REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

On October 1, 2012, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., Plaintiff Great West Casualty Company, a Nebraska corporation, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment (Doc. 1) against RBX, Inc. d/b/a RBX Transportation, Inc., a Missouri corporation and Great West's insured; FirstFleet, Inc., a Tennessee corporation; Tennessee American Recycling, LLC, a Georgia LLC, with its principal place of business in Tennessee; and Earl Fergerson, a Missouri citizen (see id., ¶¶ 1-5).1

FirstFleet has filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, stay (Doc. 30), which is now before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2, for entry of a report and recommendation. Both Plaintiff Great West and Defendant RBX, ostensibly adverse to Great West, filed oppositions to FirstFleet's motion (see Docs. 37 and 39).2 RBX's opposition prompted the undersigned to issue an order inquiring, first, whether RBX's and Great West's interests were aligned and, if so, whether RBX should be realigned as a party plaintiff; and, second, "whether this action can be adjudicated without addressing the existence and enforceability vel non of an indemnity agreement between FirstFleet[] and RBX." (Doc. 45). Great West, RBX, and FirstFleet have all filed responses to the undersigned's order.3 (See Docs. 54, 55, and 60.)

After consideration of the pleadings and the parties' briefing, the undersigned is satisfied that complete diversity exists and, therefore, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. That being the case, for the reasons discussed below, it is RECOMMENDED that FirstFleet's motion (Doc. 30) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set out herein.

I. Background

The underlying action, to which Great West is not a party, concerns an accident that occurred on August 11, 2010 in Pine Hill, Alabama. Based on the allegations of the complaint, on that day, Fergerson was operating under a contract with RBX to transport one of its trailers improperly loaded (by Tennessee American) with bales of scrap cardboard to International Paper. After being instructed by First Fleet regarding the unloading of the trailer, Fergerson was injured when he opened the trailer door and a bale of corrugated cardboard fell, striking the door, and knocking him to the ground. Fergerson and his wife filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Wilcox County, Alabama on August 11, 2011, asserting negligence claims against all defendants. FirstFleet timely removed that case to this Court on the basis of diversity, alleging that Fergerson and his wife fraudulently joined RBX to defeat this Court's jurisdiction. Specifically, FirstFleet argues that, under either Alabama or Missouri law, "it is clear that the remedies available against RBX, under these circumstances, are limited to actions for workers' compensation benefits." (CA 2:11-00549-KD-C, Doc. 1, notice of removal, ¶ 4.) Magistrate Judge Cassady disagreed, finding that FirstFleet failed to meet its burden to prove fraudulent joinder by showing there was no possibility that an Alabama state court would find that the Fergersons' complaint states a claim against RBX, and recommended that the case be remanded. Judge DuBose concurred. (See CA 2:11-00549-KD-C, Doc. 31, 32, 33 (report & recommendation, order adopting report & recommendation, to which no objections were filed, and entering judgment, remanding case).)4

The present declaratory judgment action concerns a single policy issued by Great West to RBX (Policy No. GWP31400F), which provided Commercial Auto, Inland Marine, Cargo, and General Liability coverage, effective August 1, 2010 to August 1, 2011. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 16, 17.) International Paper was a named additional insured under the policy, and Great West is also providing International Paper a defense in the state-court action under a reservation of rights. (Id., ¶ 18.) Great West has, however, denied coverage to FirstFleet, which tendered defense of the state-court action to Great West on December 30, 2011 (see id., ¶¶ 23-26), and through this lawsuit, Great West seeks declarations that FirstFleet has no coverage, or no potential coverage, under the policy and, accordingly, "Great West owes no duty to defend or indemnify FirstFleet with respect to the [state-court] action." (Id., ¶¶ 22-33.)

In its motion to dismiss or, alternatively, stay, FirstFleet informs the Court that its demand on Great West was based, in part, on an indemnity provision in its transportation agreement with RBX, which required RBX to meet certain insurance obligations, and which Great West has found to be unenforceable. (See Docs. 30 at 2-3; 30-1, Dec. 30, 2011 demand letter; 30-2, Feb. 15, 2012 response; 30-3, Feb. 29, 2012 reply.) Great West's refusal to defend and indemnify FirstFleet led FirstFleet to file, on March 15, 2012, a cross-claim in the state-court action against RBX— asserting claims for breach of contract, negligence, common law indemnity, and declaratory judgment—which RBX answered on April 16, 2012, and which remains pending. (See Docs. 30 at 3-4; 30-4, cross-claim; 30-5, answer to cross-claim.)

II. Analysis

Before proceeding to FirstFleet's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, stay, the undersigned must first address this Court's jurisdiction. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[B]y whatever route a case arrives in federal court, it is the obligation of both district court and counsel to be alert to jurisdictional requirements." (citing, among other cases, United Republic Ins. Co., in Receivership v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 315 F.3d 168, 170-171 (2d Cir. 2003) ("We have . . . urged counsel and district courts to treat subject matter jurisdiction as a threshold issue for resolution . . . ."); United States v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 300 F.Supp.2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (district courts have an "independent obligation to address [subject-matter jurisdiction] sua sponte" (internal quotation marks omitted)))).

A. The Court must be satisfied that the parties are properly aligned before determining it has subject matter jurisdiction.

"[F]ederal courts are required to realign the parties in an action to reflect their interests in the litigation. The parties themselves cannot confer diversity jurisdiction upon the federal courts by their own designation of plaintiffs and defendants." City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fid. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941)). "Rather it is the `duty . . . of the lower federal courts[] to look beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute,'" id. at 1313-14 (quoting Northbrook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 493 U.S. 6, 16 n.5 (1989) (citations and quotations omitted)), "as determined by `the principal purpose of the suit' and `the primary and controlling matter in dispute,'" id. at 1314 (quoting City of Indianapolis, 314 U.S. at 69); accord Cromwell v. Admiral Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 11-0155-CG-N, 2011 WL 2670098, at *4 (S.D. Ala. June 21, 2011) ("In addressing the proper alignment of the parties, the court must consider `the principal purpose of the suit and the primary and controlling matter in dispute.'" (quoting Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. First Nat'l Bank at Winter Park, Fla., 351 F.2d 519, 522 (5th Cir. 1965)), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2689356 (S.D. Ala. July 7, 2011).5

"Where the parties' interests are the same, [the Eleventh Circuit has] held that those parties must be aligned together and [has] reversed a district court's failure to do so, even where the parties' interests were in opposition outside of the issues raised in the subject action." City of Vestavia Hills, 676 F.3d at 1314 (citing Weller v. Navigator Marine, Inc., 737 F.2d 1547, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Development Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Hous. & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1995) ("`[W]here party designations have jurisdictional consequences,' [the E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1230, 1241 (3d Cir. 1994)))).6

How RBX is aligned in this lawsuit clearly has "jurisdictional consequences." Because Fergerson and RBX are both citizens of Missouri, realignment of RBX as a party plaintiff destroys the bedrock requirement that, for a federal court to have jurisdiction pursuant to diversity, all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806); Avirex, 745 F. Supp. at 689 ("Where federal jurisdiction rests on diversity, diversity must be complete between the parties." (citing Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. J.W. Marshall, 265 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1959))).7

In addressing the proper alignment of the parties, RBX contends it should be aligned with Fergerson; Great West, in a possible attempt to skirt the issue, questions the continued necessity of RBX to its declaratory judgment action; and FirstFleet argues that RBX's continued presence is essential to fully adjudicate the declaratory relief Great West seeks. Specifically, RBX asserts that

(Doc. 55 at 1.) Great West contends, however, that, at least when it filed this lawsuit, it anticipated that RBX could take a position adverse to it, and, since RBX has not taken such a position, it is now clear that RBX is misjoined and should be dropped as a party. (See Doc. 54 at 3-5.)8 As to FirstFleet, it stakes the position that RBX is neither misjoined nor indispensable: "[R]ather than directly address the question of realignment, Great West now confesses that it has misjoined RBX as a defendant—a mistake that it contends is easily corrected by the dismissal of RBX. Given the issues involved, however, RBX's presence in this lawsuit is necessary, and its dismissal should not be permitted." (Doc. 60 at 2.)

As to the potentially related issue of the relevance of the agreement between FirstFleet and RBX, RBX punts (see Doc. 55 at 2)9; Great West contends that the enforceability of that agreement "is not an issue raised by [it] in the declaratory judgment action" (Doc. 54 at 7 (emphasis in original))10; and, not surprisingly, FirstFleet argues that determining whether its agreement with RBX is an "insured contract" under the Great West policy is essential to determining whether FirstFleet is covered by the policy (see Doc. 60 at 4-6).

B. RBX has chosen to align with its insurer, Great West, against FirstFleet. Fergerson's indisputable interest for purposes of this action is to maximize the insurance coverage available to him in the state-action, which aligns him against FirstFleet here. Therefore, both Missouri citizens are aligned together, and complete diversity is preserved.

With regard to realignment, this Court must ensure that parties to this lawsuit with the same interests are "aligned together . . ., even [if] the parties' interests were[, are, or could be] in opposition outside of the issues raised in the subject action." City of Vestavia Hills, 676 F.3d at 1314 (citing Weller, 737 F.2d at 1548) (emphasis added). In Vestavia Hills, a declaratory-judgment action filed after entry of a state-court judgment and removed to federal court, the realigned parties' interests were in opposition before the state-court judgment.11 In Weller, where Defendant Navigator was a Florida citizen, the district court denied a motion for realignment and dismissal after it found that two defendants—Corzilius, a Florida citizen, and Martini—should not be realigned as plaintiffs, concluding "Corzilius and Martini were adverse to Weller because, in the event that Weller should not prevail, Corzilius and Martini would have an action against him for breach of contract." 737 F.2d at 1548-49. The Eleventh Circuit vacated and reversed, observing, "Although the district judge was correct in noting that Corzilius and Martini would have an action against Weller should Navigator prevail, this does not indicate that the position of Corzilius and Martini was not substantially identical to that of Weller in the suit before the court." Id. at 1549 (emphasis added). Thus, here, the parties' interests should be aligned around the narrow issue this case presents: whether FirstFleet has coverage under the Great West-RBX policy. While that fight is primarily between Great West and FirstFleet, what matters for jurisdictional purposes is where the two Missouri citizens—RBX and Fergerson—line-up. If, for purposes of "the suit before the court[,]" Weller, 737 F.2d at 1549, their interests are aligned—meaning they appear on the same side of the "v."—there is complete diversity, and this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

Fergerson is not a party to the insurance policy at issue, and he has failed to respond to the Court's inquiry regarding realignment, but his interests for purposes of this suit appear straightforward: maximizing the insurance coverage available to him in his state-court action. See, e.g., Brave Ventures, LLC v. Ambrester, 854 F.Supp.2d 356, 358 (E.D. Va. 2012) (realigning state-action plaintiff/federal defendant as federal plaintiff in a pure declaratory judgment action filed prior to judgment in the underlying state action: "Ambrester is not a party to the insurance agreement and has no potential duties under the insurance policy itself. As a plaintiff in a separate tort suit in state court, his sole interest in this action would be maximizing his potential recovery, and therefore establishing coverage under any and all insurance policies that could potentially compensate him, if he prevails in his lawsuit."). And, as both RBX and FirstFleet point out, if Great West prevails in this suit—that is, it is determined that FirstFleet does not have coverage under the policy—Fergerson benefits. (See Doc. 55, RBX's response to realignment inquiry, at 1 ("FirstFleet and RBX are both defendants in the Fergerson[s'] underlying lawsuit[,] and RBX believes Fergerson would prefer that both RBX and Firs[t]Fleet (which RBX understands has its own separate insurance coverage) remain potentially [] liable to Fergerson. That will not be the case if this Court finds RBX is required to indemnify FirstFleet."); Doc. 60, FirstFleet's response to realignment inquiry, at 2 ("[S]hould FirstFleet have coverage under the Great West policy, any losses paid by Great West on FirstFleet's behalf would reduce the policy limits available to RBX for the Fergerson claim, and visa versa.").)

While it may be generally true "the normal alignment of parties in a suit seeking a declaratory judgment of non-coverage is Insurer versus Insured and Injured Party[,]" Home Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Adco Oil Co., 154 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 1998) (cited in City of Vestavia Hills, 676 F.3d at 1314), a court must nevertheless examine the declaration(s) being sought, and where, like here, the amount of insurance coverage available is at issue, a court should align the parties seeking to maximize coverage together. See, e.g., Baldwin County Bd. of Educ. v. Melvin Pierce Painting, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-00558-KD-M, 2012 WL 124844, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 17, 2012) (DuBose, J.) ("[T]he primary purpose of this litigation is to determine whether FCCI must provide coverage, and if so, the amount of coverage available to satisfy the $1.5 million dollar judgment against Pierce. Since Pierce sought indemnification and a defense, which FCCI initially denied, and Pierce then challenged FCCI's decision, it is clear that Pierce too is interested in having FCCI pay all of the judgment or as much as possible to reduce its liability. . . ."); Cromwell, 2011 WL 2670098, at *6 ("[T]he primary thrust of the current litigation will be the issue of the amount [and potentially the existence] of coverage. Despite plaintiff's claim that defendant SafetyNet takes an adverse position to the plaintiff because it seeks continued defense [and thus continued expenses reducing the available policy proceeds] by Admiral in the state court litigation, it is clear that SafetyNet's principal interest in this suit is in having Admiral pay as large a portion of the judgment as possible, thereby reducing the unsatisfied remainder of the judgment for which SafetyNet would remain liable. . . . Based on the record, the undersigned concludes that the interests of SafetyNet are properly aligned in this litigation with those of the plaintiff. . . ."); Bromwell v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 208, 209-11 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting district court's realignment of defendant trucking company and defendant driver with plaintiffs—representatives of the estates of three deceased motorcyclists—against insurance company, in an action seeking "a declaration that the incident which occurred on June 17, 1990, constituted three separate accidents, and therefore the available liability insurance coverage would be $2,250,000 and not the $750,000 available for a single accident[,]" even though "the realignment destroyed diversity of citizenship" and required dismissal); accord Brave Ventures, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 358.

Therefore, because the two Missouri citizens, RBX and Fergerson, should be aligned together, complete diversity exists, and this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Since the undersigned is satisfied that complete diversity exists, it is therefore not necessary to undertake the potentially cumbersome analysis required to determine whether RBX should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 21. As such, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DECLINE Great West's invitation to drop/dismiss RBX (see generally Doc. 54).12

C. This Court has very recently provided ample guidance as to how the pending motion to dismiss should be considered.

Since January 2011, this Court has addressed Wilton/Brillhart Abstention, as guided by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Ameritas Variable Life Insurance Co. v. Roach, 411 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2005), at least five times. E.g., Essex Ins. Co. v. Foley, Civil Action No. 10-0511-WS-M, 2011 WL 290423 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 27, 2011) (Steele, J.); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. King, Civil Action No. 11-0577-WS-C, 2012 WL 280656 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 2012) (Steele, J.); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Hill, Civil Action No. 11-0414-CG-B, 2012 WL 1598155 (S.D. Ala. May 7, 2012) (Granade, J.); QBE Ins. Corp. v. Whispering Pines Cemetery, LLC, Civil Action No. 12-0054-KD-C, 2012 WL 4435302 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2012) (DuBose, J.); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, Civil Action No. 12-00358-KD-N, 2012 WL 6680306 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2012) (Nelson, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 6677906 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2012).

As this Court stated in Pennsylvania National,

2012 WL 280656, at *2-3 & n.3 (some citations modified).

D. Great West requests that this Court declare rights as to a duty to defend and a separate duty to indemnify. Because FirstFleet has raised the ripeness of the duty to indemnify in its motion, the Court shall analyze each duty separately.14

In conjunction with finding no coverage or no potential coverage for FirstFleet under the policy's Commercial Auto Part, Great West requests this Court declare "Great West owes no duty to defend or indemnify FirstFleet with respect to the underlying [state-court] action." (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 27, 33 (emphasis added).) To be certain, "[u]nder Alabama law, an insurer's duty to indemnify and its duty to defend the insured are distinct obligations." W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 06-0803-WS-B, 2008 WL 161921, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2008) (Steele, J.) (citing Tanner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 874 So.2d 1058, 1063 (Ala. 2003) ("Liability insurance coverage includes two separate duties: (1) the duty to defend; and (2) the duty to indemnify.")). "Those duties must be analyzed separately for purposes of determining an insurer's obligations to its insured." Id.

1. Here, the state court has not ruled on liability; as such, a declaration as to any duty to indemnify is not yet ripe, and that component of the case should be stayed.

Because "[t]here is abundant support in the case law for the proposition that `an insurer's duty to indemnify is not ripe for adjudication in a declaratory judgment action until the insured is in fact held liable in the underlying suit[,]'" W.G. Yates & Sons, 2008 WL 161921, at *6-7 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2008) (quoting Assurance Co. of Am. v. Legendary Home Builders, Inc., 305 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1270 (S.D. Ala. 2003) and collecting authority), those duties must also be analyzed separately under Wilton/Brillhart/Ameritas. For example, again in Pennsylvania National, after denying Baldwin County's motion to dismiss as to that declaratory judgment action's "duty-to-defend component[,]" 2012 WL 280656, at *5, the Court addressed the ripeness of the duty to indemnify:

Id. (internal citations omitted); compare id., with Docs. 30, motion, at 7 & 9; 37, RBX's response; 39, Great West's response; and 40, reply, at 6 (FirstFleet raises the ripeness of the duty to indemnify in its motion (and again on reply), but RBX and Great West fail to address this issue).

Opinions differ as to whether the not-yet-ripe-duty-to-defend component of a declaratory judgment actions should be stayed or dismissed, see 2012 WL 280656, at *5, but the undersigned agrees with the approach Judge Steele took in Pennsylvania National and RECOMMENDS that Great West's duty-to-indemnify claims be STAYED. In Pennsylvania National, this Court adopted the approach taken in Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Evans, 76 F.Supp.2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999), where

2012 WL 280656, at *5 (quoting 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 and citing, among other authority, Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. GMC Concrete Co., Civil Action No. 07-0563-WS-B, 2007 WL 4335499, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 7, 2007) ("The duty to indemnify issue will remain part of the case, but will not be considered . . . until the earlier of (a) final disposition of the [underlying] Action; or (b) a ruling on the duty to defend, at which time the Court will entertain any motion that the parties may wish to file concerning the duty to indemnify claims.")).

2. The request that Great West's duty-to-defend claims be dismissed or, alternatively, stayed should be denied.

Although FirstFleet's motion is based on the nine nonexhaustive Ameritas guideposts, that analysis generally applies only "where there is `parallel litigation in the state court.'" Essex Ins., 2011 WL 290423, at *2 (quoting Ameritas, 411 F.3d at 1331); see id. ("An important threshold question is whether Ameritas even applies in this case. After all, the Supreme Court in Brillhart addressed the circumstance `where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties.'" (quoting Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495) (emphasis added by Essex Court)); accord State Farm, 2012 WL 6680306, at *4; QBE Ins., 2012 WL 4435302, at *3; Pennsylvania Nat'l, 2012 WL 280656, at *4.

This action is not parallel to the action proceeding in Wilcox County Circuit Court. First, Great West is not a party to that action. Second, in that action, FirstFleet has asserted a cross-claim that (1) alleges Great West's insured, RBX, owes FirstFleet a defense and indemnity, pursuant to an agreement between the two; (2) alleges FirstFleet is entitled to common law indemnity from RBX; (3) alleges RBX was negligent; and (4) requests the state court declare that, "pursuant to the [agreement between RBX and FirstFleet], RBX is required "to indemnify, defend and hold harmless" FirstFleet "for all defense and litigation costs and all liability arising out of the [state-court action]." (See generally Doc. 30-4.) But no coverage issues, pursuant to the policy at issue in this matter, have been joined there. Thus, the Circuit Court will not determine whether FirstFleet is covered by the policy and, as such, whether Great West owes a duty to defend or indemnify FirstFleet. "In short, what we have here are not parallel state court proceedings, but merely related state court proceedings. `In such circumstances, courts have shown marked reluctance to exercise their discretion to stay or dismiss the declaratory judgment action.'" State Farm, 2012 WL 6680306, at *5 (quoting Essex Ins., 2011 WL 290423, at *2 (quoting, in turn, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Knight, Civil Action No. 09-0783-WS-B, 2010 WL 551262, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2010))); see also New Hampshire Ins., 2012 WL 1598155, at *1-3.15 This alone should

But, even if the Ameritas analysis is performed, the result is no different. FirstFleet's motion as to the duty-to-defend claims still should be denied. First, even if it were before the state court, Alabama would have little, if no, interest in deciding whether FirstFleet, a citizen of Tennessee, is covered under an insurance policy issued by Great West, a citizen of Nebraska. Second, this declaratory judgment action is of tremendous value to clarifying the legal relations between Great West and FirstFleet. (Compare Doc. 30 at 9 ("FirstFleet, Inc. does not deny that the issue raised in this suit serve[s] a useful purpose.").) Third, FirstFleet, the party who attempted to remove the underlying action, admits that "there is [no] overt evidence of `procedural fencing' on behalf of Great West." (Id. at 9.) Fourth, "for this Court to decide [Great West's] duty to defend would neither increase friction between federal and state courts nor encroach on state-court turf[.]" Essex Ins., 2012 WL 280656, at *4. Finally, there neither appears to be a superior alternative remedy to this lawsuit for determining, nor a court better situated than this one to determine, Great West's duty as to FirstFleet.

III. Conclusion

Because complete diversity exists, which ensures that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under § 1332, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DECLINE Great West's invitation to drop/dismiss RBX (see generally Doc. 54).

It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that FirstFleet's motion to dismiss, or alternatively, to stay (Doc. 30) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Great West's duty-to-indemnify claims should be STAYED until the earlier of (1) final disposition of the underlying state-court litigation; or (2) a ruling on the duty to defend, at which time the Court will entertain any motion that the parties may wish to file concerning the duty-to-indemnify claims. And, as to the duty-to-defend claims, FirstFleet's motion should be DENIED.

IV. Notice of Right to File Objections

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72.4. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.