MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Brian R. Tinsley ("Mr. Tinsley"), who is proceeding pro se, initiated this breach of contract action on January 23, 2015. (Doc. 1). The four defendants named in his lawsuit are BP Corporation North America, Inc. ("BP Corp."), BP America, Inc. ("BP America"), Craig Cerise ("Mr. Cerise"), and Lynette Otto ("Ms. Otto"). (Doc. 15).

The case arises out of Mr. Tinsley's efforts to become a commissioned broker of petroleum products for BP Corp. and/or BP America, which began in February 2013. (Doc. 15 at 4 ¶ 15). Mr. Tinsley filed an amended complaint (Doc. 15) on March 3, 2015, and this pleading includes nine counts: (i) breach of oral contract; (ii) breach of implied contract; (iii) conspiracy to breach an oral contract; (iv) conspiracy to breach an implied contract; (v) fraud; (vi) conspiracy to commit fraud; (vii) deceptive business practice; (viii) conspiracy to commit deceptive business practices; and (ix) financial discrimination. (Doc. 15 at 14-21 ¶¶ 45-80).

Pending before the court and challenging the viability of Mr. Tinsley's amended complaint is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25) (the "Dismissal Motion") filed on March 24, 2015. Defendants also filed their supporting brief (Doc. 26) and evidentiary materials (Doc. 27) on this same date. Because Mr. Tinsley is representing himself, the court, on March 25, 2015, entered a special briefing order (Doc. 30) on the Dismissal Motion.

Also pending before the court is a Motion for Default Judgment, Legal Malpractice, [and] Fraud upon the Court (Doc. 31) (the "Default Motion") filed by Mr. Tinsley on April 13, 2015, as part of his response to Defendants' Dismissal Motion. Mr. Tinsley also filed a supporting memorandum (Doc. 32) on April 13, 2015. On April 27, 2015, Defendants filed their reply (Doc. 34) in support of their Dismissal Motion.

Accordingly, the Dismissal Motion and the Default Motion are now both under submission. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Dismissal Motion is GRANTED IN PART and otherwise DENIED. Further, Mr. Tinsley's Default Motion is DENIED.

II. Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(2)

In Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir.1990), the Eleventh Circuit described the framework for evaluating personal jurisdiction challenges under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when subject matter jurisdiction is premised upon diversity, as Mr. Tinsley relies upon here (Doc. 15 at 2 ¶ 6):1

Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514 (emphasis added) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the legal sufficiency of a complaint. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) ("[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion: (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]"). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide "`a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (setting forth general pleading requirements for a complaint including providing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief").

While a plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, Rule 8 does not mandate the inclusion of "detailed factual allegations" within a complaint. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 103). However, at the same time, "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S.Ct. at 1969.

"[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (emphasis added). "Under Twombly's construction of Rule 8 ... [a plaintiff's] complaint [must] `nudge[][any] claims' ... `across the line from conceivable to plausible.' Ibid." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S.Ct. at 1950-51.

A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965).

C. Rule 55

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs default judgments and provides in part:

Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Further, an entry of a default by the clerk is a prerequisite to obtaining a default judgment against a defendant under Rule 55(b).

III. Analysis

A. Defendants' Dismissal Motion

1. Defendants' Personal Jurisdiction Challenge

The first part of Defendants' Dismissal Motion seeks a dismissal of Mr. Cerise and Ms. Otto on personal jurisdiction grounds. Mr. Cerise and Ms. Otto have supported this aspect of the Dismissal Motion with affidavits that establish their limited involvement with Mr. Tinsley and, importantly, their lack of contacts with the State of Alabama. (Doc. 27 at 5 ¶¶ 4-8; id. at 6 ¶¶ 4-7).2

As succinctly explained in LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Mobile Hotel Properties, LLC, 274 F.Supp.2d 1293 (S.D.Ala. 2003), Mr. Tinsley is able to meet his burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over Mr. Cerise and Ms. Otto in Alabama as follows:

LaSalle, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1296 (emphasis added); see also Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 n. 3 (11th Cir.1988) ("This case presents no need to examine Alabama's long-arm jurisdictional statute because that statute authorizes a court to assert personal jurisdiction to the limits of federal due process.").

Mr. Tinsley's amended complaint generally contends that personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants. (Doc. 15 at 3 ¶¶ 9-11). However, Mr. Tinsley lumps all the named defendants together as "BP" (see Doc. 15 at 1 ("to be hereafter referred to as the defendant/s [sic] or BP")) and makes no particularized allegations about why the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr. Cerise or Ms. Otto as individual defendants is constitutional. Importantly, Mr. Tinsley has neither made a sufficient threshold showing why this court can exercise personal jurisdiction over either one of them, nor rebutted any of the evidence contained in their affidavits establishing why the exercise of personal jurisdiction over each of them is improper.

A plaintiff can either establish general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant to satisfy the requirement of in personam jurisdiction. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (detailing contours of appropriate and inappropriate exercise of personal jurisdiction); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn. 8-9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 nn. 8-9, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (acknowledging distinction made between exercise of "specific" and "general" jurisdiction); Consolidated Development Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir.2000) ("The nature and quality of these contacts, however, vary depending upon whether the type of personal jurisdiction being asserted is specific or general."); Ex parte Lagrone, 839 So.2d 620, 627 (Ala. 2002) ("A nonresident defendant may be subjected to Alabama's general in personam jurisdiction if its contacts with this State, although unrelated to the cause of action, are `continuous and systematic.'") (citing Helicopteros and other cases) (emphasis by underlining added).

To establish general jurisdiction over a defendant, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's connection with the forum state is "continuous and systematic." LaSalle Bank, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1297; see also Sherritt, 216 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir.2000) ("The due process requirements for general personal jurisdiction are more stringent than for specific personal jurisdiction, and require a showing of continuous and systematic general business contacts between the defendant and the forum state." (citing Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Lovett & Tharpe, Inc., 786 F.2d 1055, 1057 (11th Cir.1986))).

In contrast, to constitute minimum contacts for the purposes of specific jurisdiction:

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir.2013) (footnote omitted); see LaSalle Bank, 274 F.Supp.2d at 1297 (similar); see also Sherritt, 216 F.3d at 1291 ("The requirement that there be minimum contacts is grounded in fairness.").

Because of Mr. Cerise's and Ms. Otto's lack of any continuous or systematic contacts with the State of Alabama,3 the court clearly cannot exercise general jurisdiction over either one of them. As for specific jurisdiction, the court concludes that a handful of telephone calls and even fewer email communications for a limited period of time with a plaintiff who had an interest in becoming a broker, who initiated the discussions about this commercial prospect at a local level first, and who happens to reside in Alabama is simply not sufficient enough to meet the minimum contacts test as framed by the Eleventh Circuit in Mosseri.

Mr. Cerise's specific contacts with Mr. Tinsley include approximately five emails and two telephone conversations occurring over the two-month period of March and April of 2013. (Doc. 27 at 5 ¶ 7). Ms. Otto's interaction with Mr. Tinsley in Alabama is even less-she sent him only one email and never spoke to him on the telephone. (Doc. 27 at 7 ¶ 7).

The court assumes without deciding that Mr. Tinsley can meet the first prong of the minimum contacts standard, i.e., the parties' dispute arises out of or relates to one or more contacts that Defendants made with the forum. However, even with the benefit of this jurisdictional assumption, neither Mr. Cerise's nor Ms. Otto's scarce communications directed toward and/or responding to Mr. Tinsley in Alabama were done so purposefully and with such a level of intentionality that they should reasonably expect to be subject to the court's jurisdiction merely because of Mr. Tinsley's presence here.

As the Eleventh Circuit explained the so-called "traditional" purposeful availment prong in Mosseri:4

Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1357 (emphasis added).

The overriding attenuated and inchoate nature as well as the low number of contacts attributable to Mr. Cerise and Ms. Otto over a short-lived period of time are insufficient to meet the purposeful availment prong. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) ("[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established `minimum contacts' in the forum State [such that a defendant] `should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'" (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980))); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. at 2183 ("The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State." (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958))); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479, 105 S.Ct. at 2185 ("It is these factors — prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing — that must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum."); see also Future Technology Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare, 218 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that "haled into court" prong was not met when "[a]ll contract negotiations took place by telephone; the contract was signed by the defendant in Illinois after at least two visits to that state by the plaintiff; the defendant never came to Florida until after the purported initial breach"); Aeropower, Ltd. v. Matherly, 511 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1156 (M.D.Ala. 2007) ("Considering the quality, nature, and extent of the Aero Records defendants' contacts with Alabama, [including telephone, fax, mail and wire communications,' as well as the association between these contacts and the instant litigation, the court finds that none of said defendants' contacts with Alabama can support a finding of purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protections of Alabama."); cf. Borg-Warner, 786 F.2d at 1063 ("The binding precedent in this circuit indicates that a purchaser in an isolated transaction may not be subject to personal jurisdiction in a seller's state merely because the manufacturer performed its duties under the contract there." (emphasis added) (citing Owen of Georgia, Inc. v. Blitman, 462 F.2d 603 (5th Cir.1972)));5 Rhodes v. Unisys Corp., 170 Fed.Appx. 681, 684 (11th Cir.2006) ("It is unlikely that a single contact [in the form of an email unrelated to causes of action which the plaintiff ultimately brought in the lawsuit] with the forum state by Weinbach will be sufficient to create jurisdiction over him by the courts in Alabama.") (citing Future Technology).

Thus, in light of the foregoing authorities and Mr. Tinsley's failure to show the existence of general jurisdiction or satisfy his second prong burden applicable to specific jurisdiction, the Dismissal Motion is GRANTED as to the personal jurisdiction portion,6 and Mr. Cerise and Ms. Otto are HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE from Mr. Tinsley's lawsuit.

2. Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Contentions

General 12(b)(6) Ruling

The second section of the Dismissal Motion contends that Mr. Tinsley has failed to state a claim against any defendant in a fashion that comports with the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal — for a claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge by a defendant post-Twombly and Iqbal, the cause of action, as alleged, can no longer just be merely possible or theoretical, but rather it must be plausible under the applicable law and asserted in a good faith factual manner beyond simply an assertion conveying to the court that "I was done wrong." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (explaining that Rule 8 pleading standard requires more from a plaintiff than merely "labels and conclusions[,]" "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[,]" or "naked assertion[s]" without "further factual enhancement" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966)).

Here, Defendants are correct that neither Mr. Tinsley's pleading nor his opposition to their Dismissal Motion "alleges anything that comes close to satisfying the legal elements of the nine [purported] claims that he makes under Alabama law." (Doc. 34 at 3). However, rather than an outright dismissal of his case with prejudice, the court concludes that, because he is representing himself, the more appropriate relief in this instance is to give Mr. Tinsley the opportunity to replead only those claims that are plausible under either Alabama or federal law against BP Corp. and BP America as Mr. Cerise and Ms. Otto are no longer defendants in his case, having been dismissed above on jurisdictional grounds.

In repleading, Mr. Tinsley must draft a much more definite and comprehendible pleading. His claims against each defendant must be set forth in separately numbered counts and not asserted against Defendants collectively. Additionally, Mr. Tinsley should refrain from incorporating allegations by reference, endeavor to streamline his claims and allegations, and reduce unnecessary duplication of his contentions. In his replacement pleading, Mr. Tinsley must break down each one of his claims into its requisite elements and connect those elements to those facts which in good faith took place and which plausibly support why that defendant is liable to him under that specific claim. If Mr. Tinsley lacks facts to plausibly support the elements of a claim, then he should omit that claim from his replacement pleading.

The deadline for Mr. Tinsley to replead his amended complaint is on or before July 20, 2015. The court cautions Mr. Tinsley that the failure to replead his complaint in an acceptable manner that comports with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as required by this order may result in a dismissal of his entire case with prejudice.

Count Specific Dismissals

While the court is giving Mr. Tinsley the opportunity to replead his amended complaint, such repleader shall not include any deceptive trade practices claim as Defendants have demonstrated the untimeliness of that alleged statutory violation. Specifically, § 8-19-14 of Alabama's Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") provides in pertinent part:

Ala.Code § 8-19-14 (emphasis added). Here, Mr. Tinsley objects to Defendants' alleged wrongful conduct that took place in March and/or April of 2013 and, yet, he did not initiate this case until over one year later, on January 23, 2015. (Doc. 1). Additionally, while Mr. Tinsley has attempted to bring a breach of contract claim, nowhere has he alleged anything that would plausibly trigger the DTPA's longer statute of limitations period for contracts lasting more than three years. Consequently, any purported deceptive trade practices violation is unambiguously time-barred by the DTPA's one-year provision and, thus, it is an implausible claim.

Further, in the absence of an underlying timely deceptive trade practices claim, Mr. Tinsley's asserted conspiracy to commit deceptive business practices is likewise an implausible count and is due to be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Callens v. Jefferson County Nursing Home, 769 So.2d 273, 280 (Ala.2000) ("A plaintiff alleging a conspiracy must have a valid underlying cause of action." (citing Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 619 So.2d 1280, 1290 (Ala.1993))); Callens, 769 So.2d at 280 ("[A] conspiracy claim must fail if the underlying act itself would not support an action" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Triple J Cattle, Inc. v. Chambers, 621 So.2d 1221, 1225 (Ala.1993))).

When repleading Mr. Tinsley must also omit his purported claim for financial discrimination because neither Alabama nor federal law recognizes such a cause of action. (See Doc. 26 at 26 ([H]is Complaint [does not] provide any law or statute which defines such cause of action.")). Accordingly, the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of the Dismissal Motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine, and those claims are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from Mr. Tinsley's lawsuit.

B. Mr. Tinsley's Default Motion

Mr. Tinsley's Default Motion seeks to have this court enter a default judgment against Defendants on his claims. However, to the extent that Mr. Tinsley is seeking such the relief under Rule 55, his request is inappropriate for at least two reasons. First, Mr. Tinsley has not obtained an entry of default by the clerk under Rule 55(a) and, without that procedural prerequisite, his motion for judgment by default under Rule 55(b) lacks an essential component. Second, by filing their Dismissal Motion, Defendants have responded to and defended against his lawsuit consistent with their obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, as a result, neither an entry of default pursuant to Rule 55(a) nor an entry of default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b) is appropriate.

Alternatively, to the extent that Mr. Tinsley seeks a judgment by default as some type of sanction against Defendants for their conduct, nothing that they have done in this litigation warrants a sanction, much less one in the extreme form of a default judgment. See, e.g., United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir.1979) ("A default judgment is clearly `a drastic remedy and should be resorted to only in extreme situations.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Charlton L. Davis & Co. P.C. v. Fedder Data Center, 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir.1977))); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir.1986) ("The decision to dismiss a claim, like the decision to enter a default judgment, ought to be a last resort-ordered only if noncompliance with discovery orders is due to willful or bad faith disregard for those orders." (emphasis added) (citing Coors v. Movement Against Racism, 777 F.2d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir.1985))). Accordingly, Mr. Tinsley's Default Motion is DENIED.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants' Dismissal Motion is GRANTED IN PART and otherwise is DENIED. Accordingly, Mr. Cerise and Ms. Otto are both HEREBY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of personal jurisdiction. Additionally, Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine of Mr. Tinsley's amended complaint are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Further, Mr. Tinsley's Default Motion is DENIED. Finally, Mr. Tinsley is ORDERED to replead his amended complaint in a plausible, good faith manner against BP Corp. and BP America only and omitting any reference to those specific claims that have been dismissed with prejudice by this order, no later than July 20, 2015.