EILEEN S. WILLETT, Magistrate Judge.
On August 31, 2016, David Levy Greenberg ("Petitioner"), through counsel, filed a "Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By Person in State Custody" (the "Petition") (Doc. 1). The Court ordered Respondents to answer the Petition. (Doc. 3). On November 21, 2016, Petitioner filed a "Motion to Stay Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Hold in Abeyance and Permit Amendment Upon Exhaustion of Pending State Court Petition" (Doc. 9). Respondents oppose the Petitioner's requested stay. (Doc. 10).
The Supreme Court has instructed that a "stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances" and is "only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court." Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (explaining that a stay "frustrates AEDPA's objective of encouraging finality" and "undermines AEDPA's goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner's incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior to filing his federal petition"). Petitioner's Motion to Stay (Doc. 9) does not address the reasons for his failure to exhaust his habeas claims prior to initiating this action. The undersigned finds that Petitioner has not shown the requisite good cause to justify a stay. See Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a court has the discretion to stay a fully unexhausted habeas petition under "the circumstances set forth in Rhines" and stating that "a stay is granted only when the petitioner shows, among other things, `good cause for his failure to exhaust'") (quoting Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277). Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that his habeas claims are potentially meritorious. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. Therefore,
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., the parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).