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JESSICA v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, 1 CA-JV 11-0175. (2012)

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona Number: inazco20120313010 Visitors: 8
Filed: Mar. 13, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2012
Summary: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24 MEMORANDUM DECISION JOHNSEN, Judge. 1 Jessica M. ("Mother") appeals the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to three of her children. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 Police served a search warrant seeking child pornography in the home Mother shared w
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THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOHNSEN, Judge.

¶1 Jessica M. ("Mother") appeals the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to three of her children. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Police served a search warrant seeking child pornography in the home Mother shared with her husband ("Father").1 Officers found deplorably filthy and unsafe conditions, and called Child Protective Services ("CPS") about three children living there. Both parents eventually pled guilty to one count of child abuse and neglect, a Class 6 undesignated felony.

¶3 The court granted a dependency petition the Arizona Department of Economic Security ("ADES") filed with respect to the three children, three-year-old twins and a one-year-old. The children were taken into foster care. A forensic interview and examination revealed all three children had been sexually abused. One child had burns on her feet and ankles that appeared to be cigarette burns, and each child had parasites. The children also had behavioral and developmental problems, were extremely fearful, had trouble sleeping and complained of "monsters." One child eventually told her foster mother that the "monster" was "daddy."

¶4 After Mother underwent a psychosexual evaluation, the court ordered supervised therapeutic visitation with the children. After their first visit with Mother, the children's behavior problems and night terrors "came flying back." The court thereafter suspended the visits with Mother.

¶5 ADES then filed a motion for termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights. The court held a four-day trial. A CPS unit supervisor testified Mother had neglected the children or failed to protect them from neglect and had failed to protect them from abuse. The supervisor testified CPS had told Mother that as long as she continued to live with Father, who CPS believed had sexually abused the children, CPS was concerned Mother would not be able to maintain a safe environment for the children. CPS had offered Mother services to help her leave the home she shared with Father, but Mother had not taken advantage of the services.

¶6 At trial, Mother denied that the children had been sexually abused. She said she did not believe Father could have abused the children and expressed her desire for them to continue to have a relationship with Father. The psychologist who evaluated Mother testified Mother's passive-dependent traits caused her to fail to protect the children from abuse. The psychologist testified Mother understood and had been warned that she would need to leave Father to regain custody of the girls, but she did not do so. The psychologist testified that returning the children to Mother would pose a risk to them and that reunification services were futile while Mother remained in the home with Father. The psychologist opined that Mother was unable to parent the children and strongly recommended against reunification.

¶7 At the conclusion of the trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was appropriate under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 8-533(B)(2), -(B)(8)(a) and -(B)(8)(b) (2012).2 The court also found that although ADES had made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services, Mother had failed to remedy the circumstances that caused the children to be placed in an out-of-home placement. Lastly, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the termination was in the best interests of the children.

¶8 Mother timely appealed the order of termination.3 We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-235 (2012).

DISCUSSION

¶9 In order to sever parental rights, the superior court must find at least one of the statutory grounds enumerated in § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005). When the superior court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm if clear and convincing evidence supports any of the grounds. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). The superior court also must find that termination is in the best interests of the child by a preponderance of the evidence. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d at 1018.

¶10 The superior court is in the best position to weigh the evidence; thus, we will accept its findings of fact "unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings" and will affirm its order terminating parental rights "unless it is clearly erroneous." Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d at 205.

¶11 Under § 8-533(B)(8), the court may terminate the parent-child relationship when it finds by clear and convincing evidence:

That the child is being cared for in an out-of-home placement under the supervision of the juvenile court, the division or a licensed child welfare agency, that the agency responsible for the care of the child has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services and that one of the following circumstances exists: (a) The child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of nine months or longer pursuant to court order . . . and the parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement. (b) The child who is under three years of age has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of six months or longer pursuant to court order and the parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement, including refusal to participate in reunification services offered by the department.

¶12 Mother does not dispute that by the date of the termination order, the children had been in an out-of-home placement for more than a year. She argues, however, that ADES did not make a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services. Though "futile efforts are not required, ADES must `undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success' in reuniting the family." Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 94, ¶ 20, 219 P.3d 296, 304 (App. 2009) (quoting Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (App. 1999)).

¶13 Substantial evidence supported the superior court's finding that ADES made diligent efforts to reunite Mother with the children. The therapeutic visitations that ADES initiated with Mother were stopped only because of the intense negative reaction the children experienced. ADES is not required to grant a parent visitation when it adversely affects the child. Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JD-5312, 178 Ariz. 372, 376, 873 P.2d 710, 714 (App. 1994).

¶14 ADES also offered Mother individual counseling, psychosexual evaluations and parenting classes. Despite Mother's participation in parenting classes, her parenting skills and understanding of the significance of the neglect and the abuse the children had experienced failed to improve. Despite the counseling, Mother also was unwilling to leave the home she shared with Father to create a safe and stable home for the children and to protect the children from abuse. As the psychologist who evaluated Mother testified, "the interventions designed to ameliorate or improve [Mother's] parenting were not successful."

¶15 The record likewise supports the court's finding that Mother "substantially neglected or willfully refused" to remedy the circumstances that caused the children to be in an out-of-home placement. As recounted above, the children had been sexually abused. Father admitted to viewing child pornography, and the circumstances in the home led CPS to conclude that the abuser was someone in the home, likely Father. Because of this, CPS clearly communicated to Mother that in order to have a chance at reunification with the children, it was important that she leave the home she shared with Father. Although CPS offered her referrals for services to help her find a new place to live, Mother failed to take advantage of any of these services, failed to leave the home and continued to deny that Father could have sexually abused the children.

¶16 On appeal, Mother argues that during the dependency proceedings, the superior court declined ADES's request to order her to leave Father. She suggests that since the court did not order her to move out, she was not required to do so in order to avoid termination. Setting aside that issue, however, Mother's refusal at trial to acknowledge that the children had been sexually abused while in her custody is sufficient to support the court's finding that Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the children's removal.

¶17 Finally, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that reunification "would be a detriment to the children due to the continued risk of abuse and neglect as well as the lack of safety and stability in the home, which deprives them of permanency." The evidence supports that finding and the court's further conclusion that termination of the children's relationship with Mother is in their best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to the three children.4

DONN KESSLER, Judge, ANDREW W. GOULD, Judge, concurring.

FootNotes


1. We view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to upholding the court's order. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 13, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002).
2. Absent material revision after the date of the events at issue, we cite a statute's current Westlaw version.
3. The superior court also terminated Father's parental rights; however, he is not a party to this appeal.
4. The caption in this appeal is amended to refer to the children by their initials.
Source:  Leagle

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