ORDER

KENDALL J. NEWMAN, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Laurie Clark seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying plaintiff's applications for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act ("Act").1 For the reasons discussed below, the court AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.

The court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether (1) it is based on proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

In this case, plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's evaluation of the medical evidence, assessment of plaintiff's credibility, or formulation of plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). Instead, plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to discharge his burden at step five of the sequential disability analysis2 to show that plaintiff could perform other work in the national economy, because the ALJ relied on deficient vocational expert ("VE") testimony. More specifically, plaintiff argues that the number of jobs identified by the VE for each representative occupation in the Dictionaryof Occupational Titles ("DOT") actually corresponded to the aggregate number of jobs for a larger group of occupations similar to the representative occupation rather than just the specific representative occupation, thereby rendering the vocational testimony insufficient.

As an initial matter, plaintiff failed to properly raise this evidentiary challenge before either the ALJ or the Appeals Council. See Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 2017); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). Even though counsel inquired at the hearing regarding the source of the VE's data and whether jobs numbers were aggregated, he failed to challenge the sufficiency of such testimony via questioning at the hearing, or supplemental briefing before either the ALJ or Appeals Council. As such, the issue is waived.

Moreover, even assuming that no waiver occurred, the argument lacks merit. The specific representative DOT occupations were merely provided as examples of occupations that would be consistent with plaintiff's RFC; the VE did not testify that those specific occupations were the only occupations that plaintiff could perform. Indeed, the VE specifically acknowledged that the jobs numbers provided were aggregate numbers for a group of occupations similar to the specific representative DOT occupations. (See Administrative Transcript ["AT"] 841-42.) Nevertheless, the VE confirmed that his jobs numbers were consistent with plaintiff's RFC, the DOT, and the VE's professional experience. (AT 845.) See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) ("A VE's recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony. Thus, no additional foundation is required.").

In sum, the court finds no prejudicial legal error, and concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: