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STATE v. TIMMONS, 1 CA-CR 10-0828. (2011)

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona Number: inazco20111213003 Visitors: 17
Filed: Dec. 13, 2011
Latest Update: Dec. 13, 2011
Summary: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 MEMORANDUM DECISION NORRIS, Judge. 1 Jamie Leann Timmons timely appeals from her conviction and sentence for theft of a means of transportation, a class 3 felony. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1814 (2007). After searching the record on appeal and finding no arguable question of law that was not frivolous, Timmons'
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THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

NORRIS, Judge.

¶ 1 Jamie Leann Timmons timely appeals from her conviction and sentence for theft of a means of transportation, a class 3 felony. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1814 (2007). After searching the record on appeal and finding no arguable question of law that was not frivolous, Timmons' counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), asking this court to search the record for fundamental error. This court granted counsel's motion to allow Timmons to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, but Timmons did not do so. After reviewing the entire record, we find no fundamental error and, therefore, affirm Timmons' conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶ 2 On December 17, 2009, a blue Kia Rio was stolen from the parking lot of a Fry's grocery store. Shortly before the owner discovered the Kia missing, she reported to the store's management she had dropped her keys and could not find them. The store's surveillance footage captured an individual getting into the Kia and driving away.

¶ 3 Ten days later, a police officer came across the Kia parked in the driveway of a house. The occupants of the house, who were friends of Timmons, told the officer Timmons had left just as he arrived. Shortly after that, a second officer came across Timmons walking down a nearby street. The police took Timmons into custody and searched her. During the search, a police officer found two keys in Timmons' pocket which, as the police confirmed, belonged to the Kia. Timmons admitted she had been using the Kia, but gave conflicting explanations for possessing it. She first told the police she had "borrowed" the car from "Jerry Brown," then said later she had bought the Kia from a "crack head" named Joey, whom she testified at trial was a "family friend."

¶ 4 A grand jury indicted Timmons for "knowingly controll[ing the victim's car], a means of transportation, knowing or having reason to know that the property was stolen." During a three-day trial, the State and Timmons presented evidence centering on whether Timmons knew or had reason to know the Kia was stolen, with Timmons steadfastly maintaining she had purchased it from "Joey" without any knowledge of or reason to believe it had been stolen and the State emphasizing her conflicting explanations and her flight from the police. The jury found Timmons guilty. The court sentenced Timmons to the presumptive term of 11.25 years in prison as a category three repetitive offender, based on her admission during her trial testimony she had two prior felony convictions, which were historic prior felony convictions. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (J) (2009). Timmons received 74 days of pre-sentence incarceration

DISCUSSION

¶ 5 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and find none.2 See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. Timmons received a fair trial. She was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and was present at all critical stages.

¶ 6 The evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports the verdict. The jury was properly comprised of eight members and the court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the charge, Timmons' presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof, and the necessity of a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and considered a presentence report, Timmons was given an opportunity to speak at sentencing, and her sentence was within the range of acceptable sentences for her offense. A.R.S. § 13-1814(D); A.R.S. §§ 13-703(C), (J).

CONCLUSION

¶ 7 We decline to order briefing and affirm Timmons' conviction and sentence.

¶ 8 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel's obligations pertaining to Timmons' representation in this appeal have ended. Defense counsel need do no more than inform Timmons of the outcome of this appeal and her future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984).

¶ 9 Timmons has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if she wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court's own motion, we also grant Timmons 30 days from the date of this decision to file an in propria persona motion for reconsideration.

MICHAEL J. BROWN, Presiding Judge, PHILIP HALL, Judge, concurring.

FootNotes


1. We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Timmons. State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989).
2. The record does not reflect whether the superior court made the determinations required by Arizona Rule of Evidence 609(a). The court and counsel discussed application of Rule 609 extensively during the trial and this discussion suggests the court had determined the two prior felonies Timmons admitted during trial were admissible under Rule 609. The record also reflects before trial the State asked the court to make the necessary Rule 609 determinations. Under these circumstances we see no prejudicial, reversible error, although the "preferred method for complying with Rule 609 is a specific on-the-record finding that the probative value of using a prior conviction for impeachment outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice." State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 400, 698 P.2d 183, 195 (1985) (citations omitted).
Source:  Leagle

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