MEMORANDUM OPINION

C. LYNWOOD SMITH, JR., District Judge.

This case arises from an incident that allegedly occurred during the night of Monday, April 18, 2016, when plaintiff, Cheryl Jarmon-Goodman, contends that she was injured in her home as a result of being "Tasered"1 by one of the defendant police officers. Plaintiff's complaint alleges federal constitutional and state-law tort claims against eleven defendants: i.e., the cities of Muscle Shoals and Sheffield, Alabama; the "Police Departments" of each of those municipalities; the Chiefs of each police department (i.e., Clint Reck in Muscle Shoals, and Greg Ray in Sheffield); the Shift Commanders of each police department (i.e., Cedric Morris in Muscle Shoals, and Ricky Terry in Sheffield); Muscle Shoals police officer Steven Benson; Sheffield police officer Sam Garrison; and a second Sheffield police officer identified only as "Officer Bishop (first name unknown)."2

Plaintiff alleged that Muscle Shoals police officer Steve Benson and Sheffield police officers Sam Garrison and "Officer Bishop" used excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and, thereby, caused her to suffer a "felonious injury" as defined in Alabama Code § 6-5-370, as well as committing the state-law torts of assault, battery, and outrage.

She also contends that the remaining eight defendants — i.e., the cities of Muscle Shoals and Sheffield, Alabama; the police departments of each municipality; the Chiefs of the respective police departments; and the Shift Commanders of each department — are liable under Alabama law for negligently failing to train and supervise Muscle Shoals police officer Steve Benson and Sheffield police officers Sam Garrison and "Officer Bishop."

The following memorandum opinion discusses only one of four pending motions: i.e., the motion to dismiss filed by the City of Sheffield, Alabama, the Sheffield Police Department, Sheffield Shift Commander Ricky Terry, and Sheffield police officer Sam Garrison.3

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This court entered an order on August 21, 2018, directing plaintiff to show cause why four defendants (i.e., the City of Sheffield Police Department, Sheffield Police Chief Greg Ray, Muscle Shoals Police Department Shift Commander Cedric Morris, and the Sheffield police officer identified only as "Officer Bishop") should not be dismissed as a result of plaintiff's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), which requires a complaint to be served within ninety days.4 Plaintiff conceded that her claims should be dismissed as to Chief Ray, Shift Commander Morris, and the City of Sheffield Police Department, but asked for additional time to attempt to better identify and serve "Officer Bishop."5 In response, this court dismissed all claims against Ray, Morris, and the Sheffield Police Department on August 30, 2018, but granted plaintiff fourteen additional days to perfect and prove service of the complaint on "Officer Bishop."6 Plaintiff nevertheless failed to serve that defendant within the extended period. Accordingly, this court dismissed all claims against him on September 19, 2018.7

II. DISCUSSION

The motion to dismiss jointly filed by the City of Sheffield, Alabama, its "Police Department," Shift Commander Ricky Terry, and police officer Sam Garrison contends that plaintiff's complaint is due to be dismissed because it constitutes an impermissible "shotgun" pleading. Those defendants argue that the imprecision of the complaint's counts, as well as the re-incorporation of all preceding allegations into each subsequent count, leave them unable to ascertain which of the defendants plaintiff seeks to hold liable for the conduct described.

So-called "shotgun" pleadings violate either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) — which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" by "fail[ing] to one degree or another . . . to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests," Weiland v. Palm Beach Sheriff's Department, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (alterations supplied) — or the requirement of Rule 10(b) that discrete claims should be pled in separate counts. See Anderson v. District Broad of Trustees, 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir. 1996). The toleration of such complaints is said to work a "great disservice to the administration of civil justice." Johnson Enterprises of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998).

The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly condemned such pleadings. See, e.g., Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated, 516 F.3d 955, 979-80 & n.54 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting numerous cases), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); BMC Industries, Inc. v. Barth Industries, Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998); GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1991).

It is said that such pleadings waste scarce judicial resources, "inexorably broaden[] the scope of discovery," "wreak havoc on appellate court dockets," and "undermine[] the public's respect for the courts." Davis, 516 F.3d at 981-83 (detailing the "unacceptable consequences of shotgun pleading") (alterations in original). See also Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2018).

The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Weiland, supra, identified four categories of "shotgun" pleadings.

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23 (bracketed alterations supplied, footnotes omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit directs district courts to independently police the parties' pleadings, and,

Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1296 (alteration and emphasis supplied, footnote omitted); see also Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 16-16685, 898 F.3d 1348, 2018 WL 3673002, at *7 (11th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018) (reiterating that, when a complaint is due to be stricken on the ground that it violates the prohibition on "shotgun" pleadings, the plaintiff should be given "another opportunity to file a complaint that passes muster," but only after the district court "point[s] out the defects in the complaint") (alteration supplied) (citing Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295).

As defendants observe, plaintiff has pled multiple counts, each of which incorporates all of the preceding factual allegations:8 a practice that has been repeatedly condemned by the Eleventh Circuit, and sometimes described as a "mortal sin." Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322 & n.12.9

More troublesome, plaintiff has failed to specify which allegations apply to each of the defendants she has sued. For example, in the "Factual Allegations" section of her complaint, plaintiff generically identifies Muscle Shoals police officer Steve Benson and Sheffield police officers Sam Garrison and "Officer Bishop (first name unknown)" as the "Defendant Officers"; and she then alleges that:

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at ECF 4 (emphasis and ellipsis supplied).

Moving to the substantive claims against the defendants, Count One of the Complaint, alleging "Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment," contains the following vague and ambiguous statements:

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at ECF 7-8 (emphasis and ellipses supplied). Those allegations, sometimes using the term "Defendant Officers," and at other times referring to "one of the Defendant Officers," "the other Defendants," "these defendants," or simply "officers," are imprecise and do not provide each of the defendant officers with adequate notice of plaintiff's claims as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Eleventh Circuit precedent.

The same concerns apply to Count Two, described as a "Civil Action for Felonious Injury Under Ala. Code § 6-5-370." All of the previously alleged facts are incorporated by reference. That count also refers to "Defendants Garrison, Bishop, and Benson," "[t]he Defendant Officers," and "the Defendant" without specifying which of the three individuals allegedly is responsible for plaintiff's injury.10

Count Three, described as a "Civil Action for Assault and Battery," adopts all of the allegations of the preceding counts, and asserts claims against "Defendants Garrison, Bishop, and Benson."11 Paragraph 36 states that "[t]he Defendant Officers assaulted Plaintiff by TASING her multiple times and kicking her in the side and stomach while she was handcuffed."12 Following that statement, plaintiff demands judgment against "the Defendant" (singular).13 The court cannot ascertain what act is attributable to each defendant, or which of the "Defendant Officers" she seeks to hold liable for damages.

Count Four, based upon the so-called tort of outrage, adopts all of the previous allegations and, additionally, suffers from the same lack of specificity noted above. Notably, paragraph 39 states that "[t]he Defendant Officers who were present at the scene while Plaintiff was being assaulted had a duty to intervene when the other officers were using excessive force."14 There simply is no way any of the defendants, or the court for that matter, can discern the basis of plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff introduced another ambiguity by referring to "the other officers" in the same paragraph in which she refers to "the Defendant Officers.15 This count also demands judgment against an unspecified "Defendant" (singular).16

Count Five of the Complaint, which asserts a claim for "negligent failure to train and supervise," likewise suffers from vague and ambiguous allegations:

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at ECF 11 (alteration, emphasis, and ellipses supplied).

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that plaintiff's complaint is an impermissible "shotgun" pleading, and that the motion to dismiss filed by the City of Sheffield, Alabama, the Sheffield Police Department, Sheffield Shift Commander Ricky Terry, and Sheffield police officer Sam Garrison (doc. no. 19) is due to be granted. In light of Eleventh Circuit precedent, however, plaintiff will be afforded one opportunity to cure the defects discussed in this opinion by way of filing an amended complaint. See, e.g., Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1296.

The other pending motions — i.e., doc. no. 10 (Motion for Summary Judgment by Muscle Shoals Police Chief Clint Reck), doc. no. 15 (Motion to Dismiss of the City of Muscle Shoals), and doc. no. 16 (Motion to Dismiss of Muscle Shoals police officer Steve Benson) — are due to be denied without prejudice and, thus, may be renewed, if appropriate, following the filing of an amended complaint. Plaintiff would be well-advised, however, to consider the arguments made in those motions when redrafting her complaint.

A separate order, in accordance with the discussion contained in this memorandum of opinion, will be entered contemporaneously herewith.