Filed: Aug. 20, 2018
Latest Update: Aug. 20, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 21, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, defendant Kizzie Morris, by and through her undersigned counsel, now moves to continue the status conference until September 18, 2018, at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between August 21, 2018 and September 18, 2018, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree a
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 21, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, defendant Kizzie Morris, by and through her undersigned counsel, now moves to continue the status conference until September 18, 2018, at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between August 21, 2018 and September 18, 2018, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree an..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 21, 2018.
2. By this stipulation, defendant Kizzie Morris, by and through her undersigned counsel, now moves to continue the status conference until September 18, 2018, at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between August 21, 2018 and September 18, 2018, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 380 pages of investigative reports and related documents and several hours recordings of body camera videos. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, conduct investigation and research, review discovery, and to discuss potential resolution with his client. Counsel for the defendant and counsel for the government have begun to engage in negotiations toward possible resolution.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 21, 2018 and September 18, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
