RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JDUGE

WALLACE CAPEL, Jr., Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Keith Anton Wilkerson ("Plaintiff") filed an application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq., on May 19, 2011. His application was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled from the date the application was filed through the date of the decision. Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which rejected his request for review of the ALJ's decision. The ALJ's decision consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner").1 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The District Judge has referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge "for consideration and disposition or recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be appropriate." Order (Doc. 16). Based on the undersigned's review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the Magistrate Judge hereby RECOMMENDS that the court AFFIRM the decision of the Commissioner.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to benefits when the person is unable to

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011).

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step Four. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step One through Step Four. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id.

To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant's Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"). Id. at 1238-39. The RFC is what the claimant is still able to do despite the claimant's impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical Vocational Guidelines4 ("grids") or call a vocational expert ("VE"). Id. at 1239-40.

The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a statutorily-required finding of "Disabled" or "Not Disabled." Id.

The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one. This court must find the Commissioner's decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence."). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff was forty-six years old on the date he filed his application, and had completed his high school education. Tr. 29, 39. Following the administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ found at Step One that Plaintiff "has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 19, 2011, the application date[.]" Tr. 21. At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: "status post hemorrhagic stroke; hypertension; alcoholic cirrhosis; peripheral vascular disease; diabetes mellitus; chronic small vessel ischemic disease; right rotator cuff tendonitis; [and] status post compression fracture of thoracic spine[.]" Tr. 21. At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments[.]" Tr. 24. Next, the ALJ articulated Plaintiff's RFC as follows:

Tr. 24. The ALJ next concluded at Step Four that Plaintiff "has no past relevant work[.]" Tr. 28. Finally, at Step Five, and based upon the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that "[c]onsidering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform[.]" Tr. 29. The ALJ identified several representative occupations, including "Laundry Folder," "Non Postal Mail Clerk," and "Shipping/Receiving Clerk." Tr. 30. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff "has not been under a disability . . . at any time during the period beginning May 19, 2011, the date the application was filed, and continuing through the date of this decision[.]" Tr. 30.

IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM

Plaintiff presents one issue for the court to consider in its review of the Commissioner's decision, arguing that the Commissioner's decision should be reversed because the ALJ "erred in relying upon the testimony of the vocational expert . . . since it conflicted with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles" ("DOT") in that the expert purportedly erred in both describing Plaintiff's previous work as medium exertional level work and "in the coding of the non-postal mail clerk and shipping/receiving clerk" representative occupations identified by the ALJ. Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 12) at 5, 10.

V. DISCUSSION

At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified about his brief employment with a lumber company in 2000. He described his job as "[p]ulling two-by-fours, stacking them on a crane chain." Tr. 39. The VE was asked to classify Plaintiff's work in the lumber industry, including "the DOT number, the exertional level, and the SVP number[.]" Tr. 49. The VE testified that Plaintiff's prior work "appears to be as a lumber stacker or lumber straightener. Medium unskilled, has an SVP of 2. And the code is 669.687-018." Tr. 49. Plaintiff's attorney did not elicit further testimony from Plaintiff about the nature of his work and did not question the VE about his classification of Plaintiff's work at the hearing. However, Plaintiff now argues that the VE erred, and the ALJ consequently erred in relying upon the VE's testimony, because "Lumber Stacker is DOT Code 922.687-070. This is [a] heavy, unskilled job with an SVP of 2 making the judges [sic] rationale totally incorrect." Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 12) at 10 (citations omitted). Plaintiff thus submits that the ALJ "erred in relying on the vocation expert witness testimony when he classified the past work as medium work when it was actually heavy work[.]" Id.

Plaintiff's argument is problematic for several reasons. First, it is not at all clear that the ALJ erred in his classification of Plaintiff's prior work. The DOT code the ALJ identified describes the occupation "Lumber Straightener" as follows:

DOT § 669.687-018. The description for "Lumber Handler," which Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have utilized, is as follows:

DOT § 922.687-074. Plaintiff provides no explanation for why the "Lumber Handler" occupation better matches his actual work than does "Lumber Straightener." Again, Plaintiff testified only that he "pulled" lumber and stacked it on a "crane chain." Tr. 39. While stacking "two-by-fours" on a "crane chain" might sound like some of the work described in the "Lumber Handler" position, without more detail, the undersigned cannot find that the VE erred in failing to rely upon that DOT code, especially where it is contemplated that a "Lumber Straightener" may "pile lumber on trucks or pallets." DOT § 669.687-018. As such, the undersigned does not find reversible error in the ALJ's reliance on the VE's coding.

Ultimately, even if the VE, and consequently the ALJ, had erred in his classification of Plaintiff's prior work, such error was harmless at most. The ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work, including his work in the lumber industry, because "[w]hile the claimant apparently worked as a lumber stacker long enough to learn the job properly, the evidence does not support finding that he performed this job at the substantial gainful activity level." Tr. 29. Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work as a lumber stacker, the ALJ was not required to determine, and indeed made no attempt to conclude, that Plaintiff is not disabled because his current RFC allows him to perform past relevant work. Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain how he could possibly have been prejudiced by the ALJ's failure to conclude that his prior work was performed at the heavy, rather than medium, exertional level, where the ALJ explicitly found in his RFC that Plaintiff can perform only "light work" with additional exertional limitations. See Tr. 24. Accordingly, any error arguably committed by the VE and ALJ in classifying Plaintiff's prior work was harmless and does not warrant reversal of the Commissioner's decision.

Plaintiff also argues that the VE provided the wrong DOT codes for two of the three representative occupations a hypothetical person with Plaintiff's RFC could perform. The VE testified that the hypothetical person described by the ALJ at the hearing could perform "light, unskilled, entry-level work[,]" including "laundry folder," with DOT occupational code 369.687-018, "mail clerk, non-postal," with DOT occupational code 209.687-026, and "shipping and receiving clerk," with DOT occupational code 222.387-074. Tr. 50-51. The ALJ further confirmed that the VE's testimony did not "deviate in any way from the way those jobs are described" in the DOT. Tr. 51.

Plaintiff argues that the VE erred because, he asserts, the mail clerk, non-postal code is actually 739.687-030 and the shipping and receiving clerk code is 222.387-050. Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 12) at 10. First, it is again not at all clear that the ALJ actually erred as Plaintiff argues. The DOT codes for the "mail clerk, non-postal" and "shipping and receiving clerk" occupations given by the ALJ correspond with occupations titled "Mail Clerk" (see DOT 209.687-026) and "Shipping-and-Receiving Weigher (clerical)" (see DOT 222.387-074). Both occupations involve light work and Plaintiff does not even argue that the duties of each are inconsistent with the RFC articulated by the ALJ. Nor does Plaintiff indicate why the "mail clerk" coding utilized by the ALJ, which corresponds with the DOT coding for "Mail Clerk (clerical)," is somehow erroneous. Moreover, the occupational code which Plaintiff asserts the ALJ should have utilized for "Mail Clerk," DOT 739.687-030 (see Pl.'s Br. (Doc. 12) at 10), appears to correspond with the DOT title "Assembler, Small Products II (any industry)." While Plaintiff correctly posits that there is a separate DOT code for "Shipping and Receiving Clerk (clerical)" (see DOT 222.387-050), it would have been erroneous for the ALJ to rely upon this code because "Shipping and Receiving Clerk" requires medium, rather than light strength work, and therefore would have been inconsistent with the hypothetical posed to the VE by the ALJ.

In any event, even if the VE had erred in assigning codes to the occupational titles for "mail clerk, non-postal" and "shipping and receiving clerk," it is apparent that any reliance by the ALJ on such error does not warrant reversal. To complete the fifth step of the disability determination process, the ALJ is required to determine "if there is other work available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant has the ability to perform." Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239. Social Security regulations establish that "[w]ork exists in the national economy when there is a significant number of jobs (in one or more occupations) having requirements which you are able to meet with your physical or mental abilities and vocational qualifications." 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(b). In order to assist the ALJ with his fifth-step inquiry, the VE was simply asked whether, given a hypothetical person with the RFC articulated by the ALJ, there is "any work in the regional or national economy that a person with that profile could perform?" Tr. 50. In addition to the two occupations which Plaintiff asserts the VE somehow erred in stating occupational codes, the VE identified "laundry folder," with DOT code 369.687-018, and testified that there "1,250 of those jobs in the state" and "220,000 in the national economy." Tr. 50. Plaintiff does not challenge the VE's coding with respect to this occupation or the VE's testimony about the number of jobs available in the state or national economies for such occupation. Because the VE testified that there are 1,250 "laundry folder" jobs available in Alabama and 220,000 such jobs in the national economy, the ALJ's determination that there is work available in significant numbers which a person with Plaintiff's RFC can perform is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Brooks v. Barnhart, 133 F. App'x 669, 670-71 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming ALJ's finding that "840 polisher, document preparer, and bonder jobs constituted a significant number in the national economy" and remarking that "[w]e have upheld the ALJ's finding that 174 small appliance repairman position[s] in the area in which the claimant resided established the existence of work in significant numbers."). Accordingly, the ALJ did not reversibly err in relying upon the VE's testimony in performing his Step Five inquiry.

VI. CONCLUSION

The undersigned Magistrate Judge has carefully and independently reviewed the record and RECOMMENDS that, for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED. Further, it is

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said Recommendation on or before December 28, 2015. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). Plaintiff is advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.