LOUIS GUIROLA, Jr., Chief District Judge.
On July 15, 2011, Courtney Davis and Richard Allen Linton were traveling on a 2000 Sea Fox vessel owned by Linton. Davis noticed that Linton was having difficulty steering the vessel. Soon afterwards, Davis and Linton were thrown from the vessel, which was spinning rapidly in circles. Davis was struck by the vessel, resulting in serious, permanent injuries including the amputation of one of her legs. Linton died in the accident. On November 4, 2011, Davis filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Mississippi, against Linton's Estate as well as the manufacturers, designers, assemblers, installers, distributors, and sellers of the vessel and its individual parts. She claims that the failure of the vessel's steering cable caused the accident.
On January 24, 2012, Linton's Estate filed this limitation of liability action, and the Court entered its Order Restraining Suits [2]. The Estate claims that the vessel was only worth $7000.00. Davis filed a claim and the present Motion to Lift Stay. The following co-defendants from Davis' state court lawsuit also filed claims in this limitation action, seeking indemnification, contribution, attorneys' fees, and costs from the Estate: Sea Fox Boat Company, Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc., and TM Acquisition Holdings, Inc.
Davis has submitted a stipulation signed only by her lawyer. In the stipulation, she agrees that the Estate has the right to litigate all issues relating to limitation of liability in this Court, but she reserves the right to contest all assertions made by the Estate in this action. Davis also states that she will not seek any judgment or ruling on the issue of the Estate's right to limitation of liability in the state court action. She agrees to waive any claim of res judicata relevant to the limitation of liability issue as a result of any judgment entered in the state court action. Davis does not concede that the vessel was worth only $7000.00, but she agrees not to seek enforcement of any judgment or recovery in excess of that amount until after the limitation of liability issue is adjudicated in this Court. Davis has submitted a supplemental stipulation that provides:
(Pl.'s Reply, Ex. 1, ECF No. 23-1). The supplemental stipulation is signed by Davis' lawyer. None of the other parties signed Davis' stipulation or supplemental stipulation.
The Fifth Circuit has held:
Odeco Oil & Gas Co. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1996). Parties seeking contribution, indemnity, and attorneys' fees are considered separate "claimants" under the Limitation Act. Id. at 675; In re Compl. of Port Arthur Towing, Co., 42 F.3d 312, 316 (5th Cir. 1995). All claimants, including those seeking indemnity, contribution, and attorneys' fees, must sign a stipulation protecting the shipowner's rights under the Limitation Act before the federal district court can lift the stay and permit the claimants to proceed in state court. Id.
In the present lawsuit, it is undisputed that the claims asserted exceed the vessel owners' declared value. It is further undisputed that the claimants seeking indemnity, contribution, and attorneys' fees have not signed either of the stipulations presented by Davis. Nevertheless, Davis argues that her stipulations are sufficient to protect the interests of Linton's Estate. In support of her assertion, she relies on Beiswenger Enterprises Corp. v. Carletta, 86 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 1996). In Beiwenger, the Eleventh Circuit held that the following stipulation was sufficient to protect the interests of the vessel owner even though co-defendants seeking indemnity and contribution had not agreed to the stipulation:
Id. at 1043.
This Court has not located any Fifth Circuit authority providing that a stay may be lifted where fewer than all claimants have joined in a protective stipulation. All Fifth Circuit cases addressing this issue clearly and unequivocally state that all claimants must agree to the protective stipulation. This Court has no authority to carve out an exception to existing Fifth Circuit law on this issue. Furthermore, the Court is concerned that the stipulations presented by Davis do not fully protect the Estate. Her stipulations merely establish the priority of the contribution and indemnity claims over her claim but do not establish the priority of the other claimants' separate and competing claims for attorneys' fees, costs, contribution, and indemnification. The Court is concerned that the claim submitted by any one party may fully exhaust or exceed the alleged $7000.00 value of the vessel, which could hinder the Estate's right to limit its liability. As a result, this Court cannot lift the stay of Davis' lawsuit against the Estate.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Motion to Lift Stay should be denied.