Filed: Nov. 29, 2012
Latest Update: Nov. 29, 2012
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Yan Ebyam, Matthew M. Scoble, Esq., counsel for defendant Thomas Johnson, William J. Portanova, Esq., counsel for defendant David Jopson, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Jesus Bruce, Hayes H. Gable, Esq., counsel for def
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Yan Ebyam, Matthew M. Scoble, Esq., counsel for defendant Thomas Johnson, William J. Portanova, Esq., counsel for defendant David Jopson, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Jesus Bruce, Hayes H. Gable, Esq., counsel for defe..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Yan Ebyam, Matthew M. Scoble, Esq., counsel for defendant Thomas Johnson, William J. Portanova, Esq., counsel for defendant David Jopson, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Jesus Bruce, Hayes H. Gable, Esq., counsel for defendant Aimee Sisco, J Toney, Esq., counsel for defendant Pablo Vasquez, David D. Fischer, Esq., counsel for defendant Dolf Podva, Carl E. Larson, Esq., counsel for defendant Donald Fried, Dan F. Koukol, Esq., and counsel for defendant Thomas Marrs, Ronald J. Peters, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on December 4, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 22, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between December 4, 2012 and January 22, 2013 under the Local Codes T-2 (unusual or complex case) and T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. This is a complex case, including over 2,000 pages of discovery, six search warrants, and nine co-defendants. Defendant Yan Ebyam is named as a defendant in two indictments pending before this Court (case nos. 2:11-CR-276 JAM and 2:11-CR-275 JAM), and Hoffman, et al., 2:11-MJ-312 JAN is factually related to this matter.
b. On April 2, 2012, the Government released a CD that was delivered to defense counsel on April 9, 2012, containing voluminous additional discovery, including evidence from devices such as computers and thumb drives. On April 19, 2012, another CD of discovery was produced containing digital discovery from the seven search warrant sites in Northern California.
c. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
d. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The Government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of December 4, 2012 to January 22, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Codes T-2 and T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
