ORDER

G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.

On March 1, 2012, the Court issued an Order (Doc. 52) denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 18) and Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or to Transfer (Doc. 17). On March 20, 2012, Defendant Mobrez1 submitted the instant Motion for Reconsideration, requesting that the Court reconsider its March 1 denial of Defendants' motions. (Doc. 57). Generally, motions to reconsider are appropriate only if the Court "(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court "to rethink what the court had already thought through, rightly or wrongly." Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.1983)).

In their motion for reconsideration, Defendants have not presented new evidence, identified clear error or manifest injustice, or identified a change in the law. (See Doc. 57). As Defendants noted in their motions to dismiss, Edward Magedson, Plaintiff's manager, sent Defendant an email on July 24, 2009 in which he stated "I am in California, I live here now." (Doc. 18-4, Ex. A). This does not change the fact, however, that in April and May 2009, Defendants called Xcentric, an Arizona LLC, at its Arizona phone number multiple times in alleged furtherance of a malicious lawsuit. Nor does Magedson's possible California residency change the fact that Defendants filed the allegedly malicious lawsuit against Magedson's Arizona LLC, traveled to Arizona for settlement discussions with Magedson and sent attorneys to Arizona to depose him. In essence, Defendants' motion is a request for the Court to rethink what the Court has already thought through. It is therefore denied.

To be sure, the Court has a strong interest in ensuring that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."); The Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (holding that a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, and that the court may raise this issue sua sponte). Nonetheless, even were the Court to find that Magedson is now a citizen of California, this would not affect the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Complaint alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because "there is complete diversity among the parties." (Doc. 55, ¶ 9). For the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, "an LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens." Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). Xcentric is an LLC with only one owner/member, namely CBIC—a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Nevada. (See Doc. 21). Even though Magedson, an alleged California citizen, is CBIC's sole shareholder, CBIC is a corporation, not an LLC. And "a corporation is a citizen only of (1) the state where its principal place of business is located, and (2) the state in which it is incorporated." Johnson, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). None of the Defendants contend that they are citizens of Nevada. Consequently the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 57).