from his convictions on multiple counts of theft by control and trafficking in stolen property, Reynaldo Vidal argues the trial court erred in submitting to the jury an interrogatory that was unsupported by the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm. 2 ..
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ESPINOSA, Judge:
¶1 In this appeal from his convictions on multiple counts of theft by control and trafficking in stolen property, Reynaldo Vidal argues the trial court erred in submitting to the jury an interrogatory that was unsupported by the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the convictions. See State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 914, 914 (App. 1999). After Vidal had visited her home in August 2010, Vidal's step-mother, A., noticed that "all the gold jewelry was missing." A set of bracelets also was taken from the jewelry box of Vidal's sister, W., with whom he lived. A police report was filed and the victims met a police officer at a pawn shop that had received some of the missing jewelry and identified various items. Under later questioning by a police officer, Vidal admitted having taken the jewelry and pawned it.
¶3 Vidal was charged with two counts of theft by control, one a class three felony and the other a class six felony, and seven counts of trafficking in stolen property. After the close of evidence, the state moved to "eliminate the upper three levels of value" on the theft counts and to instead include in the jury's interrogatories only values of $1,000 or more but less than $2,000, and less than $1,000. Vidal agreed to strike the higher values, but also moved to eliminate the $1,000 to $2,000 range, arguing the evidence did not support a finding of more than $1,000 in value as to each of the victims. The court agreed with Vidal that the interrogatory relating to the count involving W.'s property should be reduced to show a top value of $1,000, but retained the $1,000 to $2,000 range on the count involving A.'s property. The jury found Vidal guilty on six of the seven counts of trafficking and on both counts of theft, indicating it had determined the value of the property on the count relating to A. was more than $1,000, but less than $2,000. This appeal followed.
¶4 In the sole issue raised on appeal, Vidal maintains the trial court erred in allowing the $1,000 to $2,000 value range to remain on the interrogatory for the count involving A.'s property. He maintains "[t]here were no facts in this case indicating that the property taken from [A.] was worth more than $1,000" and the court therefore should not have submitted that count to the jury "on th[at] basis." We review a trial court's rejection of a proposed alteration to the verdict form, like its rejection of special instructions, for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309, 896 P.2d 830, 849 (1995). We find none here.
¶5 During A.'s trial testimony, she identified six rings included in photographs of the jewelry pawned by Vidal. She testified she had purchased one of the rings for $300 and another for $500. Vidal received $45 for each of those rings when he pawned them. Pawn slips entered into evidence showed the pawn shop had paid Vidal a total of $170 for the remaining four rings, which A. had described and identified during her testimony, but for which she had not provided a value because she received them as gifts.1
¶6 A pawn shop employee testified that the pawn value of an item was determined by "the gold value . . . that day." The shop simply weighed the item and determined value on that basis. Another pawn shop employee testified that if a person presenting an item to pawn was willing to accept less than the value of the item, they would pawn it for that lesser value, allowing the person to redeem the item at a lower price and with less interest. In view of this testimony and the disparity between the amounts A. had paid for the two rings she had purchased herself and the amounts Vidal received from the pawn shop, the jurors could draw a reasonable inference that the jewelry as a whole was worth over $1,000. Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including the $1,000 to $2,000 interrogatory on the verdict form.
¶7 Vidal's convictions and sentences are affirmed.