NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ESPINOSA, Judge.

¶1 E.D., born in January 2013, was adjudicated dependent as to his mother, Lynelle A., and his father, appellant Brandon D. Brandon appeals that order and argues there was insufficient evidence to support it. We affirm for the reasons stated below.

¶2 The Arizona Department of Economic Security, now substituted by the Department of Child Safety (DCS),2 filed a dependency petition in November 2013 as to Lynelle's four children: A.S., J.S., N.A., and E.D. Although only E.D. is Brandon's child, all of the children lived with Lynelle and Brandon at the time the dependency petition was filed. The filing of the petition was prompted by and based on reports in August 2012, May 2013, September 2013, and November 2013 that J.S. was being physically abused.

¶3 DCS investigators failed to substantiate the August 2012 report, but they did find J.S. had some bruises in May 2013 and September 2013. In connection with the November incident, a school official contacted the Globe Police Department because J.S. had bruises on his face and a swollen black eye and his explanation for how the injuries had occurred did not make sense to the official. After police officers investigated, including holding forensic interviews of both children, Lynelle and Brandon were arrested for child abuse. DCS took the children into temporary custody, and filed the petition.

¶4 DCS alleged in the petition that E.D. was dependent based on abuse and neglect because Brandon had physically abused A.S. and J.S., had engaged in domestic violence with Lynelle in the children's presence, had failed to protect the children from Lynelle's mental illness and neglect, and had been unable or unwilling to provide E.D. with the basic necessities of life. Based on information gathered from A.S. and J.S., DCS further alleged Brandon had struck them, shoved J.S. into a wall, and had thrown a telephone, breaking a window.

¶5 After a contested dependency hearing in March 2014, the juvenile court found, "it is clear [J.S.] suffered a significant injury; a black eye, [and] multiple bruises," referring to the November 2013 incident. The court noted that Lynelle had not explained how J.S. had been injured, denying at one point that the child had been injured notwithstanding photographs introduced at the hearing that showed the child's bruises and black eye. The court concluded that these injuries, "coupled with the injury in September and the holes in the wall, the broken window and the relationship between [Brandon] and these children with whom he has no blood relationship," established by a preponderance of evidence that Brandon or Lynelle "or both were responsible for the injuries and/or failed to protect . . . [J.S.] from further injury." Because the biological father of A.S. and J.S. was likely to be a proper placement for them, the court prompted DCS to move to dismiss the dependency petition as to these children. The court commented that A.S. and J.S. had a father who could care for them and dismissed the dependency as to them.

¶6 With respect to N.A. and E.D., the juvenile court stated, "I can find the children are dependent because they were in a placement where the parents were unable or unwilling to protect the children." Based on the evidence that J.S. had been abused, the court found E.D. dependent. But, the court added, it could not find either of these children had been harmed, emotionally or physically, and could not decide whether placement with Lynelle would pose a risk to their health, safety, and welfare. Although the court found the children dependent, it wrestled with the appropriate placement and whether they should be returned to their mother, who was not living with Brandon at the time of the adjudication hearing, or whether they should remain in foster care. The court specified that DCS had the burden of establishing "it would be contrary to the health, safety and welfare of the children to be returned to the parents," and gave DCS the opportunity to present such evidence at a later date. The court entered a minute-entry ruling that essentially followed the statements it had made at the end of the hearing on the record.

¶7 On appeal, Brandon contends there was insufficient evidence establishing E.D. is dependent as to him. He argues there was no evidence regarding Lynelle's alleged mental illness, therefore, the allegation in the petition that Brandon had failed to protect E.D. from Lynelle in this regard necessarily failed. He also maintains there was no evidence of domestic violence in the home and that the evidence about damage to the home did not establish how it had occurred. Finally, he contends there was insufficient evidence of the cause of J.S.'s injuries, noting it had been reported earlier that J.S. was a victim of bullying at school, and insisting there was no evidence Brandon had inflicted the injuries. As part of this argument, he focuses on the portion of the juvenile court's order in which the court acknowledged it did not have before it any evidence that E.D. "was in any danger from [Brandon]." Brandon asserts this was "most telling" of the insufficiency of the evidence as to E.D.'s dependency.

¶8 A dependent child includes one adjudicated to be "[i]n need of proper and effective parental care and control and . . . who has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care and control" or whose "home is unfit by reason of abuse, neglect, cruelty or depravity by a parent." A.R.S. § 8-201(14)(a). A child's dependent status must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1). On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court's findings, Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009), and will not disturb the court's ruling unless no reasonable evidence supports it, In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JD-500200, 163 Ariz. 457, 461, 788 P.2d 1208, 1212 (App. 1989).

¶9 The record before us supports the juvenile court's order. Although the court noted there was no evidence E.D. had been injured directly, the finding of dependency was based on evidence that Brandon had abused J.S. and from this fact the court had inferred, implicitly, if not expressly, that Brandon was unable to provide E.D. with safe, proper, and effective parental care and control and rendered the home unfit based on the abuse of E.D.'s half brother. See § 8-201(14)(a)(i), (a)(iii). A child can be adjudicated dependent based on abuse of a sibling if "the conditions creating the dependency as to [the abused child] . . . pose an imminent risk of harm to [the other child]." In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. 96290, 162 Ariz. 601, 604, 785 P.2d 121, 124 (App. 1990).

¶10 We agree with Brandon that at first blush it appears the juvenile court made contradictory findings in its minute-entry order by finding E.D. dependent but then finding it did not have sufficient evidence before it establishing "that any of them would come to specific injury" and could not say "the health, safety and welfare of the children" would be at risk if placed with Lynelle. We agree with DCS, however, that the findings in the minute entry must be viewed together with the court's comments on the record at the end of the dependency hearing. And those comments must be considered in the context within which they were made. We therefore can infer that the court found Brandon's abuse of J.S. had posed a risk to E.D. and that there was domestic violence in the home. But the court could not enter a disposition at that time because it needed more information as to whether placing E.D. with Lynelle would endanger his health, safety, and welfare. The comments and findings can, therefore, be reconciled and are not necessarily inconsistent, as Brandon suggests.

¶11 We also reject Brandon's argument that there was insufficient evidence J.S. had been abused, the basis for the juvenile court's finding that E.D. is a dependent child. Brandon insists J.S. had been having trouble at school and there was insufficient evidence that he was the one who had inflicted the injuries and that domestic violence, rather than something else, had resulted in damage to the home. The record, however, contains evidence that Lynelle offered different explanations to police officers and investigators as to how J.S. had been injured, testifying at the dependency hearing initially that he had not been injured at all, contrary to photographs that clearly demonstrated otherwise. And officers did not believe the explanation J.S. had given them. A.S. told the DCS investigator Brandon "hurts" her and J.S., and both children said they were afraid to go home.

¶12 Nine-year-old A.S. testified briefly at the hearing as well. The juvenile court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor, including whether she appeared nervous when looking at Brandon, as counsel for the children suggested when questioning her. She testified she would not want to be returned to her mother's custody, and was "afraid something might happen" if she were to go home. It is apparent from the transcript that she became upset when asked what she thought might happen if she were to be returned to the mother's custody; the record shows she was unable to answer and that the court stopped the questioning when she began to cry.

¶13 The case manager was asked whether there were "any concerns of the safety of [E.D.] if [he] were returned to [Brandon] and the dependency were dismissed." She responded the concern was the same as she had expressed about returning all of the children to the mother, which was that criminal charges were pending in connection with allegations of child abuse. She also testified it would be in the child's best interest to remain in licensed foster care. On the record, at the end of the hearing, the juvenile court found that although there was no evidence that A.S., N.A., or E.D. had been abused, there was evidence that J.S. had sustained "a significant injury; a black eye, multiple bruises."

¶14 Based on all of the circumstances and evidence before it, the juvenile court concluded a preponderance of the evidence showed either the mother or Brandon "or both were responsible for the injuries and/or failed to protect . . . the child, [J.S.,] from further injury." To the extent there were conflicts in the evidence, it was for the juvenile court, not this court, to resolve them, because it was "in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004); see also In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546, 744 P.2d 455, 458 (App. 1987) (as fact-finder, juvenile court in best position to weigh evidence and judge credibility of witnesses). We will not reweigh the evidence, which is essentially what Brandon is asking us to do. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002). The court drew its own inferences from the evidence and we have no basis for interfering with its exercise of that discretion here.

¶15 The juvenile court's order adjudicating E.D. dependent as to Brandon is affirmed.