MOORE, Judge.
Susan Rayford Daniels ("the mother") appeals from a judgment entered by the Shelby Circuit Court ("the trial court") denying her Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion for relief from a judgment entered by the trial court on May 5, 2004.
On October 31, 2003, Rodney K. Rayford ("the father") filed in the trial court a petition seeking to modify the mother's child-support obligation and requesting that he be allowed to claim both of the parties' children for income-tax purposes. The father asserted, among other things, that the parties had been divorced by a judgment entered by the trial court on June 20, 2000, and that, pursuant to that
(Bold typeface omitted.) The record indicates that the petition and summons sent by certified mail was returned to the clerk's office marked "Not Deliverable as Addressed."
On January 19, 2004, the father filed a "motion for service by publication," in which he asserted:
(Capitalization in original.)
The father's affidavit, attached as exhibit "A" to the father's motion, stated:
On April 2, 2004, the father filed a "motion for default," asserting, among other things, that service by publication had been completed on or about February 28, 2004, that the mother had "failed to answer or to otherwise make an appearance or request an extension before . . . March 19, 2004, per notice issued by the Clerk of Court," and requesting that the trial court enter a default against the mother and set the matter for a hearing to allow him to present proof in support of his petition to modify. The matter was set for a hearing on April 29, 2004.
The record contains a completed CS-41 Child-Support-Obligation Income Statement/Affidavit form signed by the father on April 29, 2004, along with a CS-42 Child-Support Guidelines form completed and signed by the father's attorney on that same date. See Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin. On May 5, 2004, the trial court entered a judgment finding that a material change in circumstances existed, ordering the mother to pay child support in the amount of $392 per month until the parties' children attain the age of 19 years, allowing the father to claim both children for income-tax purposes, and suspending the mother's visitation with the children pending further order of the court.
On October 20, 2010, the mother filed a "motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)," asserting, among other things, that the May 5, 2004, judgment was void because it had been entered against her "without proper service and/or personal jurisdiction." Specifically, she asserted:
The father filed a response to the mother's Rule 60(b) motion. On January 24, 2011, the trial court entered a judgment denying the mother's Rule 60(b) motion. On February 18, 2011, the mother filed what she styled as a "Motion to Vacate, Alter, or Amend"; the trial court purported to deny that motion on February 23, 2011.
On February 24, 2011, the father filed a response to the mother's motion to vacate,
Bank of America Corp. v. Edwards, 881 So.2d 403, 405 (Ala.2003) (quoting Image Auto, Inc. v. Mike Kelley Enters., Inc., 823 So.2d 655, 657 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn Insurance Mgmt. & Admin., Inc. v. Palomar Ins. Corp., 590 So.2d 209, 212 (Ala. 1991)); see also Ex parte N.B., 66 So.3d 249, 254 (Ala.2010).
On appeal, the mother argues that the trial court erred in declining to grant her Rule 60(b) motion. Specifically, she argues that, because she was not a resident of Alabama in 2004, the trial court erred in allowing the father to serve her by publication. The mother correctly points out that Rule 4.3, Ala. R. Civ. P., as it read before it was amended in August 2004, did not allow a nonresident in an in personam action to be served by publication. See, e.g., Cameron v. Tillis, 952 So.2d 352, 353-54 (Ala.2006) (holding that service by publication on a nonresident was invalid before the August 1, 2004, amendment to Rule 4.3).
The father argues and the mother acknowledges, however, that, in Gross v. Loewen, 522 So.2d 306 (Ala.Civ.App.1988), this court indicated in dicta that, in a postdivorce modification proceeding, a nonresident defendant could be served by publication. The mother asks this court to overrule that part of our opinion in Gross. As the mother points out, in Gross, this court reasoned that an exception to the general rule exists because postdivorce proceedings are actually continuations of the original divorce action. We note, however, that our supreme court has held: "The filing of a petition to modify a domestic-relations judgment is, for purposes of applying the rules of procedure, treated as the filing of a separate action." Ex parte Davidson, 782 So.2d 237, 240 (Ala.2000). Thus, we conclude that the reasoning of the court's dicta in Gross was flawed.
In Gross, this court also relied on former § 30-3-25(a)(4), Ala.Code 1975, a part of the former Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
The Alabama Comment to § 30-3B-108, Ala.Code 1975, makes it clear that "out of state service of process [is limited] to the manner currently provided for by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rule 4.2[, Ala. R. Civ. P.])."
Having found the rationale in the dicta in Gross to be misplaced in the present case, we decline to follow it. We instead conclude that, based on the plain language of Rule 4.3 as it existed before the August 1, 2004, amendment, service by publication on a nonresident defendant, such as the mother in this case, was improper. Because the mother "was not properly served, the default judgment is void." Cameron, 952 So.2d at 354. A void judgment must be set aside. Bank of America Corp. v. Edwards, 881 So.2d at 405. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in declining to grant the mother's Rule 60(b) motion. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause for the trial court to enter a judgment granting the mother's Rule 60(b) motion and setting aside the May 5, 2004, void judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
THOMPSON, P.J., and PITTMAN, BRYAN, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
(Emphasis added.)