MICHAEL J. SENG, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter proceeds against Defendant T. Peterson on Plaintiff's First Amendment access-to-court claim. Specifically, Plaintiff accuses Defendant of interfering with Plaintiff's ability to meet a filing deadline in connection with his petition for writ for habeas corpus when Defendant denied Plaintiff Priority Library User ("PLU") privileges.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on July 6, 2015. (ECF No. 48.) Plaintiff filed an opposition. (ECF No. 53.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 54.) This matter is fully briefed and deemed submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, Defendant asks the Court to judicially notice a number of documents, including the Abstract of Judgment in
Defendant also asks the Court to judicially notice the following documents relating to Plaintiff's petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed in the Northern District of California,
Lastly, Defendant asks the Court to judicially notice the following documents relating to Plaintiff's appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
The Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either "generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction" or "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Public records, including judgments and other court documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice.
The acts that form the basis of this action occurred at California Correctional Institute ("CCI") in Tehachapi, California, where Plaintiff was an inmate housed in the Segregated Housing Unit ("SHU") for a serious rule violation, Pl.'s Dep. at 37, and Defendant Peterson was a CCI Legal Officer, Peterson Decl. ¶ 3.
Plaintiff is presently serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole following an April 2004 conviction. RJN, Ex. M.
On June 19, 2007, Plaintiff challenged his conviction and sentence by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed in the Northern District of California,
On July 7, 2010, Plaintiff's petition was denied on the merits, and the district court declined to issue a certificate of appealability ("COA"). RJN, Ex. B. Plaintiff was informed that, while the district court's denial of a COA was not appealable, he may ask the appellate court to issue a COA under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Plaintiff received notice of the district court's judgment on July 20, 2010. Pl.'s Dep. at 17. Based on the district court's reference to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22, Plaintiff calculated that he had until August 7, 2010, to file a request for a COA with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Pl.'s Dep. at 17-18.
In 2010, scheduling for the CCI law library was based on whether an inmate had PLU or General Library User (GLU) status. Peterson Decl. ¶ 5. PLU status was given to any inmate who had either a verified court-imposed deadline or a statutory deadline within thirty days. 15 C.C.R. §3122(b)(1) ("An established court deadline may be either a court imposed deadline for an active case or a statutory deadline. Inmates who apply for PLU status based on a court imposed deadline must show documentation from the court to verify that deadline. Inmates who apply for PLU status based on a statutory deadline must identify the legal rule that compels the deadline.")
When an inmate requested PLU status, he was required to provide proof of the deadline. 15 C.C.R. §3122(b)(1) ("An established court deadline may be either a court imposed deadline for an active case or a statutory deadline. Inmates who apply for PLU status based on a court imposed deadline must show documentation from the court to verify that deadline. Inmates who apply for PLU status based on a statutory deadline must identify the legal rule that compels the deadline.")
If an inmate could not provide proof of the deadline, Peterson gave him GLU status. Peterson Decl. ¶ 6. Inmates with GLU status received library access based on library availability, custody status, and chronological order.
On July 21, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a PLU Request and Declaration. Peterson Decl., Ex. A. Plaintiff asserted that he "believe[d]" that his deadline to request a COA from the Ninth Circuit was August 7, 2010, and he cited Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 as the basis for his belief.
Peterson was the CCI Legal Officer who evaluated Plaintiff's request. Peterson Decl. ¶ 7. As a CCI Legal Officer, Peterson was responsible for scheduling inmates' law library visits; delivering legal supplies, forms and legal materials to inmates; and receiving, processing, and approving or denying inmate requests for law library services.
In evaluating Plaintiff's request, Peterson performed a PACER search for the case number listed on the request form to determine whether there was a court-ordered deadline. Peterson Decl. ¶ 7. Unable to verify an August 7, 2010, court-ordered deadline, Peterson denied Plaintiff's request for PLU status on July 22, 2010. Peterson Decl. ¶
There is no evidence that Peterson attempted to determine whether there was a statutory deadline by reviewing either Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
On August 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to file a request for a COA in the district court in
On February 23, 2011, the district court informed Plaintiff that his two motions were construed as notices of appeal and were directed to the appellate court. RJN, Ex. E.
On March 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed a 36-page application for a COA in the district court. RJN, Ex. F. This application was summarily denied on April 9, 2012 by the district judge.
On March 26, 2012, a notice of appeal was filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On May 15, 2012, the appellate court summarily denied Plaintiff's request for a COA, citing 28 U.S.C.§ 2253(c)(2), which provides that a COA will issue only if the applicant has made a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." . RJN, Ex. J.
Plaintiff then filed a 19-page motion for reconsideration, which was denied on June 19, 2012. RJN, Exs. K-L.
Pursuant to 15 C.C.R. § 3123(b), "[i]nmates on GLU status may receive a minimum of 2 hours per calendar week of requested physical law library access, as resources are available." Inmates who are unable to physically access the law library, including those who have "been suspended from physical access . . . pending investigation of a serious rule violation," may request access to legal materials from the library staff through the law library paging process. 15 C.C.R. § 3123(c).
As CCI Legal Officer, Peterson processed these requests from inmates in the SHU for legal forms, paper, envelopes, and legal documents for in-cell study, and was responsible for overseeing fulfillment of those requests. Peterson Decl. ¶ 9.
On July 19, 2010, Plaintiff requested five forms from the law library, and he received them on July 20, 2010. Peterson Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. B.
On July 21, 2010, Plaintiff requested ten sheets of blank paper, five envelopes, legal forms, and the address for the Ninth Circuit Court. Peterson Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. C. Plaintiff received these materials on July 27, 2010.
Also on July 21, 2010, Plaintiff requested three court cases for in-cell study. Peterson Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. D. Plaintiff was provided with those cases on July 29, 2010.
On July 28, 2010, Plaintiff requested legal materials, including ten sheets of legal paper, ten sheets of blank paper, five envelopes, and legal forms. Peterson Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. E. Plaintiff was provided with the materials he requested on July 29, 2010.
On August 6, 2010, one day before the deadline to file a notice of appeal or request for certificate of appealability, Plaintiff gained physical access to the law library. Opp'n at 9.
Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, and to prevail on summary judgment, he must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for him.
In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence,
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff cannot establish injury because he fully briefed his request for a COA, because his petition for writ of habeas corpus had no merit, and because Peterson did not unreasonably burden Plaintiff's meaningful access to the court. Alternatively, Defendant asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff contends that he has shown injury because the Ninth Circuit did not consider Plaintiff's 39-page application when denying his request for a COA. Plaintiff also argues that Peterson is not entitled to qualified immunity.
Prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts.
However, prisoners do not have a "freestanding right" to a law library.
To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, prisoners must allege an actual injury, i.e., that some official action has frustrated or is impeding plaintiff's attempt to bring a nonfrivolous legal claim.
A missed filing deadline, by itself, is not enough to state an access to the courts claim. The plaintiff must identify his underlying claim and show that it arguably had some merit.
Though Defendant's motion for summary judgment proceeds directly to an analysis of whether Plaintiff has established injury, the Court will first consider whether Defendant improperly denied Plaintiff PLU status.
Defendant declares that "PLU status was given to any inmate who had a verified court-ordered deadline within thirty days." Peterson Decl. ¶ 5, and that Plaintiff was not given PLU status because Defendant was unable to verify a court-ordered deadline through a PACER search. But pursuant to 15 C.C.R. § 3122(b)(1), a court deadline can be
Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure does not itself specify a filing deadline, but it does refer to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Regarding the time to file a notice of appeal, Rule 11 relies on Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that a notice of appeal "must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Since the district court's judgment in Plaintiff's habeas action was rendered on July 7, 2010, Plaintiff's notice of appeal and/or request for COA was indeed due on or before August 7, 2010, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Thus, it appears that Defendant's failure to verify a statutory deadline resulted in an improper denial of Plaintiff's request for PLU status.
Defendant is correct, though, that Plaintiff has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to alleged injury from Peterson's denial of PLU status. Following Peterson's denial, Plaintiff filed two motions for extension of time before his August 7, 2010, deadline; the district court construed them as timely notices of appeal. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 22(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, in the absence of a separate request for a COA, a notice of appeal constitutes such a request. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1) ("If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice of appeal constitutes a request addressed to the judges of the court of appeals.") Thus, Plaintiff effectively filed a timely notice of appeal and request for a COA, notwithstanding Defendant's failure to verify the statutory basis of Plaintiff's deadline.
Plaintiff counters that his injury goes beyond the filing of a timely notice of appeal and/or request for a COA. His injury, he asserts, is the frustration of his desire to use the law library facilities to research and write a brief in support of his request for a COA. It is true that the frustration of an inmate's efforts to file a brief in support of an appeal of a state court conviction can constitute an actual injury.
Defendant also argues that summary judgment is warranted because the denial of Plaintiff's request for COA by both the district court and the appellate court presumptively means that Plaintiff's arguments in his habeas petition had no merit. This argument conflates two standards.
In an access-to-court action, a plaintiff does not have to show that his claim would have ultimately been successful on the merits.
In contrast, a COA is issued where the appeal presents a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). To satisfy the "substantial showing" standard, a petitioner "must demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason[,] that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further."
The standard for an access-to-court claim is thus lower than the standard for the issuance of a COA. Plaintiff here adequately asserted non-frivolous underlying claims, even if the district court and the appellate court ultimately declined to issue a COA. Plaintiff's right to pursue these claims is exactly the sort of litigation addressed in
Finally, Defendant moves for summary judgment pursuant to
Here, Plaintiff contends that he was deprived of his right to access to the courts because Defendant improperly denied him PLU status. Plaintiff maintains that, as a result of Defendant's actions, he was unable to present a timely and properly researched brief in support of his request for a COA. However, if the Court were to find that Plaintiff was denied access to the courts, or that his right to present a meaningful argument was unconstitutionally impaired, such a finding would necessarily imply the invalidity of his underlying criminal conviction.
Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction and sentence have been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) days after being served with the findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
