ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Christopher Paul Capocci's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1). Magistrate Judge Milling entered a Report and Recommendation (doc. 12) recommending that the § 2254 Petition be dismissed, to which Capocci has filed Objections (doc. 13). The undersigned now undertakes de novo review of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P.

I. Background.

Following a jury trial, petitioner, Christopher Paul Capocci, was convicted in Alabama state court of one count of first-degree rape, in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-6-61(a)(3), and one count of first-degree sexual abuse, in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-6-66(a)(1). At sentencing, Capocci was found to be a habitual felony offender and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment. On direct appeal, Capocci's appointed appellate counsel (who was different than his trial counsel) filed an Anders brief. In light of this development, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals afforded Capocci an opportunity to raise any pro se issues he wished to be heard; however, Capocci elected not to respond. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed his convictions and sentences.

In his Rule 32 petition filed in Baldwin County Circuit Court after the conclusion of his direct appeals, Capocci asserted ten claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Claim 6, as described by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, was as follows:

(Doc. 1, Exh. B, at 2.) The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found that Claim 6 was procedurally barred by operation of Rule 32.2(d), which mandates that all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel "must be raised as soon as practicable, either at trial, on direct appeal, or in the first Rule 32 petition, whichever is applicable." Rule 32.2(d), Ala.R.Crim.P. The appeals court reasoned that the applicable time frame for Capocci to raise Claim 6 for Rule 32.2(d) purposes was in a motion for new trial. As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained:

(Doc. 1, Exh. B, at 10.)

In his ensuing § 2254 petition filed in federal court, Capocci raises a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, predicated on trial counsel's failure "to communicate anyway [sic] with the Petitioner prior to the expiration of the time allowed by the court for the petitioner to accept the plea bargain offered by the State." (Doc. 1, at 4.) The petition alleges, "Had the Petitioner been fully informed of the plea offer by the State the Petitioner would have taken the plea offer. . . . The Petitioners [sic] trial counsel's performance [was] below the prevailing professional norms considering all circumstances and as a result the Petitioner was prejudiced and was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel a [sic] Guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution." (Id. at 5.)

In a Report and Recommendation (doc. 12) entered on December 30, 2016, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Capocci's habeas petition be dismissed as procedurally barred. The reasoning undergirding that recommendation was as follows: (i) the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' adjudication of the ineffective assistance claim rests on an independent and adequate state-law ground, namely Rule 32.2(d); (ii) the state appellate court did not apply Rule 32.2(d) in a manifestly unfair or arbitrary manner, inasmuch as Capocci or his appellate counsel had the opportunity to raise the issue in a motion for new trial or on direct appeal, but did not do so; (iii) Capocci failed to meet the "cause" prong of the cause and prejudice test for overcoming the procedural default, he asserted no claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his § 2254 petition and, even if he had done so, such claim was never exhausted in the state courts and therefore could not be considered on federal habeas review; and (iv) the Supreme Court's ruling in Trevino v. Taylor, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013), does not support a finding of "cause" to excuse the procedural default here because it does not appear that the Trevino rules apply at all and, even if they do, Capocci failed to present a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to the state courts. On the basis of these determinations, the Report and Recommendation recommends that Capocci's § 2254 petition be dismissed as procedurally barred, and that he be granted neither a Certificate of Appealability nor leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II. Analysis.

Capocci's first objection to the Report and Recommendation concerns its determination that "the Petitioner had the opportunity to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for new trial and did not." (Doc. 12, at 9.) Capocci objects that this finding "fails to consider . . . that new appellate counsel was not appointed until 12 days prior to the deadline for filing a new trial motion." (Doc. 13, at 2.) Contrary to petitioner's objection, the Magistrate Judge was keenly aware of the temporal interval between appellate counsel's appointment and the deadline for filing a motion for new trial; indeed, he recited both on page 8 of the Report and Recommendation, just one page before the objected-to passage. Moreover, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals opinion prominently set forth the relevant dates and opined that, given the sequence of events, "appellate counsel could have filed a motion for new trial prior to the expiration of the 30-day period." (Doc. 1, Exh. B, at 10.) This conclusion rings true, given that the issues raised by Capocci with respect to the plea offer could be uncovered without preparation or scrutiny of a trial transcript; indeed, the pertinent facts on which the claim was based would have been known to Capocci immediately after the trial. Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with and adopts the Magistrate Judge's determination that the interval between appointment of appellate counsel and the deadline for Capocci to file a motion for new trial was not so short that application of Rule 32.2(d) in these circumstances was arbitrary, manifestly unfair, or otherwise inadequate for purposes of the procedural default doctrine.1

Petitioner next objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that Capocci "did not raise the issue of ineffective appellate counsel in his Petition." (Doc. 13, at 3.) The Report and Recommendation is correct: Nowhere in his counsel-prepared § 2254 Petition did Capocci identify a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In framing the ineffective-assistance claim, Capocci states only that his "trial counsel's performance" was "below the prevailing professional norms . . . and as a result the Petitioner was prejudiced and was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel." (Doc. 1, at 5 (emphasis added).) Capocci's Petition does not reasonably advance any claim for relief that appellate counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. In fact, far from branding appellate counsel with accusations of ineffective assistance, the § 2254 Petition takes pains to state that appellate counsel did nothing wrong. For example, Capocci's Petition asserts that the Alabama appellate court made a "wrongful assumption that the Petitioner's new counsel on appeal had an opportunity to raise the issue in a new trial motion before the trial court." (Doc. 1, at 5.) Later in the § 2254 Petition, Capocci elaborates that "new counsel on appeal was never aware of the issue and never had a reasonable or sufficient opportunity to raise the issue before the trial court or to the Court of Appeals." (Id. (emphasis added).) Such allegations are irreconcilable with petitioner's Objection to the Magistrate Judge's finding that the § 2254 Petition lacked a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or his present insistence that he intended to articulate such a claim all along.2

As a corollary to his objection to the Magistrate Judge's finding that the § 2254 Petition does not present a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Capocci balks at "the companion finding that even if he had done so, the claim was not exhausted as to state law remedies." (Doc. 13, at 3.) The Report and Recommendation included a straightforward determination that even if the § 2254 Petition contained a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (which it does not), "such a claim could not be considered here; no such claim was brought in Petitioner's state habeas corpus proceeding and thus Petitioner has not exhausted his state law remedies for such a claim." (Doc. 12, at 12.) Capocci does not, and cannot, dispute that the ten claims for relief in his Rule 32 petition are devoid of any allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to litigate the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as to the plea offer. (See doc. 1, Exh. B, at 2-3.) Nor does Capocci quarrel with the Magistrate Judge's formulation of the exhaustion doctrine as requiring petitioners to give the state courts an opportunity to act on their claims before presenting them to a federal court on habeas review. See generally Preston v. Secretary, Florida Dep't of Corrections, 785 F.3d 449, 457 (11th Cir. 2015) ("For a federal claim to be exhausted, the petitioner must have fairly presented [it] to the state courts. . . . The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is straightforward: the petitioner must have given the state courts a meaningful opportunity to address his federal claim.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Report and Recommendation correctly observes that any claim of ineffective of assistance of appellate counsel that Capocci might have included in the § 2254 Petition would have flunked the exhaustion prerequisite for federal habeas review. Petitioner's objection to that determination is unfounded.3

Capocci's third objection concerns the Report and Recommendation's determination that the Supreme Court's decision in Trevino v. Taylor, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013), does not alter the "cause" analysis here for purposes of overcoming the procedural default. On its face, the rule in Trevino applies only where a "state procedural framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal." Trevino, 133 S.Ct. at 1921. Petitioner offers no evidence or persuasive argument that Alabama's procedural framework makes it highly unlikely in a typical case for a defendant to have a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal. There has been no sound reason articulated in this case why Capocci (via his appellate counsel) could not have fully, meaningfully litigated via motion for new trial or on direct appeal the question whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing properly to communicate the State's plea offer to Capocci. The Court cannot find on this nonexistent showing by Capocci that Alabama's procedural framework makes it "virtually impossible" for a defendant to have a meaningful opportunity to litigate an ineffective assistance claim prior to collateral review. Therefore, the Trevino rule has not been shown to have any application here.

Even if Capocci could satisfy the threshold requirement for Trevino to apply, that determination would not help him. The rule in Trevino is that, where a state procedural framework makes it virtually impossible for a defendant in a typical case to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, "[a] procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial, if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective." Trevino, 133 S.Ct. at 1921 (citation omitted).4 But Capocci is not arguing that his Rule 32 counsel ineffectively failed to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to the plea offer. Obviously, Rule 32 counsel did raise that precise claim as Claim 6 of Capocci's initial Rule 32 petition. Rather, Capocci endeavors to rely on Trevino to litigate what he says is the ineffective assistance of Rule 32 counsel in failing to argue that Capocci's appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to the plea offer. By its terms, Trevino creates only a very narrow exception to procedural default allowing a federal habeas court to hear "a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial." 133 S.Ct. at 1921 (emphasis added). Yet Capocci would have this Court extend Trevino to reach what he says is a claim (not pleaded in his § 2254 Petition and not properly before the Court) of ineffective assistance on direct appeal. Trevino is too narrowly circumscribed to cover this situation.5 Even if the Trevino rule could be extended in the manner requested, the fact remains that no claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is presented in Capocci's § 2254 Petition; therefore, petitioner is seeking to use Trevino to excuse procedural default of a claim that he has not even raised in these federal habeas proceedings. This Objection is overruled.6

Finally, Capocci objects to the Report and Recommendation's finding that he "has not shown cause why [his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to the plea offer] was not brought at the appropriate time according to state procedural rules." (Doc. 12, at 13.) The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that petitioner has not shown "cause" to excuse the procedural default of his ineffective-assistance claim.7 That claim was known to him and available to him at the conclusion of his trial. He could have alerted his newly-appointed appellate counsel to the issue with sufficient time to file a motion for new trial, or certainly to pursue that ground on direct appeal. He could have raised the issue himself when the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals solicited any issues he wished to present in the wake of his appellate counsel's Anders brief. But Capocci did none of these, instead waiting until his Rule 32 petition to raise the issue for the first time, in violation of a clear state procedural rule (Rule 32.2(d)) requiring him to bring that ineffective-assistance claim as soon as practicable. The Alabama courts relied on that independent and adequate state-law ground to reject this claim, and Capocci has failed to show cause to overcome the procedural default.

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, and after due and proper consideration of the issues raised and a de novo determination of those portions of the record to which objection is made, the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is adopted as the opinion of this Court. Petitioner's Objections (doc. 13) are overruled in their entirety. It is ordered that Capocci's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1) is denied and that this action is dismissed with prejudice. The Court certifies that any appeal from this determination would be frivolous and not brought in good faith; therefore, Capocci may not take an appeal in forma pauperis, and will not be granted a certificate of appealability in connection with any such appeal.

DONE and ORDERED.