Filed: Oct. 24, 2019
Latest Update: Oct. 24, 2019
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 17, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 21, 2019, and to exclude time
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 17, 2019. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 21, 2019, and to exclude time ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 17, 2019.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 21, 2019, and to exclude time between October 17, 2019, and November 21, 2019, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find:
a) On June 6, 2019, the Court granted the defendant's coram nobis petition and set the matter for a status hearing on July 25, 2019. The Court granted the coram nobis petition based on prior counsel's ineffective assistance related to potential immigration consequences of a criminal conviction. The status hearing was subsequently continued to September 12, 2019, and later to October 17, 2019. The United States and counsel for the defendant have explored potential resolution of this matter. Counsel for the defendant has conducted follow-up research and investigation related to the potential immigration consequences of this case and potential resolution options. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to conduct investigation and research.
b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) The government does not object to the continuance.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 17, 2019 to November 21, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: October 15, 2019 McGREGOR W. SCOTT
United States Attorney
/s/ JUSTIN L. LEE
JUSTIN L. LEE
Assistant United States Attorney
Dated: October 15, 2019 /s/ CLYDE BLACKMON
CLYDE BLACKMON
Counsel for Defendant
NAVJOT SINGH
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
