JAMES M. MOODY, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Cory Deontra Bradley, is a prisoner in the Federal Correctional Institution located in Forrest City, Arkansas. He has filed a pro se action alleging that Defendants violated the Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA") and his constitutional rights. See docket entries #1, #5, and #48. Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Brief in Support, and a Statement of Undisputed Facts. See docket entries #40, #41, and #42. Plaintiff has filed a Response, a Supplemental Response, a Statement of Facts, and an Addendum. See docket entries #45, #50, #53, and #54. For the following reasons, the Motion will be granted and the case dismissed, without prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Officer Meadows, Nurse Weyant, Dr. Spitz, and Dr. McIntyre violated his Eighth Amendment rights as protected by Bivens.
Defendants Meadows, Weyant, Spitz, and McIntyre argue that the Bivens claims must be dismissed, without prejudice, because Plaintiff has failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. See docket entries #40 and #41. This argument is well taken.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides, in pertinent part, that: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to give prison officials the opportunity to rectify the perceived problem before the courts become involved. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) (explaining that the exhaustion requirement applies to federal prisoners who have filed a Bivens action). Importantly, the Eighth Circuit has clarified that § 1997e(a) requires inmates to: (1) fully exhaust their administrative remedies as to each separate claim raised in the complaint; and (2) complete the exhaustion process prior to filing an action in federal court.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not fully and properly exhaust his prison administrative remedies regarding any of his Bivens claims prior to filing this lawsuit on August 29, 2011.
Plaintiff explains that he did not so because monetary damages are unavailable in the prison grievance system. See docket entries #45 and #50. However, in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001), the Court held that the PLRA requires an inmate to complete the prison grievance process even though it does not permit an award of monetary damages.
Plaintiff also contends that, in late September of 2011, a prison counselor told him that he could only obtain monetary damages by filing an FTCA claim. See docket entries #45 and #50. Thus, Plaintiff mistakenly believed that he was not required to use the prison grievance process. Id.
It is well settled that a prisoner's subjective and possibly incorrect understanding of the prison grievance process is irrelevant to a determination of whether there has been proper exhaustion. See Hahn v. Armstrong, Case No. 10-1785, 2011 WL 135740 (8th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011) (unpublished decision); Gibson v. Weber, 431 F.3d 339, 341 (8th Cir. 2005); Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2000).
More importantly, Plaintiff allegedly received the misleading information in late September of 2011, which was a month after he filed his Complaint. As previously explained, the PLRA requires a prisoner to complete all stages of the prison grievance process before filing a complaint in federal court. Thus, any misunderstanding Plaintiff may have had in September of 2011 is irrelevant.
Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to grant him an extension of time so that he may properly exhaust his administrative remedies. See docket entry #45. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that exhaustion is mandatory, and that unexhausted claims must be dismissed, without prejudice, if they have not been fully and properly exhausted prior to the filing of the complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). Thus, Plaintiff's Bivens claims against Defendants Meadows, Weyant, Spitz, and McIntyre are dismissed, without prejudice.
Plaintiff also brings an FTCA claim against Defendant United States.
Defendant United States argues that Plaintiff has not properly exhausted his administrative remedies in regard to these FTCA claims. See docket entries #40 and #41.
Before filing an FTCA claim in federal court, a plaintiff must file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency, which in this case is the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP").
The purpose of the FTCA exhaustion requirement is to give the "federal agencies a fair opportunity to meaningfully consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, deny, or settle FTCA claims prior to suit." Mader v. U.S., 654 F.3d 794, 801 (8th Cir. 2011). Thus, in the administrative claim, a plaintiff must provide the federal agency with sufficient information to conduct an investigation, which includes "the identity of the claimants and the nature of the claims." Farmers State Savs. Bank v. Farmers Home Admin., 866 F.2d 276, 277 (8th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
The issue in this case is whether Plaintiff provided the BOP with sufficient information about the nature of the claims that he currently raises in this federal lawsuit.
On April 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the BOP. The form directed Plaintiff to: "State in detail the known facts and circumstances . . . identifying persons and property involved, the place of the occurrence and the cause thereof. Use additional pages if necessary." See docket entry #42 at 21 (emphasis added). Immediately below these clear instructions, Plaintiff wrote: "I suffered a wound under my arm on [my] upper rib cage from a weapon used by another inmate." Id. Plaintiff did not provide any other details about the nature of his claim.
The BOP denied Plaintiff's April 22 administrative claim because "it claim is for a personal injury suffered as a result of a fight," and "[y]ou have provided no evidence of, nor alleged, any wrongdoing by an employee of the United States." Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
On June 26, 2011, Plaintiff filed a second administrative claim. See docket entry #9 at 4. Once again, the form instructed Plaintiff to: "State in detail the known facts and circumstances . . . identifying persons and property involved, the place of the occurrence and the cause thereof. Use additional pages if necessary." Id. (emphasis). This time, Plaintiff gave a more detailed explanation of what occurred on March 29, 2011. Specifically, he explained that:
Id.
The BOP denied Plaintiff's June 26 administrative claim because it was duplicative of his April 22 administrative claim. Id. at 1.
Clearly, neither the April 22 nor the June 26 administrative claim alleged that federal employees negligently treated Plaintiff's paranoia or improperly denied his May 2011 requests for protective custody and a single man cell. Thus, Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies in regard to either of these two FTCA claims.
Plaintiff's two remaining FTCA claims have similar exhaustion problems. The April 22 and June 26 administrative claims also do not mention that federal employees allegedly caused the fight and failed to protect Plaintiff from Wynn's attack. To the contrary, according to the June 26 administrative claim, Plaintiff thought his verbal argument with Wynn was over, and he was surprised when Wynn subsequently reentered the TV room and attacked him. Additionally, Plaintiff did not allege, as he currently does in this federal lawsuit, that Defendant Meadows negligently left the control booth outside the TV and thus, failed to stop the fight sooner.
Further, neither the April 22 nor the June 26 administrative claims alleged that Plaintiff received negligent medical care for the minor injury he suffered during his fight with Wynn. In fact, the BOP denied Plaintiff's April 22 administrative claim because it thought he was trying to hold the Government liable for Wynn's conduct, and not for any alleged wrongdoing by a federal employee. In sum, neither Plaintiff's April 22 nor his June 26 administrative claims gave the BOP sufficient information so that it could "meaningfully consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, deny, or settle" any of Plaintiff's negligence claims which are now being asserted in this case under the FTCA. See Mader, 654 F.3d at 801; Farmers State Savs. Bank, 866 F.2d at 277; see also Allen v. U.S., 590 F.3d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that: "While we will liberally construe an administrative charge for exhaustion of remedies purposes, we also recognize that there is a difference between liberally reading a claim which lacks specificity, and inventing, ex nihilo, a claim which simply was not made"). Thus, Plaintiff's FTCA claims against Defendant United States are dismissed, without prejudice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry #40) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. The Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis appeal would not be taken in good faith.
Additionally, exhaustion under the FTCA is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. See Allen v. U.S., 590 F.3d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 2009). Thus, a trial court may consider, sua sponte, exhaustion of an FTCA claim. Id. In contrast, exhaustion of a Bivens claim, under the PLRA, is an affirmative defense that must be raised and proved by the defendant. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).
