ORDER RE:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ELECTRONIC CASE FILING

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO TRANSFER CASE

(3) SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Re: Dkt. No. 52

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Craig R. Brittain, an individual and U.S. Senate Candidate in Arizona and Brittain for U.S. Senate, a Campaign Committee (collectively, "Brittain") bring this action against defendant Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter"). Brittain asserts eight causes of action against Twitter for: (1) violation of the First Amendment; (2) violation of federal election law; (3) breach of contract; (4) conversion, (5) violation of the antitrust; (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7) tortious interference; and (8) promissory estoppel. (Dkt. No. 13.)

Now before the Court is Brittain's motion for permission for electronic case filing and to transfer this action back to the District of Arizona. (Dkt. No. 52 ("Motion").) Twitter opposes only the motion to transfer.1 (See Dkt. No. 56 ("Opp.").) Having carefully reviewed the papers submitted, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court GRANTS plaintiff permission for electronic case filing, and DENIES plaintiff's motion to transfer.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2018, Brittain filed his initial complaint in the District of Arizona, in which he resides. (Dkt. No. 1. ¶ 36.) Defendant subsequently moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of California pursuant to the forum selection clause found in Twitter's Terms of Service ("Terms"). (Dkt. No. 22.) In pertinent part, the Terms provide as follows:

(Dkt. No. 23, Ex. C ("Terms") at 11.) On January 4, 2019, the Arizona district court granted Twitter's motion and transferred the action to the Northern District of California ("Transfer Order"). (Dkt. No. 46 ("Transfer Order") at 2.) In so granting, the Arizona court noted that Brittain had agreed to Twitter's Terms "by affirmatively assenting to [Twitter's] `clickwrap' agreement" and found that he had failed to meet his "heavy burden of showing the extraordinary circumstances necessary to render the clauses unenforceable." (Id. at 2, 7.)

On February 4, 2019, Brittain moved for permission for electronic case filing and to transfer this action back to the District of Arizona. (Motion.) On February 19, 2019, Twitter responded, opposing only the motion to transfer. (See Opp.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Once a court grants a Section 1404(a) motion and transfers an action, "the transferee court should generally abide by the transferor court's transfer decision and should not retransfer the case." Goor v. Vignoles, No. C. 12-01794 DMR, 2012 WL 5499841, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (finding that courts "should be loathe" to reconsider a coordinate court's decision "in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as whether the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice") (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, the fact that an action has been transferred once does not preclude the transferee court from entertaining a subsequent motion to transfer.

"A motion to transfer is perfectly appropriate . . . on a showing of changed circumstances, particularly when they frustrate the purpose of the change of venue." Federal Practice and Procedure § 3846; Ametek, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C-90-20278-DLJ, 1990 WL 10072473, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 1990) (transferee court is not powerless to act where the original purposes of the transfer have been frustrated by an unforeseeable later event). "The transferee district should not retransfer `except under the most impelling and unusual circumstance or [unless] the transfer order is manifestly erroneous.'" Ametek, 1990 WL 10072473, at *1 (quoting United States v. Koenig, 290 F.2d 166, 173 n.11 (5th Cir. 1961)); see also Christianson, 486 U.S. at 816 (finding that "transferee courts that feel entirely free to revisit transfer decisions of a coordinate court threaten to send litigants into a vicious circle of litigation.").

III. DISCUSSION

Brittain fails to identify any change in circumstances since the Arizona court's Transfer Order, let alone one of such an "impelling and unusual" nature so as to justify retransfer. See Motion at 2; see also Ametek, 1990 WL 10072473, at *1 (quoting Koenig, 290 F.2d at 173 n.11). Nor does Brittain aver that the Arizona district court so erred in enforcing Twitter's forum selection clause that the transfer order "is manifestly erroneous." Id. Accordingly, Brittain fails to establish that retransfer is appropriate in this case. See Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 63 (finding that the party resisting a forum selection clause "bears the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for which the parties bargained is unwarranted").

However, out of an abundance of caution, and in light of Brittain's pro se status, the Court reviews the Transfer Order to determine whether it "is manifestly erroneous." Ametek, 1990 WL 10072473, at *1. The Arizona district court properly employed the Ninth Circuit's three-prong test to determine whether Twitter's forum selection clause controls the parties' dispute. (Transfer Order at 3 (citing Yei A. Sun v. Advanced China Healthcare, Inc., 901 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2018)).) The test provides that a forum selection clause controls a party's dispute unless the plaintiff makes a "strong showing that: (1) the clause is invalid due to `fraud or overreaching,' (2) `enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, . . . or (3) `trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the litigant will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.'" Yei A. Sun, 901 F.3d at 1088 (citing M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1972)).

First, the Arizona court correctly found that Twitter's Terms, to which Brittain assented when he registered for an account, are valid and enforceable. (Transfer Order at 4-5 (finding that Brittain failed to show "that the Terms are unconscionable or illusory.").) Second, the court analyzed Brittain's argument that enforcing the forum selection clause would contravene Arizona's public policy and found that "Arizona public policy favors enforcing forum selection clauses." (Id. at 6-7 (emphasis in original).) Third, given the current procedural posture of the case and the Court's ability to provide accommodations for pretrial matters so as not to require a personal appearance, it is not clear that the Arizona court's finding that the "fact that Brittain is a self-represented, indigent litigant is no basis for not enforcing the forum selection clauses" was manifestly erroneous. (Id. at 5 (citing Yei A. Sun, 901 F.3d at 1087).) However, those accommodations are not necessarily available for trial. Therefore, the Court reserves on whether a procedural change would render the transfer to the Northern District of California a manifest injustice. The same may also apply in the discovery context.

Nevertheless, because Brittain fails to allege any change in circumstances following the Arizona court's Transfer Order so as to justify retransfer, and because the Arizona court's decision to so transfer was not manifestly erroneous in light of the action's current procedural posture, the Court will not transfer this action back to the District of Arizona.2

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Brittain's motion to transfer venue and GRANTS Brittain's motion for permission for electronic case filing. Moreover, the Court CONTINUES the briefing deadlines for defendant's pending motion to dismiss as follows: Brittain's opposition is now due March 25, 2019 and Twitter's reply is now due April 1, 2019. Additionally, once fully briefed, the Court will deem the motion submitted without requiring a personal appearance. If the Court determines that argument is necessary, it will contact to the parties to schedule a hearing via telephone. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing currently scheduled for April 16, 2019.

Brittain is directed to follow the instructions on the Court's website regarding pro se litigants' registration for ECF and PACER. (See http://cand.uscourts.gov/ECF/proseregistration.) After registering on ECF and PACER, Brittain must file a notice of ECF registration that plaintiff has made available an electronic mail address for service of papers electronically filed on the docket. Upon filing of such notice, the Court will designate this action for the ECF program.

Brittain must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and all general orders and local rules pertaining to electronic filing including General Order 45 which requires in part that parties must provide the judge's chambers with a paper copy of each document that is filed electronically, marked "Chambers Copy." By registering, Brittain accepts responsibility for all technical requirements and computer-related tasks associated with participation in the ECF program.

The Court also advises that a Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which contains helpful information about proceeding without an attorney, is available in the Clerk's office or through the Court's website, http://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se. Additional assistance is available through the Legal Help Center. There is no fee for this service. Parties can make an appointment to speak with an attorney who can provide basic legal information and assistance. The Help Center does not see people on a "drop-in" basis, and will not be able to represent parties in their cases. There is no charge for this service. To make an appointment with the Legal Help Center, you may: (1) sign up in person on the appointment book outside the Legal Help Center offices at the San Francisco Courthouse, located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue, 15th Floor, Room 2796, San Francisco, California or the Oakland Courthouse, located at 1301 Clay Street, 4th Floor, Room 470S, Oakland, California; (2) call 415-782-8982; or (3) email federalprobonoproject@sfbar.org. The Help Center's website is available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/legal-help.

This Order terminates Docket Number 52.

IT IS SO ORDERED.