STIPULATION REGARDING REQUEST FOR (1) CONTINUANCE OF HEARING DATE AND (2) FINDINGS OF EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIOD PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

KANDIS A. WESTMORE, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, the United States Attorney for the Northern District of California and Assistant United States Attorney Garth Hire, and defendants Fernando Paez-Lazcano and Marco Antonio Mora-Reynoso, by and through their respective counsel of record, Julia Mezhinsky Jayne and Assistant Federal Public Defender Angela Hansen, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. On September 15, 2015, the Honorable Kandis A. Westmore signed a federal criminal complaint charging defendants with conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On that same day, defendants made their initial appearances and were arraigned on the criminal complaint.

2. On September 22, 2015, defendants waived the timing for preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 and the timing for indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) until October 27, 2015 for defendant Mora-Reynoso and until October 28, 2015 for defendant Paez-Lazcano.

3. The parties subsequently submitted stipulations and appeared in Court and the defendants continued to waive the timing for preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 and the timing for indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b) until February 22, 2016, and the matter is now set for preliminary hearing or arraignment on that date.

4. The government has provided discovery to the defendants and defense counsel require additional time to review that discovery and to potentially negotiate a pre-indictment disposition based on that review. Thus, counsel for defendants represent that additional time is necessary to confer with defendants, conduct and complete an independent investigation of the case (including a review of covert audio-video recordings of controlled purchases of firearms and narcotics), conduct and complete additional legal research including for potential pre-indictment and/or pre-trial motions, review the discovery already produced and soon to be produced, as well as potential evidence in the case, and prepare for trial in the event that a pre-indictment resolution does not occur. Defense counsel represent that failure to grant the continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The parties agree that the requested continuance is not based on congestion of the Court's calendar, lack of diligent preparation on the part of the attorneys for the government or the defense, or failure on the part of the attorney for the government to obtain available witnesses.

5. Defense counsel represent that their clients understand that they have a right under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) to be charged by information or indictment with the offenses alleged in the pending criminal complaint and that their clients knowingly and voluntarily waive that right and agree to exclude the time to be charged by indictment or information to March 8, 2016. Defense counsel further represent that their clients knowingly and voluntarily waive the timing for preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 to March 8, 2016.

6. For purposes of computing the date under Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for preliminary hearing, and the date under the Speedy Trial Act by which defendants must be charged by indictment or information, the parties agree that the time period of February 22, 2016, to March 8, 2016, inclusive, should be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i) and (h)(7)(B)(iv) because the delay results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request, without government objection, on the basis of the Court's finding that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendants in the filing of an information or indictment within the period specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b); and (ii) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

7. Nothing in this stipulation shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods be excluded from the period within which an information or indictment must be filed.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

[PROPOSED] ORDER

The Court has read and considered the Stipulation Regarding Request for (1) Continuance of Hearing Date and (2) Findings of Excludable Time Period Pursuant to Speedy Trial Act, filed by the parties in this matter. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, demonstrates facts that support a continuance in this matter, and provides good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, as well as to waive the timing for preliminary hearing under Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Court further finds that: (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendants in the filing of an information or indictment within the time period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b); and (ii) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN:

The hearing for preliminary hearing and arraignment on information or indictment in this matter currently scheduled for February 22, 2016, for defendant Mora-Reynoso and defendant Paez-Lazcano, is continued to 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, March 8, 2016, before the Honorable Kandis A. Westmore, United States Magistrate Judge, in Oakland, California. The time period of February 22, 2016, to March 8, 2016, inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which an information or indictment must be filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (B)(iv). Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which an information or indictment must be filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.