Filed: Dec. 12, 2016
Latest Update: Dec. 12, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 1/31/17 AT 9:15 A.M. JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, AUSA Michael Beckwith and AUSA Paul Hemesath, and Defendant Alvaro Rios Madrid, represented by Attorneys Frank Ragen, Dina Santos, and Danielle Peay; hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 1/31/17 AT 9:15 A.M. JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, AUSA Michael Beckwith and AUSA Paul Hemesath, and Defendant Alvaro Rios Madrid, represented by Attorneys Frank Ragen, Dina Santos, and Danielle Peay; hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 1/31/17 AT 9:15 A.M.
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, AUSA Michael Beckwith and AUSA Paul Hemesath, and Defendant Alvaro Rios Madrid, represented by Attorneys Frank Ragen, Dina Santos, and Danielle Peay; hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 13, 2016.
2. By this stipulation, Defendant now moves to continue the status conference until January 31, 2017 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between December 13, 2016, and January 31, 2017, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for Defendant desire additional time to continue to review discovery, conduct investigation, engage in negotiations, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Counsel for Defendant believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
b) The government does not object to the continuance.
c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 13, 2016, to January 31, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
