VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, Senior District Judge.
This patent infringement action was initiated on March 2, 2015, by MiMedx Group, Inc. ("MIMEDX") against Nutech Medical, Inc. ("NUTECH") and DCI Donor Services, Inc. ("DCI"). Pending before the court are a Motion To Dismiss (Doc. 23) filed by NUTECH on April 17, 2015, and an opposed Motion To Stay Discovery and Rule 26 Obligations (Doc. 27) filed by NUTECH on May 5, 2015. This case was reassigned to the undersigned on June 2, 2015. The undersigned then entered a scheduling order regarding these pending motions. Responsive submissions were filed and, on August 20, 2015, a four-and-a-half hour hearing was held before the undersigned.
MIMEDX is the owner of two patents, the `687 patent and the `494 patent. In its complaint, MIMEDX asserts that NUTECH has infringed both of these patents.
The `687 Patent is entitled "Methods fo Determining the Orientation of a Tissue Graft" and has seven claims. Claim 1 of the `687 patent is its only independent claim. All of the remaining claims depend on Claim 1.
Claim 1 reads:
Dependent claims 2-4 are directed to different types of labels: "an embossment" (Claim 2); "a raised or indented texture" (Claim 3) and "a logo, a design, a name or text" (Claim 4). Dependent claim 5 is directed to a tissue graft with "multiple tissue layers" (Claim 5). Dependent claims 6 and 7 require the claimed label to visibly distinguish each side of the placental tissue graft: "a basement side" (Claim 6); and "a stromal side" (Claim 7).
The `494 Patent, which shares the same disclosure as the `687 patent,
Claim 1 of the `494 patent states:
Claims 2-5 depend on Claim 1. Claim 2 has the additional requirement that the claimed layers are "dehydrated together in a drying fixture." Claim 3 requires the amnion and chorion layers to be "treated with an antibiotic prior to lamination." Claim 4 requires the tissue graft to be "exposed to sterilizing conditions." Claim 5 requires "one amnion layer and one chorion layer."
Independent claim 6 requires "one or more amnion layers" and "one or more chorion layers" that have been separated, cleaned, and processed:
Claims 7 and 8 depend on Claim 6. Claim 7 requires "one amnion layer and one chorion layer." Claim 8 requires the amnion and chorion layers to be "chemically decontaminated."
Independent claim 9 requires the amnion layer to retain its epithelial cellular layer, but otherwise is similar to Claim 1:
Independent claim 10 is also similar to claim 1, except that it uses the more open-ended "comprising" language instead of "consisting essentially of" language found in claim 1:
For a complaint to survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 and fn.3) However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not a matter unique to patent law and accordingly is reviewed under the applicable law of the regional circuit. In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2012). Neither party has pointed out, and the undersigned has not located, any patent-specific rule adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in reviewing motions to dismiss.
NUTECH asserts, and MIMEDX does not dispute, that
(Motion, doc. 23 at 11)(citations omitted).
MIMEDX argues that the motion is premature, in that claim construction has not yet occurred. Further, the parties disagree as to whether or not NUTECH must prove that dismissal is proper by "clear and convincing evidence." Finally, the parties disagree as to whether or not the patents at issue are directed to non-patentable subject matter and thus are invalid unless an inventive concept has been added, sufficient to transform non-patentable subject matter to an invention and, finally, whether or not such "transformation" is set out in each patent. The court will address these issues in the order set out above.
MIMEDX argues that NUTECH's motion is premature, as claim construction has not yet occurred. (Opposition Brief, doc. 37 at 15-16; 29-30; Response to Notice of Supplemental Authority, doc. 55 at 8-9). MIMEDX relies primarily on Bancorp Servs. LLC v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (US), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012) in support of this argument. (Id.). MIMEDX does concede that "courts have been willing to dismiss claims under § 101 [for lack of subject matter validity] without performing a claim construction analysis, [but argues that] in cases such as this, where parties clearly dispute the appropriate meaning for a central term, courts have declined to rule on Rule 12 motions prior to engaging in claim construction." (Id.)(emphasis supplied). However, nowhere does MIMEDX tell the court what "dispute" actually exists as to any term of either patent.
Unhelpfully, what MIMEDX does say conflates the question of law which this court must decide — do the claims of the respective patents fail as claiming non-patentable subject matter — with "facts" (e.g. "terms") that are in dispute (e.g., must be "construed"). MIMEDX says:
(Opposition Brief, doc. 37 at 29-30)(emphasis supplied)(internal citations omitted).
MIMEDX also states:
(Response to Notice, doc. 55 at 8-9)(some alterations in original)(internal citations omitted).
As NUTECH does not, for purposes of this motion, dispute the meaning of any claim terms, and specifically does not dispute the construction of "laminated" as used in the `494 Patent as meaning "adhered," the court finds that the motion is not premature.
MIMEDX asserts that its patents are "presumed valid" and thus NUTECH bears the "high burden" of showing invalidity by "clear and convincing evidence." (See Opposition Brief, doc. 37, at 15; see also, Response to Notice, doc. 55 at 8-9.) NUTECH responds that such a presumption and burden do not apply where there is no factual issue to be decided. The court finds that such a presumption and burden have no impact in this case as there is no fact, but only a question of law, to be determined, in light of the applicable legal standard governing motions to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in Section 101 of the Patent Act:
35 U.S.C. § 101. In choosing such expansive terms "modified by the comprehensive `any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
Yet, while the scope of Section 101 is broad, the Supreme Court has long recognized that there is an "important implicit exception [to it]: [l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). "Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, [because] they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work." Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
The Supreme Court has also recognized, however, that "too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law." Id.; see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. This is because "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. To that end, it has explained that "an application of a law of nature, [natural phenomena or abstract idea] to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (emphasis in original).
In terms of the process used to analyze patent eligibility under Section 101, the Federal Circuit has explained that a court should first identify whether the claimed invention fits within one of the four statutory classes set out in the statute: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. Ultramercial III, 772 F.3d at 713-14. The court must then assess whether any of the judicially recognizable exceptions to subject matter eligibility apply. Ultramercial III, 772 F.3d at 714. NUTECH has challenged both patents as ineligible under Section 101 as claiming natural phenomena.
In Alice, the Supreme Court confirmed the framework to be used in order to distinguish patents that claim patent-ineligible concepts, including natural phenomena, from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts:
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294-98) (citations omitted; alterations in original). Since Alice, the Federal Circuit has recognized that "[d]istinguishing between claims that recite a patent-eligible invention and claims that add too little to a patent-ineligible . . . concept can be difficult, as the line separating the two is not always clear." DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
The `687 Patent is a method patent. Thus, it is a "process," and falls within one of the four statutory classes set out in the Patent Act. The court therefore turns to step one of Mayo to determine whether or not the claims of the `'687 Patent are directed to a patent-ineligible concept (step one). If not, the court's analysis ends, and the motion to dismiss is due to be denied. If the claims are so directed, the court must determined whether the patent claims add enough to constitute a patent-eligible invention (step two of Mayo). If the answer at step two is "yes," then the motion is due to be denied. If the answer at step two is "no," then the motion is due to be granted. In making these determinations, the court will look to each claim both individually and as a composite. See Diehr, supra, at 188, 101 S.Ct. 1048 ("[A] new combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use before the combination was made").
What is claimed is:
Applying step one of Mayo, the court determines that Claim 1 is "directed to" a natural phenomenon, i.e., placental tissue. Accordingly, the court turns to step two of Mayo. The court finds that Claim 1 sets out a process—adding an asymmetrical label—that is "novel and useful"
Because all of the remaining claims of the `687 Patent depend on the method of Claim 1, the court finds that the same analysis of Mayo's steps one and two result in the same decision regarding these claims as well. Accordingly, NUTECH's motion to dismiss is due to be denied as to all of the claims of the `687 Patent.
The `494 Patent is also a "method" patent and, accordingly, falls within one of the four statutory classes set out in the Patent Act. The court therefore turns to step one of Mayo to determine whether or not the claims of the `494 Patent are directed to a patent-ineligible concept (step one). If not, the court's analysis ends, and the motion to dismiss is due to be denied. If the claims are so directed, the court must determined whether the patent claims add enough to constitute a patent-eligible invention (step two of Mayo). If the answer at step two is "yes," then the motion is due to be denied. If the answer at step two is "no," then the motion is due to be granted. In making these determinations, the court will look to each claim both individually and as a composite.
What is claimed is:
Applying step one of Mayo, the court determines that Claim 1 is "directed to" a natural phenomenon, i.e., placental tissue. Accordingly, the court turns to step two of Mayo. The parties agree that placental tissue as it occurs in nature has both an amnion layer and a chorion layer, and that the amnion layer contains a fibroblast cell layer. Merely cutting that tissue into pieces to be used as a graft is, as stated in the patent application itself, not "novel" and therefore, without more, does not "transform" that naturally occurring tissue into a patent-eligible invention. Further, the undersigned agrees that separating the layers, washing or otherwise cleaning them, and/or dehydrating them, are not "novel" and accordingly do not "transform" the naturally occurring tissue into a patent-eligible invention. However, giving the term "directly laminated to each other" the meaning—"directly adhered to each other"—ascribed to that term by MIMEDX, the court finds that Claim 1 sets out a method that is "novel and useful" and that "transforms" the naturally occurring tissue into a patent-eligible invention. Accordingly, NUTECH's motion to dismiss is due to be denied as to Claim 1.
Claims 2 through 5 carry forward the "directly laminated to each other" term that causes Claim 1 to set out a method that is "novel and useful" and that "transforms" the naturally occurring tissue into a patent-eligible invention. Accordingly, NUTECH's motion to dismiss is due to be denied as to these claims as well.
What is claimed is:
Again recognizing that the parties agree that placental tissue as it occurs in nature has both an amnion layer and a chorion layer, and that the amnion layer contains a fibroblast cell layer, the court finds that separating the layers from the placenta and from each other, washing or otherwise cleaning them, layering them directly over each other and laminating and heat dehydrating them, are not steps that are "novel" and accordingly the method described in this claim does not "transform" the naturally occurring tissue into a patent-eligible invention. Accordingly, the court finds that NUTECH's motion to dismiss is due to be granted as to this claim.
These claims depend on Claim 6. The court finds nothing in Claim 7 or Claim 8, either alone or as a composite whole (including Claim 6) that is "novel" so as to "transform" the naturally occurring placental tissue into a patent-eligible invention. Accordingly, the court finds that NUTECH's motion to dismiss is due to be granted as to these claims.
What is claimed is:
This claim contains the "directly laminated to each other" term that the court found "novel and useful" and transformative in analyzing Claim 1. The court finds no reason to depart from that analysis. Consistent therewith, the court finds that NUTECH's motion to dismiss is due to be denied as to this claim.
What is claimed is:
This claim contains the "directly laminated to each other" term that the court found "novel and useful" and transformative in analyzing Claim 1. The court finds no reason to depart from that analysis. Consistent therewith, the court finds that NUTECH's motion to dismiss is due to be denied as to this claim.
Consistent with the foregoing analysis, NUTECH's Motion To Dismiss is hereby