THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

NORRIS, Judge.

¶1 Defendants/Appellants City of Cottonwood and certain elected officials (collectively, the "City") appeal from a judgment entered against it by the superior court on a bid-protest action filed by Tom Mulcaire Contracting, LLC. The City also appeals from a judgment entered against it, awarding Mulcaire attorneys' fees under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 12-2030 (2003). As we explain, we do not have jurisdiction to address the City's appeal of the bid protest, but we do have jurisdiction to address its appeal of the fee judgment.1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In February 2009, the City solicited requests for proposals, and, on May 5, 2009, awarded the contract to Tiffany Construction Company ("Tiffany contract"). Mulcaire protested this award, and on July 1, 2009, Mulcaire sued the City and asked the superior court to enter a writ of mandamus directing the City to rebid the Tiffany contract pursuant to A.R.S. § 34-603 (Supp. 2009). Mulcaire also requested a judgment of attorneys' fees and costs.

¶3 Approximately two months later, the City terminated the Tiffany contract because, as it explained in a letter to Tiffany, it was "in the City's best interests to begin self-performing" the work. A few weeks later, the City moved to dismiss Mulcaire's complaint or, alternatively, for summary judgment, asserting, as relevant here, the issues raised had become moot because the City had decided to self-perform the work. In response, Mulcaire asserted the City's "voluntary termination of the Tiffany contract does not automatically moot" the relief requested because the City's actions would likely recur. After oral argument, the superior court denied the City's motion.

¶4 The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the case and allowed the parties to submit written closing briefs, in which they reasserted their respective positions on mootness. Subsequently, the court ruled it could determine whether the City had violated A.R.S. §§ 34-601 to -613 (Supp. 2009) because the evidence demonstrated the City had terminated the Tiffany contract intentionally to moot the case and "prevent the current litigation." The court found the City had awarded the Tiffany contract in violation of A.R.S. § 34-603 and Mulcaire "would have been entitled to the relief requested in the complaint had the City not already cancel[]ed" the Tiffany contract. "[F]inding no just reason for delay," the court entered its ruling as a judgment in favor of Mulcaire ("merits judgment").

¶5 After entry of the merits judgment, Mulcaire moved for an award of attorneys' fees under A.R.S. § 12-2030 as the prevailing party in an application for a writ of mandamus. Over the City's objection, in a signed "Judgment of Attorney's Fees," the superior court granted Mulcaire a percentage of its requested fees ("fee judgment").

DISCUSSION

¶6 On appeal, the City challenges both the merits judgment and the fee judgment. Pursuant to our duty to determine jurisdiction over this appeal, Sorensen v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 464, 465, 957 P.2d 1007, 1008 (App. 1997), we requested the parties submit supplemental briefs because the record reflected the City had timely appealed only from the fee judgment, not the merits judgment. In its supplemental brief, the City argued we have jurisdiction to consider all of the issues it raised on appeal because the merits judgment was not a final judgment and the superior court did not enter a final judgment until the fee judgment. In its supplemental brief, Mulcaire argued we only had jurisdiction to consider the City's arguments relating to the fee judgment because the merits judgment was a final judgment and the City had only appealed from the fee judgment, not the merits judgment. As we explain, we agree with Mulcaire.

¶7 This court's jurisdiction is limited by statute. A.R.S. § 12-2101 (2003). "The general rule is that an appeal lies only from a final judgment." Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304, 812 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App. 1991). An appealing party must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of a final judgment unless the time for appeal is extended by the timely filing of certain post-trial motions, and, as a general matter, we are prohibited from extending that time. ARCAP 9(a), (b). Further, we can only review matters contained in the particular judgment from which a party appeals. See Flagstaff Vending Co. v. City of Flagstaff, 118 Ariz. 556, 561, 578 P.2d 985, 990 (1978). Although generally a court should not enter judgment until any attorneys' fees claims have been resolved, Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58(g), "a claim for attorneys' fees may be considered a separate claim" from a judgment on the merits, and a party may immediately appeal that judgment even when an attorneys' fees issue is still pending if the court makes the required Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 54(b) certification. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see Nat'l Broker Assocs., Inc. v. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 211 Ariz. 210, 216-18, ¶¶ 31-38, 119 P.3d 477, 483-85 (App. 2005).

¶8 Here, the merits judgment was a final judgment because it contained the Rule 54(b) certification: "Now therefore, finding no just reason for delay, IT IS ORDERED entering judgment in favor of [Mulcaire] and against [the City]." See In re Estate of Newman, 219 Ariz. 260, 264 n.2, ¶ 10, 196 P.3d 863, 867 n.2 (App. 2008) (express finding of "no just reason for delay" and directing entry of judgment sufficient to satisfy Rule 54(b)); see also Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 468, ¶¶ 26-28, 80 P.3d 269, 275 (2003) (appeal can be taken from interlocutory judgment that determines rights of parties and leaves another proceeding to determine amount of recovery if judgment includes Rule 54(b) certification). Moreover, contrary to the City's argument in its supplemental brief, the merits judgment resolved a claim and determined the issues presented — whether the City issued the 2009 request for proposals pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 34-601 to -613 and whether the City violated those statutes when it awarded the Tiffany contract. Although the merits judgment was final, the City failed to appeal from that judgment within the 30-day deadline and, instead, only noticed an appeal from the fee judgment.2

¶9 In sum, the City failed to timely appeal from the merits judgment and may not challenge on appeal the issues decided and findings made in that judgment. Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider only the arguments raised by the City challenging the fee judgment. A.R.S. § 12-2101(B).

CONCLUSION

¶10 For the foregoing reasons, we hold we do not have jurisdiction to address the City's challenge to the merits judgment.

PETER B. SWANN, Presiding Judge, DANIEL A. BARKER, Judge, Concurring.