ORDER AND OPINION [Re: Motion at docket 24]

JOHN W. SEDWICK, Senior District Judge.

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 24 defendant Secura Supreme Insurance Company ("Secura") moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) for an order to bifurcate or stay proceedings on plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and bad faith until the jury determines whether plaintiff is entitled to compensation under the underinsured motorist provision in the insurance policy issued by Secura. The response from plaintiff Brandon Lassley ("Lassley") is at docket 28. Secura's reply is at docket 30. Oral argument was heard on September 18, 2015.

II. BACKGROUND

Lassley alleges that he is a named insured in an automobile insurance policy purchased by his parents from Secura ("Policy").1 The Policy includes underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage with a $500,000 limit. The Policy was in effect at all times material to this action.

On January 20, 2011 Lassley was riding in an automobile when the intoxicated driver lost control of the vehicle. Lassley was injured in the ensuing crash. Lassley settled with the driver for the $100,000 liability limit in the driver's American Family insurance policy. Lassley submitted a UIM claim to Secura in May 2012 and demanded policy limits. Secura evaluated Lassley's claim and concluded that the driver was not underinsured, stating that Lassley was "fully compensated for his injuries with the $100,000 obtained by the driver's insurance carrier."2 The parties nevertheless exchanged settlement offers, but were unable to reach a settlement agreement. During the course of dealings between Lassley and Secura's representatives, Secura asked and Lassley agreed to submit to an independent medical examination ("IME"). In January 2014 the IME physician concluded that the injury to Lassley's left anterior cruciate ligament ("ACL") likely resulted from the auto accident and that Lassley had residual knee problems.

The UIM policy states that if the parties are unable to agree on the amount of Lassley's damages, they can agree to submit that issue to arbitration.3 The contract is silent regarding what happens if the parties do not agree to arbitration, which is what happened here.4 Believing he had no other option to vindicate his contractual rights,5 Lassley brought the present action in July 2014 in which he alleges breach of the insurance contract and bad faith. Lassley seeks compensatory and punitive damages. The lawsuit was filed in an Arizona superior court. Secura removed the case based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 42(b) governs Secura's motion for bifurcation. It states in pertinent part that the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues or claims "[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize."6 This rule "confers broad discretion upon the district court to bifurcate a trial."7 "The piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single lawsuit . . . is not to be the usual course," however, and will be ordered only where the party seeking separate trials meets his or her burden of proving that bifurcation is necessary.8

IV. DISCUSSION

Secura's peculiar motion asks the court to bifurcate this action into two trials: (1) a trial on a hypothetical "claim for UIM benefits" not found in Lassley's complaint9 and (2) a trial on the two claims Lassley actually pled (breach of contract and bad faith).10 Secura argues that the two claims in Lassley's complaint are not yet ripe for adjudication, but instead of seeking dismissal of those claims it asks the court to stay all litigation, including discovery, pending the jury's resolution of a non-existent "claim for UIM benefits."11 Secura cites no cases where a court has granted such an extraordinary request, and put actual claims on hold in order for a jury to resolve a hypothetical one.

What is more, even assuming (without deciding) that Secura is correct in asserting that Lassley must pursue a "UIM benefits" cause of action and not a breach of contract action, bifurcation would still serve no purpose. Secura argues that bifurcation will further Rule 42(b)'s goals of avoiding prejudice and expediting the litigation because, it argues, Lassley's "bad faith claim will presumably go away" after the jury decides the amount of damages to which Lassley is entitled.12 This is not so. Even if such a jury verdict would resolve Lassley's claim for benefits, it would not resolve Lassley's claim for bad faith insurance adjustment. This latter claim does not depend on the value of Lassley's damages. Instead, it focuses on whether Secura violated its "obligation to immediately conduct an adequate investigation, act reasonably in evaluating the claim, and act promptly in paying a legitimate claim."13 The jury would need to hear evidence relevant to this claim regardless of the amount it ultimately decides that Lassley can recover under the policy.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the preceding discussion, Secura's motion at docket 24 is DENIED.