MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KEITH STARRETT, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Synovus Bank's Motion to Amend [18], Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [23], and Motion to Strike Jury Demand [25]. After reviewing the submissions of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the Motion to Amend [18] and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are well taken and should be granted. Because of the rulings on these motions, the Court further finds that a ruling on the Motion to Strike Jury Demand [25] should be deferred pending further briefing.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Synovus Bank ("Plaintiff") brings this action to recover an amount owed under a promissory note (the "Note") executed by Defendants Scenic Oaks Development, LLC ("Scenic Oaks"), House Mountain, LLC ("House Mountain"), and Edmund Rasha Cannon, Jr. ("Race Cannon") (collectively "Defendants"). The Note was first executed on June 6, 2013, with an original amount of $6,600,000 and a maturity date of December 30, 2013. After being modified twice, the final outstanding principal of the loan totaled $3,036,956.72, with a final maturity date of July 15, 2015. (Third Extension and Modification Agreement [23-1].) No payment was made when the Note matured. (Complaint [1] at ¶ 12; Answer [7] at ¶ 12.) A letter was sent by Plaintiff on July 28, 2015, demanding full payment of the loan by August 14, 2015, but no payment was made. (Complaint [1] at ¶ 13; Answer [7] at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff filed suit on August 21, 2015.
Plaintiff now seeks leave to amend its complaint and add three defendants, Edmund Rasha Cannon 2013 Irrevocable Trust ("Race Cannon Trust"), Heather Shackleford Cannon 2013 Irrevocable Trust ("Heather Cannon Trust"), and Heather Shackleford Cannon ("Heather Cannon"), and two fraudulent transfer claims. Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment on its breach of contract claim against Defendants, and has moved to strike Defendants' jury demand based on the waiver of the right to a jury trial found in the Note. The Court has considered these motions and is now ready to rule.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Amend [18]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) instructs the Court to "freely give leave when justice so requires." A motion to amend, however, "may be denied on numerous grounds such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment." Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep't of Educ. ex rel. Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brewer-Giorgio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff proposes to amend the complaint in order to add two new claims and three new defendants. The Motion to Amend [18] was filed on February 15, 2016, a day before the deadline for amended pleadings expired on February 16, 2016. (See Scheduling Order [15].) Defendants argue that the Court should not allow the amendments because of the undue delay in the filing of this motion, the undue prejudice the amendments would cause them, and because the Court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the new claims.
Because the Motion to Amend [18] was filed by the deadline set out in the scheduling order, the Court does not find that there has been undue delay in its filing. See Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 148 F.3d 1231, 1257 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that a delay in filing a motion to amend was not an "undue delay" when it was filed before the deadline in the scheduling order).
Defendants argue that the new claims are unrelated to the original breach of contract claim and that the original defendants will have their defense of the breach of contract claim "complicated by and intermingled with new defendants defending state law claims." (Response [21] at p. 4.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, the latter argument is moot. See infra II.B. As for the new claims not relating to the breach of contract claim, these claims are for intentional and constructive fraudulent transfer and are premised on the allegations that liquid assets were transferred by Race and Heather Cannon to Race Cannon Trust and Heather Cannon Trust in anticipation of defaulting on the Note. If the Note was not defaulted on, and there was consequently no breach of contract, these claims would have no basis. They are necessarily, then, related to the breach of contract claim. Therefore, no undue prejudice will occur by adding unrelated claims to the litigation because these claims are not unrelated.
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' new claims do not meet the jurisdictional amount for the Court's diversity jurisdiction. They argue that these claims seek equitable relief and that Plaintiffs do not show that their amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As the assets allegedly transferred "caused their total assets to decrease by approximately $19 million dollars and caused their combined net worth to decrease by approximately $17 million dollars," the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfactorily pleaded that the threshold of diversity jurisdiction is met. (See Proposed Amended Complaint [18-1] at p. 14 ¶ 61.)
Therefore, because the Court also does not find that the amendments are made with undue delay or that they would unduly prejudice Defendants, the Motion to Amend [18] will be granted.
B. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [23]
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Eleventh Circuit has held that
[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the evidence before the court shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In making this determination, the court must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.
The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.
Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in original). Defendants have not submitted a response to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [23] and have offered no evidence to show that there is any dispute as to any material fact. As such, the Court evaluates only the evidence submitted by Plaintiff in order to determine if it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its breach of contract claim.
The Third Extension and Modification Agreement [24-1] establishes that Scenic Oaks, House Mountain, and Race Cannon were all jointly and severally liable as borrowers under the Note and that the maturity date of the Note was July 15, 2015. Defendants admitted that no payment was made on the Note when it matured on this date. (Answer [7] at p. 2 ¶ 12.) Failure to pay constituted an Event of Default under the Note. (Note [1-1] at pp. 1-2.) The Note provides that Plaintiff, as the lender, is entitled to the entire outstanding principal balance of the loan and all accrued but unpaid interest and charges upon an Event of Default. (Id. at p. 4). The Note also states that Plaintiff is entitled to charge interest on the entire unpaid principal at a rate of 16% per annum1 until the loan is paid in full. (Id.) The Note also entitles Plaintiff to collect any reasonable attorney's fees in the event it becomes necessary to employ counsel to collect on the debt. (Id. at p. 7.)
There is no dispute that Defendants breached their contract with Plaintiff by failing to make a payment on the loan as obligated by the Note. By law, then, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment in its favor for the outstanding principal and any accrued interest, as well as attorney's fees associated with the breach of contract claim. As of April 8, 2016, the total outstanding Note balance, including interest, was $3,377,676.19. Attorney's fees amounted to $101,343.22. Again, Defendants have not disputed these amounts.
Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [23]. Plaintiff is entitled to the amount of $3,377,676.19 for the total outstanding balance on the Note and $101,343.22 for attorney's fees, plus whatever interest and reasonable attorney's fees Plaintiff has incurred since submission of their motion.
C. Motion to Strike Jury Demand [25]
Because the breach of contract claim has been dealt with on summary judgment, the only remaining claims are the fraudulent transfer claims Plaintiff adds in its Motion to Amend [18]. No arguments were made as whether the waiver of the right to a jury applies to these claims. The Court therefore finds that further briefing on this motion is needed. Parties are given two weeks from the date of this order to submit their arguments as to why the purported waiver does or does not apply to these claims. The Court will defer its ruling on the Motion to Strike Jury Demand [25] until these submissions are made.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Amend [18] is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [23] is granted. Plaintiff is entitled to the amount of $3,377,676.19 for the total outstanding balance on the Note and $101,343.22 for attorney's fees, plus whatever interest and reasonable attorney's fees Plaintiff has incurred since submission of their motion.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion to Strike Jury Demand [25] is deferred. Parties are given two weeks from the date of this order to submit arguments as to why the purported waiver does or does not apply to these claims.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST
1. Appealable Orders: Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute:
(a) Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under 28 U.S.C.§ 158, generally are appealable. A final decision is one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983). A magistrate judge's report and recommendation is not final and appealable until judgment thereon is entered by a district court judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(b) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, a judgment as to fewer than all parties or all claims is not a final, appealable decision unless the district court has certified the judgment for immediate review under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Williams v. Bishop, 732 F.2d 885, 885-86 (11th Cir. 1984). A judg ment which resolves all issues except matters, such as attorneys' fees and costs, that are collateral to the merits, is immediately appealable. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1721-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 837 (11th Cir. 1998).
(c) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted.
(d) Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5: The certification specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable.
(e) Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949); Atlantic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 890 F.2d 371, 376 (11th Cir. 1989); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 157, 85 S.Ct. 308, 312, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).
2. Time for Filing: The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Rinaldo v. Corbett, 256 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 4(a) and (c) set the following time limits:
(a) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): A notice of appeal in compliance with the requirements set forth in Fed.R.App.P. 3 must be filed in the district court within 30 days after the entry of the order or judgment appealed from. However, if the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 60 days after such entry. THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Special filing provisions for inmates are discussed below.
(b) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): "If one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a), whichever period ends later."
(c) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): If any party makes a timely motion in the district court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a type specified in this rule, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the date of entry of the order disposing of the last such timely filed motion.
(d) Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Under certain limited circumstances, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(5), the time may be extended if a motion for an extension is filed within 30 days after expiration of the time otherwise provided to file a notice of appeal, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. Under Rule 4(a)(6), the time may be extended if the district court finds upon motion that a party did not timely receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order, and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension.
(e) Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): If an inmate confined to an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a notarized statement, either of which must set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class postage has been prepaid.
3. Format of the notice of appeal: Form 1, Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a suitable format. See also Fed.R.App.P. 3(c). A pro se notice of appeal must be signed by the appellant.
4. Effect of a notice of appeal: A district court loses jurisdiction (authority) to act after the filing of a timely notice of appeal, except for actions in aid of appellate jurisdiction or to rule on a timely motion of the type specified in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
