JOHN H. ENGLAND, III, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Jason M. Jackson ("Jackson" or "Plaintiff") initiated this action on July 25, 2017, against Defendants the City of Argo, Alabama ("the City" or "Argo") and Officer Glenn Wells, ("Captain Wells," and together with the City, the "Defendants"). (Doc. 1). On August 18, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, (doc. 5), and to strike portions of it, (doc. 6). On August 31, 2017, Jackson amended his complaint, (doc. 12), and the undersigned found both of Defendants' motions moot in light of the amended complaint, (doc. 17). As with the original complaint, Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 12(b)(6), FED. R. CIV. P., permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). The complaint must establish "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; accord Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."). Ultimately, this inquiry is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
To that end, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief." "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require `detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Mere "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557).
The City of Argo is an Alabama municipality located partially in Jefferson County and partially in St. Clair County. (Doc. 12 at ¶ 2). It has fewer than 19,000 inhabitants. (Id. at ¶ 30).
On the morning of August 8, 2015 — a clear, dry, sunny day — Jackson was travelling northbound on Interstate 59. (Id. at ¶¶ 29 & 31). Captain Wells, an Argo police officer and the city's only officer on duty that day, was running radar on Interstate 59. (Id. at ¶¶ 3 & 29). Wells believed Jackson was travelling at twenty-six miles per hour in excess of the speed limit. (Id. at ¶ 31). Based on that belief, Captain Wells pursued Jackson in his patrol car and, using his emergency equipment, stopped Jackson. (Id.). Captain Wells issued Jackson a citation for reckless driving. (Id.).
Jackson hired counsel to defend against the reckless driving charge, and, after the City refused to dismiss the charge, the matter proceeded to trial in Argo Municipal Court on November 6, 2015. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37). Captain Wells testified that he has worked at the Argo Police department since 2006 and runs radar on I-59 "pretty much every Saturday and Sunday" from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. (Id. at ¶ 37). Captain Wells also testified that his only probable cause in pulling Jackson over was his speed. (Id.). Captain Wells further testified that he is aware of Alabama Code § 32-5A-171(8), which prohibits a municipality or town with fewer than 19,000 inhabitants from enforcing the general prohibition on driving in excess of the maximum speed limit on an interstate highway. (Id. at ¶¶ 17 & 37).
Following Captain Wells's testimony, Jackson moved for an acquittal on the reckless driving charge, arguing reckless driving requires the presence of another factor in addition to speeding, but the municipal court denied the motion. (Id. at ¶¶ 21 & 39). Jackson was found guilty of reckless driving and was assessed a fine and court costs totaling $362.00. (Id. at ¶¶ 39-40). Jackson then appealed to the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, posting a $250.00 appeal bond with the City. (Id. at ¶¶ 40-41). A year after receiving the citation, Jackson was acquitted of the reckless driving charge; however, the City did not refund Jackson's appeal bond. (Id. at ¶¶ 42-43).
Jackson's amended complaint asserts the following claims: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 count against the City for illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (doc. 12 at ¶¶ 45-62); (2) a § 1983 count against Captain Wells in his individual capacity, also for illegal seizure, (id. at ¶¶ 63-68); (3) a § 1983 count against the City for excessive fines in violation of the Eighth Amendment, (id. at ¶¶ 69-74); (4) a § 1983 count against the City for negligent training, (id. at ¶¶ 75-79); (5) a § 1983 count for inadequate policies against the City, (id. at ¶¶ 80-87); (6) a § 1983 count against the City, asserted in the alternative to his fourth count, for customs and policies encouraging Argo officers to violate motorists' constitutional rights, (id. at ¶¶ 88-99); (7) a § 1983 count against the City for malicious prosecution, (id. at ¶¶ 100-12); (8) a state law unjust enrichment claim against the City, (id. at ¶¶ 113-17); (9) a state law conversion claim against the City, (id. at ¶¶ 118-21); and (10) a state law fraudulent inducement claim against the City, (id. at ¶¶ 122-24). Jackson also includes a number of class action allegations. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-14).
Defendants argue Jackson's illegal seizure claims fail against both the City and Captain Wells because Captain Wells had probable cause to stop Jackson. (Doc. 13-1 at 19-21). Consequently, they contend Captain Wells is shielded by qualified immunity. (Id. at 27-31). Defendants also argue Jackson's claims against the City are fatally flawed by Jackson's failure to plead specific facts that would support municipal liability under § 1983 and because actions Jackson attributes to the City were actually undertaken by the city's municipal court. (Id. at 22-26).
"Qualified immunity protects government officials who were sued individually `unless the law preexisting the defendant official's supposedly wrongful act was already established to such a high degree that every objectively reasonable official standing in the defendant's place would be on notice that what the defendant official was doing would be clearly unlawful given the circumstances.'" Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). To receive the protection of qualified immunity, the government official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2004). Once an official establishes he is acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate qualified immunity is inappropriate. White v. City of Birmingham, 96 F.Supp.3d 1260, 1285 (N.D. Ala. 2015). To determine whether qualified immunity is appropriate, the court asks two questions: (1) "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" (2) "If a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, . . . [was] the right . . . clearly established?" Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). This two-part analysis may be performed in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Here, Jackson alleges his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the stop. "The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation marks omitted). A law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle consistent with the Fourth Amendment "when there is probable cause to believe that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles." United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998). Thus, "the existence of probable cause at the time of [a seizure] is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the [seizure] . . . Probable cause exists where the facts within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials, derived from reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed." Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
A police officer need not have actual probable cause to be shielded by qualified immunity, as the Eleventh Circuit has recently explained:
Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018).
Jackson's theory breaks down as follows: because Argo has fewer than 19,000 inhabitants, (see doc. 12 at ¶ 30), an Argo police officer is statutorily forbidden from issuing a speeding citation on an interstate highway. See ALA. CODE § 32-5A-171(8) ("A law enforcement officer or a peace officer of any incorporated municipality or town which has less than 19,000 inhabitants according to the most recent federal decennial census shall not enforce this section on any interstate highway."). The City's police officers get around this by issuing reckless driving citations instead of speeding citations, even in the absence of probable cause for reckless driving. Jackson contends Captain Wells subjected him to an illegal seizure because Captain Wells (1) lacked the authority to pull Jackson over for speeding because of the statutory provision in § 32-5A-171(8);
Although Jackson contends that reckless driving under Alabama law is "often informally referred to as `speeding plus' in law enforcement because the statute clearly states
Jackson relies primarily on Zann v. State, 17 So.3d 1222 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), for the proposition that more than speeding is required for reckless driving. (See doc. 12 at ¶ 22; doc. 19 at 5).
The remainder of Jackson's argument Captain Wells violated his constitutional rights by stopping him for reckless driving based only on his speed fares no better. Paragraphs 26 and 27 of the amended complaint reference an advisory opinion by former Alabama Attorney General William Pryor distinguishing § 32-5A-170, which prohibits drivers from driving "at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing," from § 32-5A-171, the prohibition on exceeding the speed limit.
AGO 2004-061 at 6. The problem with relying on this advisory opinion is that, as Jackson concedes, (see doc. 12 at 8 n.3 & n.4), it does not relate to the reckless driving statute at all, so its statements about what must and must not be enforced as speeding are not directly applicable. Jackson argues the opinion applies by analogy to reckless driving because both statutes require a second element. (Id.). But, as stated above, at least one provision of the reckless driving statute does not
Separately, but dovetailing with the above discussion, Jackson's claim against Captain Wells is due to be dismissed because he has not shown that it is clearly established that a police officer lacks probable cause to stop a motorist for reckless driving based solely on the motorist's speed.
Four of the counts against the City are directly related to the stop and assert the City is liable for it via municipal liability. As with Jackson's claim against Captain Wells, these counts assume a stop based on reckless driving is unlawful if it is based on speed alone. Count I is an illegal seizure (i.e., Fourth Amendment) count against the City, attempting to hold it liable for the traffic stop itself. (Doc. 12 at ¶¶ 45-62). Count IV alleges the City "negligently failed to train Captain Wells regarding state and federal law, particularly with regard to a) the lack of authority to enforce § 32-5A-171 on Alabama interstate highways via using other statutes, b) the lack of authority to cite drivers for reckless driving when the only perceived traffic violation is speed; and 3) illegal seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution." (Id. at ¶ 76). Count V alleges the City failed "to create, adopt and implement rules, regulations, practices and procedures which clearly instruct police officers as to the limits of their traffic enforcement [sic] under Alabama law and the Fourth Amendment pertaining to illegally stopping motorists traveling through the City of Argo on Interstate 59," leading to the stop. (Id. at ¶¶ 81-86). Count VI, asserted in the alternative to Count IV, alleges the City's customs and practices created an unwritten policy encouraging its officers to illegally stop motorists, resulting in the violation of Jackson's Fourth Amendment rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 89-99).
A municipality can only be liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees when its "official policy" causes a constitutional violation. Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). To support municipal (or Monell) liability under § 1983, Jackson must show "(1) a violation of his constitutional rights; (2) that the City had a custom or policy that was deliberately indifferent to that constitutional right; and (3) a causal link between the City's policy or custom and the violation." Sharp v. City of Huntsville, AL., 730 F. App'x 858, 860 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)). Jackson's inability to show the stop violated the Fourth Amendment forecloses his ability to show the first element, and thus is fatal to each of these claims against the City regardless of whether Jackson can show the other elements.
In Count VII, Jackson asserts a malicious prosecution claim against the City. (Id. at ¶¶ 101-112). To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, "the plaintiff must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures in addition to the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution." Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit has looked to both state and federal law for the elements of the common law tort. Id. Under Alabama law, those elements are (1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused's favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused. Id. at 881-82 (citing Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002-04 (11th Cir.1998) and Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 831-32 (Ala.1999)). As discussed above, Jackson cannot show the City
Jackson also contends in Count III that the $362.00 in court costs and fines imposed for the reckless driving ticket was excessive under the Eighth Amendment because the ticket was issued pursuant to an unconstitutional stop. (Doc. 12 at 16-18). The Eighth Amendment's "Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense." Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558 (1993). A fine is excessive when it is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense," which "is determined by examining three factors: (1) whether the defendant falls into the class of persons at whom the criminal statute was principally directed; (2) other penalties authorized by the legislature (or the Sentencing Commission); and (3) the harm caused by the defendant." United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). Jackson cannot show that the stop was unconstitutional, so he also cannot show that the fine was excessive solely because of an unconstitutional stop. And, considering the factors above, the undersigned finds a $362.00 fine for a reckless driving conviction (which, as Jackson notes, is punishable by a fine of between $25.00 and $500.00, (see doc. 12 at ¶ 25)), is not grossly disproportionate to the offense such that it is unconstitutionally excessive.
In his response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Jackson "concedes he cannot maintain claims against the City for the intentional torts of conversion and fraudulent inducement." (Doc. 19 at 13). Therefore, those claims, contained in Counts IX and X, (doc. 12 at ¶¶ 118-124), are abandoned and due to be dismissed.
As to Jackson's unjust enrichment claim, Defendants contend Jackson's allegations are based on actions taken by the Argo Municipal Court and, in any event, the City is entitled to local-government immunity. (Doc. 13-1 at 34-35). In response, Jackson states his unjust enrichment count is not a tort claim but an equitable remedy, and is properly a part of his § 1983 Monell claims against the City. (Doc. 19 at 13-14). To the extent Jackson intends his unjust enrichment count to be part of his § 1983 claims, it is due to be dismissed for the same reasons that those claims are due to be dismissed, as discussed above. To the extent it is intended to be an unjust enrichment claim under state law, Jackson has abandoned it by failing to respond to Defendants' arguments under state law, and it is also due to be dismissed.
Jackson's complaint attempts to bring claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a class comprised of "all persons within the applicable statute of limitations preceding the filing of this action to the date of Class certification who, while traveling on Interstate 59, received a citation for reckless driving by a City of Argo officer/employee where the charge of reckless driving on the face of the citation would not make a prima facie case of reckless driving under Alabama law and were therefore assessed with fines, bonds, or costs." (Doc. 12 at ¶ 9). "[A] class representative must be part of the class and `possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members." East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 Although Jackson argues Captain Wells is not entitled to immunity under state law, (doc. 19 at 14-15), it is unclear what relevance this argument has given Jackson's state law claims are asserted only against the City and have been affirmatively abandoned. (1977). To the extent class claims could be appropriate in this case,
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion to dismiss, (doc. 13), is
