CARPENETI, Chief Justice.
A tenant fell on the outside stairs of her rented apartment and sustained a serious back injury. When she fell, one of the wooden stairs broke. She sued her landlord, from whom she subleased the apartment, alleging that her fall was caused by the landlord's negligent failure to inspect and maintain the staircase.
Before trial, the tenant filed a series of motions in limine, including one seeking to prevent the admission of evidence not previously disclosed during discovery on the issues of comparative negligence and failure to inspect and maintain, and another seeking to prevent the defendants from misstating the respective duties of landlords and tenants. The superior court denied these motions. At the close of evidence, the tenant moved for a directed verdict on the landlord's comparative negligence defense and the landlord's attempt to allocate fault to a deceased party. She also moved to preclude the landlord from making arguments based on medical records admitted at trial. The superior court denied each motion. The jury returned a verdict finding no negligence.
The tenant appeals the denial of her motions in limine and for directed verdict, as
Because the superior court did not err, because the jury's verdict was not contrary to the evidence, and because the medical records issue is moot, we uphold the jury's verdict and affirm the superior court's rulings.
On October 21, 2006, Elizabeth Heynen (Heynen) fell on the exterior stairs of her second-floor rented apartment in Skagway. The apartment building was constructed by its owner, Leslie Fairbanks (Leslie), in 1990-91. In April 2006, Leslie leased the building to his daughter, Julene Fairbanks (Julene). Julene operated a specialty food store on the ground floor, where Heynen was an employee. Julene also rented the upstairs apartment to Heynen.
In June 2007, Heynen filed a complaint for personal injury. She alleged that she fell when she "exited her ... apartment, intending to descend the outside stairway to take her dog for a walk" and "the edge of the first step below the upper landing crumbled underfoot causing her to fall down backwards, landing on her buttocks and severely striking her lower spine on the edge of the landing." The complaint detailed Heynen's medical problems following the fall, which she claimed caused immediate pain and permanent injuries and required her to have spinal surgery. Heynen further alleged that both Leslie and Julene had breached their duties as landlords to inspect, maintain, and repair the staircase and that their negligence had been a substantial factor in causing her injuries. Heynen sought general and special damages as well as fees and costs.
Leslie and Julene each answered the complaint. They denied Heynen's allegations and presented a number of affirmative defenses, including third-party negligence, failure to mitigate, and comparative negligence. Heynen filed an amended complaint on October 12, 2007, in which she argued that the defendants' failure to maintain the premises as required by AS 34.03.100
During discovery, Heynen filed a request for admissions in which she asked Leslie and Julene to "admit there are no genuine issues of fact to support your third Affirmative Defense that Plaintiff Elizabeth Heynen's `injuries, if any[,] were caused by and/or contributed [to] by her own negligence.'" Leslie and Julene declined to make this admission, stating that there were "genuine issues of fact as to how the accident occurred," that discovery was ongoing, and that the defendants "anticipate[d] being able to further respond to this request after plaintiff's discovery deposition." Heynen subsequently filed a request for supplementation from Julene, asking her to "provide any information which she intend[ed] to present at trial" regarding the affirmative defenses. Julene did not respond to this request. Heynen did not file a motion to compel.
In October 2008, Heynen filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Leslie's and Julene's affirmative defenses of comparative negligence and failure to mitigate. The superior court denied the motion as to comparative negligence. The court noted that Heynen's motion for summary judgment relied
In March 2009, Heynen filed a motion for discovery sanctions based on Leslie's and Julene's "failure to provide a factual basis [for,] or to respond to[,] repeated discovery requests as to their affirmative defense of comparative negligence." As a sanction for these alleged discovery violations, Heynen requested that the superior court preclude Leslie and Julene from asserting the comparative negligence defense at trial. The superior court denied this motion, explaining that "sanctions ... only come into play if there is an order compelling discovery which is violated" and noting that Heynen did not "point to any fact, or any document, that defendants have not produced." But the court invited Heynen to move to compel disclosures if she felt that "defendant's disclosures [were] inadequate," and noted that if "defendants attempt to introduce evidence at trial which was not [previously] disclosed, [Heynen] may object under Rule 37(c)(1)."
Before trial, Heynen filed a series of motions in limine. Motion in limine No. 2, filed in September 2009, requested a court order prohibiting the defendants from raising any new factual defenses to Heynen's claim that her fall was caused by the defendants' failure to inspect, repair, and maintain the stairway. Motion in limine No. 4 requested an order prohibiting the defendants from presenting any facts not previously disclosed in support of their comparative negligence defense.
On November 5, 2009, the superior court issued an order on Heynen's motions in limine Nos. 2 through 6. The court granted three of Heynen's motions, but denied motions No. 2 and No. 4.
Heynen also filed motion in limine No. 8, which requested an order prohibiting defendants' counsel from "miscommunicating the differing duties at issue" — specifically, the duties of landlords under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and the lesser duty of care imposed on tenants. The superior court denied the motion in an order that stated: "The parties are free to make arguments that note the similarities and the differences between their respective duties, as long as they do not misstate the law." The court also noted that the parties' "duties are different, and counsel should not argue that they are the same."
A jury trial was held in November 2009, with Julene as the sole defendant.
The jury found no negligence as to any of the parties listed on the special verdict form: Julene and Leslie Fairbanks, Kosters, and Heynen. Heynen did not file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On March 17, 2010, the superior court entered a final judgment in favor of Julene and awarded her approximately $7,700 in Civil Rule 79 costs and approximately $9,770 in Civil Rule 82 attorney's fees. Heynen appeals.
When considering a claim that evidence offered at trial was insufficient to support a jury verdict, we review the record to determine whether "the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence."
Our "role in reviewing a grant of a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV is not to weigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, but rather to determine whether [the] evidence, when viewed in light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment."
We review a trial court's rulings on a motion in limine according to the underlying relief sought in the motion. Here, the types of relief sought in the motions in limine — preclusion of evidence and a ruling on trial management — call for abuse of discretion review.
Heynen argues that the evidence of Julene's negligence "was so strong that reasonable persons could not differ in judgment," and requests that the final judgment be vacated. Julene responds that Heynen "failed to make a motion for a directed verdict or any post-trial motion" on the issue of Julene's negligence and is therefore precluded from arguing that the verdict should be set aside on appeal. In the alternative, Julene argues that the question of negligence was properly submitted to the jury and that the finding was supported by the evidence.
Heynen contends that the jury's verdict was contrary to the evidence. Heynen did not move for a directed verdict at trial on the issue of Julene's negligence, nor did she move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Julene argues that "to challenge a verdict as being inconsistent, a party must raise the issue before the jury is discharged," and claims that Heynen is precluded from raising this argument on appeal. Julene relies on Roderer v. Dash
We have stated that questions of negligence should generally be resolved by the jury rather than foreclosed by the trial court through summary judgment or other means.
Heynen argues that the evidence presented at trial "was such that reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment." Heynen claims "uncontroverted evidence" established that Julene breached her duty to "inspect, maintain, and repair" the stairs; and that Julene's breach caused Heynen's injuries. Specifically, Heynen points to evidence that Julene did not actively inspect, repair, or maintain the staircase, and cites expert testimony indicating that the step broke as a result of moisture and rot. Heynen further argues that a connection between her fall, her injuries, and her resulting disabilities was conclusively established at trial. Julene disputes each of these points.
First, while admitting that she had not physically tested the wood in the stairs to see whether it was punky or would give way under a knife, Julene noted that she "ha[d] been up and down the staircase" and the staircase "fe[lt] solid."
Second, as to the condition of the steps, Julene adduced evidence disputing Heynen's claim that the break was due to negligence on Julene's part. The steps at issue were
George also testified that wood that is exposed to the elements has a useful service life in Southeast Alaska of between 10 and 20 years.
Julene disputed that the step was rotten, and offered testimony in support of this position. Kenneth Graham, Julene's partner, removed the broken step the day of the accident.
In light of all of this evidence, the jury could have concluded that a visual inspection of wooden stairs that "fe[lt] solid" was reasonable under the circumstances. The jury may have subscribed to the argument that Julene made at closing, and concluded that the flaw in the wood was a latent, natural flaw — not caused by rot-and therefore difficult or impossible to discover under the circumstances. Julene's counsel made this argument at closing:
In other words, even if Julene had been the most vigilant of landlords, if the step broke along a knot in the wood (which was characterized by Heynen's construction expert as a "very unpredictable element" of wood), this is not the type of harm that she could reasonably have been expected to find. Under this view, reasonable jurors could have differed over whether Julene was negligent. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the jury's verdict was not contrary to the evidence.
Heynen argues that the superior court erred in denying her motions in limine No. 2
In motion in limine No. 2, Heynen requested an order precluding Julene "from raising any factual defenses not previously disclosed to Plaintiff's claim that her fall was caused by Defendants' failure to inspect, repair and maintain the subject stairway." In motion in limine No. 4, Heynen similarly requested an order precluding Julene from raising "new facts in support" of her comparative negligence defense for the first time at trial. In denying the two motions, the superior court wrote:
The superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue an order precluding Julene from presenting undefined evidence at trial; nor does Heynen point to any evidence that was introduced without having been properly disclosed in advance. As the court noted, Heynen's motions in limine No. 2 and No. 4 argued that Julene made inadequate disclosure during the discovery phase of the case. Heynen also alleged inadequate disclosure in a request for supplementation and in a motion for discovery sanctions.
In motion in limine No. 8, Heynen requested that the superior court "issue an Order prohibiting counsel for [Julene] from miscommunicating the differing duties at issue in this matter." Heynen argued that Julene planned to conflate her affirmative duty of care as a landlord with Heynen's duty of ordinary care as a tenant, and that "to allow such arguments [would] unduly prejudice the Plaintiff and confuse the jury." Ruling on this motion, the superior court wrote: "The parties are free to make arguments that note the similarities and differences between their respective duties, as long as they do not misstate the law. Their duties are different, and counsel should not argue that they are the same."
Heynen argues that this order "invited [Julene] to confuse the distinction between the duty of a landlord as opposed to a tenant"; but she does not identify any objection to such an argument at trial.
Heynen contends that "there was no evidence presented to create a question for the jury on whether [she] was comparatively negligent" and that the superior court erred in allowing this theory to be considered by the jury. We note first that the jury found no negligence on Heynen's part; accordingly, any error would have been harmless because Heynen was not prejudiced by the superior court's action.
But because Heynen argues that the mere giving of a comparative negligence instruction was confusing to the jury, we also address this issue on the merits. We conclude that the superior court did not err in its instructions on this matter. After the close of evidence, Heynen moved for a directed verdict on the issue of her comparative negligence. The superior court denied this motion ruling that the jury could draw "[a] reasonable inference ... that a substantial factor in [Heynen's] fall was the fact that she stepped so close to the edge of the step." The jury found that Heynen was not comparatively negligent, but it also found that the other parties listed on the verdict form were not negligent. On appeal, Heynen challenges the superior court's denial of her motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the comparative negligence defense "confused the jury so that the resulting verdict was contrary to the evidence presented."
We will not reverse a superior court's denial of a motion for directed verdict unless the "evidence ... is such that reasonable persons could not differ in their judgment."
We are not persuaded by Heynen's argument that the jury was somehow confused by the existence of Julene's comparative negligence defense. We trust jurors to consider properly presented claims and defenses within the contours of jury instructions. Heynen's argument seems to imply that because the jury did not find negligence on the part of any of the parties, it must have been confused. But the existence of negligence is not a necessary precondition to the occurrence of a personal injury. The superior court did not err by denying Heynen's motion for directed verdict on the issue of comparative negligence.
Heynen argues that the inclusion of Kurt Kosters on the special verdict form as an individual to whom fault could be allocated "was improper and confusing because Mr. Kosters was an employee and agent of Mr. Fairbanks and thus any allocation of fault was imputable to Mr. Fairbanks, who was dismissed from the action by stipulation of
Heynen moved for a directed verdict on this issue at trial, claiming that there was "no way a reasonable juror could conclude ... that Mr. Kosters was negligent." Heynen also argued that it was improper to allocate fault to an employee who merely "did what was on the plans."
The superior court denied the motion for directed verdict, ruling:
The superior court also rejected Heynen's argument that allowing the jury to consider allocating fault to Kosters was improper because it "allocated fault in another direction to [Leslie Fairbanks]," who was no longer a party. The court noted that "the legal issue under the doctrine of respondeat superior... is an entirely different question," and concluded that "[e]mployees don't have immunity from liability." At the close of evidence, Heynen renewed the motion for directed verdict; the court again denied it. The jury found that Kosters was not negligent.
It was not error to deny the motion for directed verdict because reasonable jurors could have concluded that Kosters was, or was not, negligent. The jury heard testimony suggesting that Kosters may have been negligent in failing to use treated wood on the exterior stairs where Heynen fell. Kosters testified, in a deposition transcript read to the jury, that he decided what type of wood would be used to build the stairs and that there was never any discussion about possibly waterproofing the wood.
Heynen's other arguments challenging the propriety of allowing the jury to consider allocating fault to Kosters are unpersuasive. As the superior court properly noted, there was no reason that Leslie's role in the trial and his relationship to Kosters should have prevented the jury from considering whether Kosters negligently caused the accident. Though Heynen reached a settlement with Leslie, fault could still be allocated or imputed to Leslie under AS 09.17.080
Heynen argues that the superior court abused its discretion in admitting her medical records from the 1980s and 1990s, when she was involved in multiple car accidents. This evidence might have been relevant in the jury's assessment of causation or damages had it found that Julene was negligent. Because it returned a verdict of no negligence, however, this point is moot. We therefore decline to reach it.
We AFFIRM the decisions of the superior court.
CHRISTEN, Justice, not participating.
It is also irrelevant that Kosters was deceased and had no estate. Kosters' estate was not exempt from liability, and there is no rule stating that judgment-proof individuals cannot be tort defendants.
