ORDER

GREGORY A. PRESNELL, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 178) filed by the Plaintiffs and the responses in opposition (Doc. 179, 181) filed by certain Defendants.

I. Background

On February 29, 2016, this Court entered an order (Doc. 176) (henceforth, the "Order") granting in part a number of motions to dismiss filed by various defendants. The Order addressed only the Plaintiffs' antitrust claims, which were dismissed with prejudice. (Order at 19). The Plaintiffs' state law claims had been referred to Magistrate Judge Smith for disposition by way of a Report and Recommendation. (Order at 1). The Plaintiffs now seek reconsideration of the Order.

II. Legal Standards

The federal rules do not specifically provide for the filing of a "motion for reconsideration." Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828, 113 S.Ct. 89, 121 L.Ed.2d 51 (1992). However, it is widely recognized that Rule 59(e) encompasses motions for reconsideration. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (3d ed. 2012). In the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources, reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy, to be employed sparingly. U.S. v. Bailey, 288 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2003). A busy district court need not allow itself to be imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriatim. Union Planters Nat. Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1982).1 The decision to alter or amend a judgment is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. O'Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992). Appropriate circumstances for reconsideration include situations in which the Court has obviously misapprehended a party's position, the facts, or mistakenly has decided an issue not presented for determination. Anderson v. United Auto Workers, 738 F.Supp. 441 (D. Kan. 1990).

Generally speaking, the authorities recognize four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted.

11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (3d ed. 2012).

Parties cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion to relitigate old matters, Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005), or to raise new legal arguments which could and should have been made during the pendency of the underlying motion, Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). Where a party attempts to introduce previously unsubmitted evidence in support of a motion to reconsider, the party must make some showing that the evidence previously was unavailable. Mays v. U.S. Postal Service, 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir.1997)(citing, inter alia, Engelhard Indus. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923, 84 S.Ct. 1220, 12 L.Ed.2d 215 (1964)). To avoid repetitive arguments on issues already considered fully by the court, rules governing reargument are narrowly construed and strictly applied. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Heath Fielding Ins. Broking Ltd., 976 F.Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y.1996).

III. Analysis

The Plaintiffs' primary argument1 in favor of reconsideration is that, sometime after the filing of their Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 151), the Plaintiffs "obtained" what they characterize as "direct evidence of price fixing by the named Defendants and unnamed co-conspirators." (Doc. 178 at 2). The Plaintiffs seek to have the Court reconsider the Order and grant them leave to amend their pleading to add in this evidence. (Doc. 178 at 3).

The Plaintiffs' effort must fail, for several reasons. As noted above, to justify reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence, a party must make some showing that the evidence was previously unavailable. The Plaintiffs here have made no such showing. The closest they come is a statement that the new evidence was unavailable at the time their Amended Complaint was filed. However, the Amended Complaint was filed on April 14, 2015, while the Order was not entered until ten months later — on February 29, 2016. The Plaintiffs offer no explanation for their failure to bring this information before the Court during that time.

Even if they had provided a legitimate justification for their delay in raising it, the Plaintiffs' "direct evidence of price fixing" would not suffice to save their antitrust claims, which were dismissed due to a failure to properly allege the existence of a collusive agreement to fix prices. (Doc. 176 at 8-17). The evidence consists of statements from individuals employed by two of the Defendants. The Plaintiffs do not provide affidavits or transcripts of the statements. Instead, they paraphrase:

(Doc. 178 at 2).

These vague assertions do not add any weight to the Plaintiffs' existing allegations. Among other shortcomings, the statements do not identify any Defendants (aside from, presumably, Progressive and State Farm) that allegedly participated in the agreement to fix prices, or even what states the agreement covered. The speakers who made the statements are not identified — even by job title — and thus there is no basis for a determination that either statement was made by someone with actual knowledge of the underlying facts. And the statements obviously have not been reduced to an admissible form. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 1000 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Additionally, commentators have described as `self-evident' the requirements that newly discovered evidence be `both admissible and credible,' as there is no reason to set aside a judgment on the basis of evidence that could not be admitted at a new trial or, if admitted, would be unconvincing." (quoting 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 60.42[6] (3d ed. 1997)).

IV. Conclusion

In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 178) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED.