THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOHNSEN, Judge.

¶ 1 Kanika Lashawn Robinson appeals her conviction of fraudulent schemes and artifices, a Class 2 felony. She argues the superior court abused its discretion by denying her mid-trial request for substitution of counsel without adequate inquiry. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Robinson was indicted on one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices, a Class 2 felony, and one count of forgery, a Class 4 felony. The morning after the first day of trial, after the jury had been impaneled and sworn, Robinson filed a handwritten "Motion to Appoint New Counsel." In its entirety, the motion stated, "I, Kanika Robinson, request that the court allow my present attorney [] to withdraw and request that the court appoint me a new counsel to represent me in my case due to irreconciable [sic] conflict exist [sic] between me and my attorney lack of communication [sic]."

¶ 3 After the first day, trial was postponed for unrelated reasons. When trial resumed a few days later, the court denied Robinson's motion as untimely. Before proceeding, however, the court heard from the prosecutor, who described hearing an argument "on the other side of the aisle" during juror strikes. Robinson's attorney then spoke, describing an argument he had with Robinson and her boyfriend about which jurors to strike from the panel. The attorney admitted "get[ting] a little heated at the moment" but denied his relationship with Robinson was "broken."

¶ 4 The court then called on Robinson, who said,

¶ 5 The court moved on without further addressing the merits of the motion. The jury convicted Robinson of fraudulent schemes and artifices but acquitted her of the forgery charge. The court imposed a suspended sentence of three years' supervised probation.

¶ 6 We have jurisdiction of Robinson's timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033 (2012).1

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 Robinson argues the court erred in denying her motion for change of counsel without conducting an inquiry into her allegations. We review a denial of a request for change of counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 507, ¶ 11, 968 P.2d 578, 580 (1998).

¶ 8 Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to representation by competent counsel; a defendant is not entitled, however, "to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney." Id.; see U.S. Const. amend. VI. The superior court is required to appoint new counsel only if there is "an irreconcilable conflict or a completely fractured relationship between counsel and the accused." State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 186, ¶ 29, 119 P.3d 448, 453 (2005). A sufficiently fractured relationship may be evidenced by a "total breakdown in communication" that results in "such minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful communication was not possible." State v. Torres, 208 Ariz. 340, 343, ¶ 8, 93 P.3d 1056, 1059 (2004) (quoting United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002)).

¶ 9 When presented with a defendant's motion to change counsel, the superior court must "inquire as to the basis" of the request. Torres, 208 Ariz. at 343, ¶ 7, 93 P.3d at 1059. The scope and formality of the required inquiry depends on the nature of the defendant's request. Id. at ¶ 8. Informal inquiry on the record suffices when a defendant has voiced general complaints about strategic or tactical conflicts, while a formal evidentiary hearing may be appropriate if the defendant raises "sufficiently specific, factually based allegations" supporting the substitution request. Id. (quotations omitted).

¶ 10 The superior court in this case did not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it considered and resolved Robinson's motion. Her written motion contained no specific factual allegations, but instead contained general statements about "irreconciable [sic] conflict" and "lack of communication." In court, Robinson said only that she "felt like [her lawyer] didn't want to represent me" because when she asked him questions about the case, he became "upset because . . . I don't understand something." Moreover, on appeal, Robinson does not "explain what other pertinent evidence or information would have come to light had the court conducted a more formal or extensive hearing." State v. Paris-Sheldon, 214 Ariz. 500, 505, ¶ 11, 154 P.3d 1046, 1051 (App. 2007).2

¶ 11 Given her failure to make specific factual allegations, nothing in Robinson's motion or oral statement in court required the superior court to conduct further inquiry into her request for change of counsel. See id.; see also Torres, 208 Ariz. at 343, ¶ 8, 93 P.3d at 1059.

¶ 12 Moreover, Robinson's dispute with her lawyer during jury selection related to strategic decisions about how to exercise peremptory strikes, and "disagreements over defense strategies do not constitute an irreconcilable conflict" requiring change of counsel. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186, ¶ 29, 119 P.3d at 453. Asked to respond to Robinson's motion, her lawyer told the court that "I don't think it [the attorney-client relationship] is broken." We defer to the superior court's resolution of a factual dispute if supported by the record. Paris-Sheldon, 214 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 13, 154 P.3d at 1051.

¶ 13 Nor did the court abuse its discretion by denying Robinson's motion as untimely. In addressing a motion for change of counsel, the court may consider several factors, including "the timing of the motion [and] inconvenience to witnesses." State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 486, 733 P.2d 1066, 1069 (1987). Robinson did not file her motion for new counsel until after the first day of trial, with the jury selected and sworn and the witnesses already summoned. Without new counsel ready to step in (and Robinson does not contend otherwise), the court could have granted her motion at that point only by declaring a mistrial and setting a new trial date, thereby wasting court resources and inconveniencing jurors and witnesses.

¶ 14 For all these reasons, the superior court did not err in denying Robinson's motion for change of counsel.

CONCLUSION

¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Robinson's conviction and sentence.

DONN KESSLER, Judge, MICHAEL J. BROWN, Judge, concurring.