ORDER

JAMES M. MOODY, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Cory Deontra Bradley, is a prisoner in the Federal Correctional Institution located in Forrest City, Arkansas. He has recently filed a Motion for Protective Order, which is more properly characterized as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See docket entry #55. For the following reasons, the Motion will be denied.

II. Discussion

In August of 2011, Plaintiff filed this pro se action alleging that Defendants violated the Federal Torts Claim Act and his constitutional rights when they failed to: (1) protect him from being beaten by another inmate on March 29, 2011; (2) provide him with adequate medical care for the injury he suffered during that fight; (3) provide him with adequate mental health care for paranoia; and (4) grant him protective custody and a single man cell. See docket entries #1 and #5.

On May 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion alleging that Defendants and other prison officials are currently retaliating against him, in numerous ways, for filing this lawsuit.1 See docket entry #55. Accordingly, he asks the Court to issue an Order directing that he be immediately transferred to another federal prison that "is within 500 miles of his home state of Missouri." Id. at 2.

When deciding whether to grant a prisoner preliminary injunctive relief, a court must consider: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the balance between the harm to the movant and the harm to the nonmoving party should the injunction issue; (3) the likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Bear v. Kautzky, 305 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Dataphase Sys. v. C.L. Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)). Importantly, the movant bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction. Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2011). Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has emphasized that "in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration." Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995).

Keeping these principles in mind, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction should be denied because he has not demonstrated a threat of irreparable harm or the likelihood of success on the merits of his underlying claims.2

Additionally, a party requesting a preliminary injunction must "establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint." Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a relationship between the alleged retaliation and the conduct asserted in his Complaint (i.e., failure to protect, inadequate medical treatment, and denial of protective custody status and a single man cell). See, e.g., Devose, 42 F.3d at 471 (affirming the denial of a prisoner's request for a preliminary injunction because his allegations of recent retaliation for filing the lawsuit were "entirely different from" the inadequate medical care claims and relief requested in his § 1983 complaint); Owens v. Severin, Case No. 08-1418, 2008 WL 4240153 (Sept. 18, 2008) (unpublished opinion) (affirming the denial of a prisoner's request for a preliminary injunction because "the relief sought was unrelated to the allegations in his [§ 1983] complaint").

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for a Protective Order (docket entry #55), which has been construed as a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, is DENIED.

2. The Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis appeal would not be taken in good faith.