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IRIS v. STATE, 1395 (2011)

Court: Supreme Court of Alaska Number: inakco20111005009 Visitors: 13
Filed: Oct. 05, 2011
Latest Update: Oct. 05, 2011
Summary: NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite a memorandum decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Appellate Rule 214(d). MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT * 1. Iris and Ryan are the parents of Drake. 1 Iris is the mother of Jules. 2 Jules and Drake are Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). 3 2. The Office of Children's Services (OCS) removed Jules from Iris after he was exposed to domes
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NOTICE

Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. A party wishing to cite a memorandum decision in a brief or at oral argument should review Appellate Rule 214(d).

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT*

1. Iris and Ryan are the parents of Drake.1 Iris is the mother of Jules.2 Jules and Drake are Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).3

2. The Office of Children's Services (OCS) removed Jules from Iris after he was exposed to domestic violence, and placed him with his maternal aunt, LeAnn, and her husband. An OCS social worker met with Iris and developed a case plan, identified reunification services and service providers, and arranged visitation. The social worker created a schedule of parenting classes for Iris, who went to only four of 12 classes.

3. Iris was then arrested for violating probation by moving without notifying her probation officer.4 Upon release, she moved into the Juneau Aiding Women in Abuse and Rape Emergencies (AWARE) shelter. In response to Iris's comments that prior counseling was not adequately addressing her anger management issues, an OCS social worker had Iris do an intake interview at SouthEast Alaska Regional Health Consortium (SEARHC), where Iris was wait-listed for counseling. In response to Iris's indication that she would undergo a psychological assessment, the social worker arranged an assessment and funding for that assessment. Iris was given a bus pass for transportation, but did not attend her psychological assessment appointments. Iris later admitted that she had never intended to go.

4. On October 31, 2009, Juneau police responded to a domestic violence report between Iris and Ryan, who were then married. Ryan had extinguished his cigarette on Iris's head and hit her after he and Iris got into a verbal altercation. On January 14, 2010, Iris and Ryan began arguing and Ryan grabbed Iris, who was eight months pregnant with Drake, and pushed her; Iris fell and began having contractions.

5. After Drake was born an OCS social worker arranged for Iris and Drake to go to the Juneau AWARE shelter. Iris then moved into an apartment, so the social worker established a safety plan that included hours during which Ryan could not be in the home, and that prohibited Ryan from being alone with Drake because Ryan had been convicted of physically abusing another infant son.

6. An OCS social worker assumed custody of Drake based on concerns for Drake's welfare because of a safety plan violation — Ryan was found in Iris's apartment during prohibited hours. Drake was placed in LeAnn's home, the same home as Jules.

7. OCS referred Iris to Catholic Community Services' parenting classes, a mental health assessment program located at and funded by SEARHC, and AWARE for classes about violence in relationships. OCS also referred Iris for individual counseling. OCS set up twice weekly visits with Jules and Drake; OCS also arranged visits at LeAnn's home but this did not last long because Iris began making allegations of alcohol abuse by LeAnn in addition to calling the police to do child welfare checks on LeAnn.5

8. Juneau police went to Iris and Ryan's apartment after they were told that Iris had threatened to have her brother shoot everyone. Iris was four months pregnant with her third son and intoxicated. Because Iris had violated her parole, she was ordered to serve the remainder of her criminal sentence, with an expected release date of October 18, 2011.

9. While incarcerated, Iris wrote a threatening letter to a woman with whom Ryan was having an affair, stating: "So I said that I was going to have my brother come and [shoot] you in the head. . . . I didn't need my brother's help the night I [stabbed Dezeree W.]."

10. Iris entered Hiland Mountain Correctional Center's Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) program. To create a plan for the baby that Iris was carrying, Iris's counselor worked with Iris's lawyer, her sons' guardian ad litem, and OCS, with whom the counselor also coordinated Iris's case plan requirements. After giving birth to her third son, Jack,6 Iris returned to the RSAT program. However, she asked to be discharged from the program against treatment advice after being disrespectful to RSAT staff. Iris then asked to re-enter RSAT and signed a behavioral contract that put her on notice that her aggressive behavior would not be tolerated. Iris was late to classes, lashed out at other program participants, threw a dustpan at another inmate, and used inappropriate language. When RSAT staff discussed the dustpan incident with her, Iris became so upset that an officer handcuffed her and took her to segregation. Iris was formally discharged from RSAT because of her conduct.

11. OCS petitioned for a termination of parental rights. The superior court found that both children were in need of aid under AS 47.10.080,7 AS 47.10.011(1), (2), (6), (8), (10), and (11),8 and AS 47.10.013.9 The superior court terminated parental rights to both children after finding by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Iris and Ryan failed to timely remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that put the children at substantial risk of harm;10 (2) OCS made reasonable and active, though unsuccessful, efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the break up of the Indian family;11 and (3) it was contrary to the welfare of the children to return home.12 The superior court also found there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including expert testimony pursuant to ICWA, that returning the children to either Iris or Ryan was likely to result in serious emotional and physical damage to the children.13 The superior court found that terminating Iris and Ryan's parental rights was in the best interests of the children.14

12. Specifically, the superior court based its finding in part on Iris's long history of treatment prior to OCS taking custody of the children; this treatment aimed at her serious mental issues and violent behavior, including treatment as a juvenile in residential programs and secure treatment facilities. The court also considered her history as an adult in RSAT and correctional facilities. The superior court relied on OCS developing and updating case plans, offering parenting classes, providing supervised visits, providing transportation to services, referring Iris to domestic violence classes, referring Iris to therapy for her anger and domestic violence issues, scheduling and paying for Iris to attend a psychological assessment, and referring Iris to the Preserving Native Families program for support services. The superior court also based its conclusion on the Department of Corrections's (DOC) provision of case management services while Iris was on probation, and the DOC's provision of the RSAT program through which Iris would have had the opportunity to receive intensive substance abuse treatment and classes on parenting, grief, and loss.

13. Based on the expert testimony of Shelly Gomez, an OCS family services supervisor and ICWA-qualified expert, and Julie Peters, an expert in speech and language pathology and Jules's speech pathologist, the superior court found beyond a reasonable doubt that returning the children to Iris was likely to cause them serious emotional and physical damage. The superior court based its conclusion on Iris's destructive patterns of behavior, the lack of change over time, and Jules's 50% delay in communication, which requires him to have a stable home to provide the structure, routine, and consistency necessary for a decrease in his developmental delays.

14. The question whether OCS used active remedial efforts to reunify the Indian family is a mixed question of law and fact.15 Whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that a child is likely to be seriously harmed if returned to a parent is a mixed question of law and fact.16 When reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, we review legal questions using our independent judgment and factual questions under the clearly erroneous standard.17

15. Regarding parental willingness to participate in treatment recommended in the case plan, we have stated: "The court should look to OCS's involvement in its entirety, and may consider a parent's demonstrated unwillingness to participate in treatment as a factor in determining whether OCS met its active efforts burden."18 Regarding parental incarceration, we have stated: "the practical circumstances of incarceration may reduce the possible options available."19 Finally, "because ICWA requires the State, rather than a particular agency, to make active efforts. . . to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs, we have held that the [DOC] . . . may fulfill this obligation by enrolling the parent in classes and treatment programs."20

16. Iris appeals the superior court's order; Ryan does not.21 On appeal, Iris makes two arguments: (1) that the superior court erred in finding that OCS made reasonable and active efforts to prevent the break up of the Indian family; and (2) that the superior court erred in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the return of the children to Iris's care would likely result in serious damage to the children.

17. There is ample evidence in the record to support the superior court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that OCS made reasonable and active efforts to prevent the break up of the Indian family. After Jules's removal, OCS's active efforts included developing a case plan identifying services addressing domestic violence, anger management, mental health issues, parenting issues, and medical needs, in addition to identifying service providers and recommending that Iris contact her tribe for further assistance. OCS also developed a schedule of parenting classes for Iris and Ryan, and arranged visitation.

After Iris's release from incarceration, OCS's efforts included updating her case plan, providing a mental health assessment and bus pass, agreeing to fund another mental health evaluation if the evaluator was approved in advance, scheduling visitation with a supervisor who modeled appropriate parental behavior, and giving Iris information on proper infant nutrition.

After Drake's birth, OCS developed a safety plan, Iris's and Ryan's violation of which resulted in OCS assuming custody of Drake. After Drake's removal, OCS provided referrals to parenting classes, a mental health assessment, and classes about violence in relationships. OCS also provided a referral for individual counseling, a referral to Iris's tribe's Preserving Native Families program, coordination with the tribe so that the children could participate in cultural activities, and visitation.

When Iris was incarcerated for a probation violation, the DOC assumed reunification efforts, and Iris was able to join the DOC's RSAT program. The RSAT social worker helped Iris place the child born while she was incarcerated, and set up in-person and telephonic visitation.22

18. There is also ample evidence in the record to support the superior court's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that return of the children to Iris's care would likely result in serious damage to the children. Iris had been involved in numerous domestic violence situations. She was charged with assaulting her pregnant sister. She was convicted for stabbing another woman multiple times. She was involved in a domestic dispute with Ryan in which he pushed and hit her, and she threw things at him, bit him, and broke a mirror over his head. Iris reported that Ryan had pushed her down a set of stairs. An officer testified that Ryan extinguished his cigarette on Iris's head and hit her. Ryan also pushed Iris, causing her to fall and begin having contractions because she was eight months pregnant with Drake.

Iris's issues with anger and violence are not confined to the home. Iris's probation officer testified that Iris "battles anger. That's her immediate response to everything." The officer also testified about Iris's history of entering treatment, then being discharged for assaultive behavior. While incarcerated, Iris wrote a threatening letter to a woman whom Ryan was having an affair with, stating: "So I said that I was going to have my brother come and [shoot] you in the head. . . . I didn't need my brother's help the night I [stabbed Dezeree W.]." While in RSAT, Iris threw a dustpan at another inmate and used inappropriate language. When RSAT staff discussed the incident with her, Iris became so upset that an officer handcuffed her and took her to segregation. These examples of Iris's continuing pattern of violence, some of which occurred in the children's presence, and her failure to successfully complete any of her case plan designed to remedy her anger and assaultive behavior, strongly suggest that the children would be seriously harmed if returned to her care.

The superior court also relied on the expert testimony of Shelly Gomez, OCS family services supervisor, who testified that Iris does not acknowledge any understanding of how domestic violence incidents may have affected her children. The court also relied on the expert testimony of Julie Peters, Jules's speech and language pathologist, who testified that because Jules has a 50% delay in communication, he requires a stable home to provide structure, routine, and consistency to decrease in his developmental delays.

19. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the superior court's finding that OCS made reasonable and active efforts to prevent the break up of the Indian family. We also AFFIRM the superior court's finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the return of the children to Iris's care would likely result in serious damage to the children.

FootNotes


* Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
1. Pseudonyms have been used throughout the memorandum opinion and judgment to protect the privacy of the family. Although both Iris's and Ryan's parental rights to Drake were ultimately terminated, only Iris appeals this determination. Accordingly, this opinion focuses on Iris.
2. Jules's biological father relinquished his parental rights.
3. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). The children's status as Indian children under ICWA was not contested on appeal and the parties' briefing suggests there was no dispute that the State was required to meet the higher burden of proof to terminate Iris's parental rights. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the children are "Indian children" within the meaning of ICWA.
4. Iris had previously been sentenced to 46 months with 24 months suspended on an assault in the second degree conviction for stabbing another woman multiple times.
5. LeAnn and her husband returned Jules and Drake to OCS because they "could no longer stand the abuse [they] had to endure from [Iris's mother] and [Iris]."
6. Iris placed Jack with her brother and his girlfriend so OCS did not assume custody.
7. AS 47.10.080(o) provides: For purposes of terminating a parent's parental rights under the standards in (c)(3) of this section, the court may determine that incarceration of the parent is sufficient grounds for determining that a child is a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011 as a result of parental conduct and that the parental rights of the incarcerated parent should be terminated if the court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the period of incarceration that the parent is scheduled to serve during the child's minority is significant considering the child's age and the child's need for an adult's care and supervision; (2) there is not another parent willing and able to care for the child; and (3) the incarcerated parent has failed to make adequate provisions for care of the child during the period of incarceration that will be during the child's minority.
8. AS 47.10.011 provides: Subject to AS 47.10.019, the court may find a child to be a child in need of aid if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been subjected to any of the following: (1) a parent or guardian has abandoned the child as described in AS 47.10.013, and the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter; (2) a parent, guardian, or custodian is incarcerated, the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter, and the incarcerated parent has not made adequate arrangements for the child; . . . . (6) the child has suffered substantial physical harm, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer substantial physical harm, as a result of conduct by or conditions created by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian or by the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian to supervise the child adequately; . . . . (8) conduct by or conditions created by the parent, guardian, or custodian have (A) resulted in mental injury to the child; or (B) placed the child at substantial risk of mental injury as a result of (i) a pattern of rejecting, terrorizing, ignoring, isolating, or corrupting behavior that would, if continued, result in mental injury; or (ii) exposure to conduct by a household member, as defined in AS 18.66.990, against another household member that is a crime under AS 11.41.100-11.41.220, 11.41.230(a)(1) or (2), or 11.41.410-11.41.432, an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.100-11.41.220, 11.41.230(a)(1) or (2), or 11.41.410-11.41.432, an attempt to commit an offense that is a crime under AS 11.41.100-11.41.220 or 11.41.410-11.41.432, or an attempt to commit an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.100-11.41.220 or 11.41.410-11.41.432; or (iii) repeated exposure to conduct by a household member, as defined in AS 18.66.990, against another household member that is a crime under AS 11.41.230(a)(3) or 11.41.250-11.41.270 or an offense under a law or ordinance of another jurisdiction having elements similar to a crime under AS 11.41.230(a)(3) or 11.41.250-11.41.270; . . . . (10) the parent, guardian, or custodian's ability to parent has been substantially impaired by the addictive or habitual use of an intoxicant, and the addictive or habitual use of the intoxicant has resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the child; if a court has previously found that a child is a child in need of aid under this paragraph, the resumption of use of an intoxicant by a parent, guardian, or custodian within one year after rehabilitation is prima facie evidence that the ability to parent is substantially impaired and the addictive or habitual use of the intoxicant has resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the child as described in this paragraph; (11) the parent, guardian, or custodian has a mental illness, serious emotional disturbance, or mental deficiency of a nature and duration that places the child at substantial risk of physical harm or mental injury[.]
9. AS 47.10.013 provides in pertinent part: (a) For purposes of this chapter, the court may find abandonment of a child if a parent or guardian has shown a conscious disregard of parental responsibilities toward the child by failing to provide reasonable support, maintain regular contact, or provide normal supervision, considering the child's age and need for care by an adult. Abandonment of a child also includes instances when the parent or guardian, without justifiable cause, (1) left the child with another person without provision for the child's support and without meaningful communication with the child for a period of three months; (2) has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child; (3) failed for a period of at least six months to maintain regular visitation with the child; (4) failed to participate in a suitable plan or program designed to reunite the parent or guardian with the child; (5) left the child without affording means of identifying the child and the child's parent or guardian; (6) was absent from the home for a period of time that created a substantial risk of serious harm to a child left in the home; (7) failed to respond to notice of child protective proceedings; or (8) was unwilling to provide care, support, or supervision for the child.
10. AS 47.10.088(a)(2); CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
11. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d); AS 47.10.088(a)(3); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(A).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e); AS 47.10.080(c)(3); AS 47.10.088; CINA Rule 18.
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e); AS 47.10.080(c)(3); AS 47.10.088; CINA Rule 18.
14. AS 47.10.080(c)(1)(A); CINA Rule 18(c)(3).
15. Ben M. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 204 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Alaska 2009) (citing E.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 46 P.3d 986, 989 (Alaska 2002)).
16. Id. (citing E.A., 46 P.3d at 989).
17. Id. (citing A.M. v. State, 945 P.2d 296, 304 n.10 (Alaska 1997)).
18. Pravat P. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 249 P.3d 264, 271 (Alaska 2011) (citing Dale H. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 235 P.3d 203, 213 (Alaska 2010)).
19. T.F. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 26 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Alaska 2001).
20. Id. at 1096 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
21. Iris does not appeal the superior court's findings on the children's CINA status. Therefore, we take as established that the children are children in need of aid as determined by the superior court; that Iris and Ryan failed to timely remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that put the children at substantial risk of harm; that it is contrary to the welfare of the children to return home; and that terminating Iris and Ryan's parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
22. T.F., 26 P.3d at 1096 (holding DOC may fulfill the state's requirement to make active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs under ICWA).
Source:  Leagle

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