OPINION & ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY, Chief District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Law Offices of Williams L. Geary LPA, William L. Geary, and Stacey Gilbert-Osborne's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 77.) The Motion is fully briefed, and the Court will resolve the matter without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion [#77].

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Moses and Mark McCormick filed this RICO action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962 following a string of events related to their Ohio state court proceedings that left them feeling aggrieved. Plaintiffs make several allegations, many of which are difficult to follow, against various state courts, agencies, attorneys, and others. With respect to the Defendants at issue in this Motion, Plaintiffs raise the following complaints:

Defendants move to dismiss the claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint for a lack of personal jurisdiction and a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, "[a]ll factual allegations in the complaint must be presumed true, and reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the non-moving party." Mitchell v. BMI Fed. Credit Union, 374 F.Supp.3d 664, 667 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (quoting Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008)). The Court, however, does not have to "accept unwarranted factual inferences." Id. (quoting Total Benefits, 552 F.3d at 434). A complaint "must state more than a bare assertion of legal conclusions to survive a motion to dismiss." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, "[a] plaintiff's [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants move to dismiss the claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a concrete financial loss as a result of the alleged RICO scheme and that the allegations of fraudulent conduct on the part of Ms. Gilbert-Osborne do not meet the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The Court will address each of Defendants' arguments, in turn, below.

A. Whether Plaintiffs Suffered a Concrete Financial Loss

First, Defendants argue that even if every allegation in Plaintiffs' Complaint is accepted as true, Plaintiffs fail to plead adequately an injury to their business or property. As such, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court disagrees.

To state a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962, a plaintiff must plead four elements: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Heinrich v. Waiting Angels Adoption Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2012). In addition, to recover a civil remedy for a violation of § 1962, a plaintiff must establish that he/she suffered an injury to their "business or property." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Importantly, an injury to "business or property" does not limit recovery to injuries affecting "business activity or property related to one's business." Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 731 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2013). To the contrary, "monetary injury, standing alone," can satisfy this requirement. Id. (internal quotations omitted). With that said, however, there are limits to § 1964's reach. For example, the Sixth Circuit has expressly excluded personal injuries — such as a broken bone or other bodily injury — and corresponding pecuniary losses — such as lost wages and medical expenses — from the scope of recovery. Id. at 564-65.

Here, it appears Plaintiffs' theory is that Defendants concocted a scheme to deprive Moses McCormick of $300,000 in marital property. From the face of the Complaint, the $300,000 is not connected in any way to a personal injury. Rather, it is a pure monetary loss of marital property, which the Sixth Circuit has recognized as a viable injury under § 1964. See id. at 564.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of the injury. See Pik-Coal Co. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 200 F.3d 884, 889 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that to sustain a civil RICO action a "plaintiff must plead and prove proximate causation.") (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, Plaintiffs claim that these Defendants, inter alia, hid trust accounts, bribed officials, and conspired with judges to obtain illegal court orders to use as leverage to induce Moses McCormick into an out-of-court settlement. In other words, Defendants, along with various individuals and entities, allegedly acted in concert to unlawfully deprive Moses McCormick of his marital property. Importantly, no matter how implausible Plaintiffs' factual allegations appear to be, the Court cannot dismiss the Complaint simply because it does not believe that the claims therein are true. See Columbia Nat. Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A] judge may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on a disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss to the extent it challenges whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pled a cognizable injury.2

As a final note, Plaintiffs should be aware that they will not be afforded the same level of deference at the summary judgment stage with respect to their factual allegations. Indeed, Plaintiffs will be required to support their allegations with actual evidence. A failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this case with prejudice.

B. Heightened Pleading Standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

Next, to the extent Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Stacey Gilbert-Osborne's participation in the RICO scheme is predicated on acts of fraud, Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed for a failure to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The Court agrees in part.

Where the predicate acts of a RICO action are based on fraud, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirement applies. Freemont Reorganizing Corp. v. Duke, 811 F.Supp.2d 1323, 1336 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (citing Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 546 F.3d 347, 356 n.4 (6th Cir. 2008)). Rule 9(b) provides that in alleging fraud or mistake, "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Sixth Circuit has interpreted this statute as requiring a plaintiff, at a minimum, to "allege the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentation on which he or she relied; the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the injury resulting from the fraud." Coffey v. Foamex L.P., 2 F.3d 157, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1993).

Here, Plaintiffs list three federal statutes involving elements of fraud that allegedly formed part of the basis for Defendant Gilbert-Osborne's participation in the RICO scheme: (1) Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents, Authentication Features, and Information, 18 U.S.C. § 1028; (2) Frauds and Swindles (Mail Fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1341; and (3) Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (Doc. 1 at 192.) With respect to the first allegation of fraud, it appears Plaintiffs are attempting to claim that Defendant Gilbert-Osborne, along with her law firm, prepared dissolution documents on April 20, 2016 that intentionally omitted $300,000 worth of marital property to which Moses McCormick was entitled. Plaintiffs then appear to suggest that Defendants engaged in an illegal scheme with certain officials to cover this up, all in an effort to deprive McCormick of his marital property. Hence, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the time and content of these alleged misrepresentations, the scheme and intent of the Defendants, and the alleged injury that resulted. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).

To the extent, however, that Plaintiffs assert Defendant Gilbert-Osborne committed mail or wire fraud, their pleading does not meet the heightened requirement of Rule 9(b). Plaintiffs merely allege, in summary fashion, that:

(Id. at 195.) Plaintiffs do not specify what Ms. Gilbert-Osborne allegedly sent through the mail or over email, when she sent these items, or to whom she sent them. Accordingly, to the extent that the RICO action against Defendant Gilbert-Osborne is predicated on violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss these claims.3

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [#77]. To the extent Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Stacey Gilbert-Osborne's participation in the RICO scheme is predicated on acts of mail or wire fraud, those claims are DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.