STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record Assistant United States Attorney JUSTIN L. LEE, and the Defendants: VICENTE VELASQUEZ by and through his counsel of record JESSE ORTIZ; PEDRO FUENTES by and through his counsel of record TODD D. LERAS; and, ROBERTO AGUILAR NAVARRO by and through his counsel of record TASHA CHALFANT, hereby stipulate and request that the Court make the following findings and Order as follows:

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 1,000 pages of investigative reports in electronic form. There is also a voluminous amount of electronic discovery which includes recordings and transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations under court-authorized wiretaps, both in English and Spanish. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, explore potential defenses, consult with their clients, discuss potential resolution, and to explain the consequences and guidelines.

c. Counsel for the defendants believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 22, 2018, to May 17, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

All counsel has reviewed this proposed order and authorized Tasha Chalfant to sign it on their behalf.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the stipulation of the parties and the recitation of facts contained therein, the Court finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

The Court orders that the time from the date of the parties' stipulation, March 22, 2018, to and including May 17, 2018, status conference hearing date shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C §3161(h)(7)(A) and (B) (iv), and Local Code T4 (reasonable time for defense counsel to prepare). It is further ordered that the presently set March 22, 2018, status conference shall be continued to May 17, 2018, at 9:30 a.m.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.