NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

NORRIS, Judge:

¶1 This appeal arises from summary judgment entered by the superior court against appellant, James House, finding his negligence and fraud claims against appellees, Diane Zubrod, and Jay Josephs, Jane Josephs, and Josephs Appraisal Arizona Group, Inc. (collectively, "Josephs") time-barred. On appeal, House argues the record reflects a genuine issue of material fact as to when his claims accrued, thus, precluding summary judgment. We disagree, and affirm the superior court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On July 28, 2005, House, an experienced real property investor, entered into a purchase contract to buy an upgraded penthouse condominium for $696,700 in a condominium complex in central Phoenix (the "complex"). House retained Zubrod as his real estate broker in the transaction. House decided to finance the unit and the lender retained Josephs to appraise it. On March 15, 2006, Josephs completed the appraisal and valued the unit at $675,000. Although the appraisal was $21,700 less than the purchase price, House closed the sale and purchased the unit on March 31, 2006.

¶3 Subsequently in September and October 2006, Zubrod sent emails to House to "[brainstorm] on what to do with the property." Zubrod attached to her September email what she called a "comparative market analysis" (CMA), which listed selling prices for 11 units in the complex. The prices ranged from a high of $790,000 to a low of $480,000, depending on unit model and square footage. The closest comparable unit, both in model and square footage, built in 2006, was priced at $640,000, $35,000 less that what House had paid for his unit. Zubrod also attached a CMA to her October email to House1 that listed 23 units in the complex, with prices ranging from a high of $750,000 to a low of $340,000. Again there were varying square footages among the properties, but the closest comparable unit was the unit also listed in the September CMA for $640,000 but which now had a selling price of $627,000, $48,000 less than what House had paid for his unit.

¶4 House refinanced the property in January 2007. Josephs reappraised the unit for the lender and valued it at $650,000, $25,000 less than what House had paid for it. The record is unclear whether House saw this appraisal but the record is clear Zubrod told him about the appraisal.

¶5 In October 2010, House spoke to a manager of the real estate company that represented the complex. The manager told House his unit had been worth between $325,000 to $350,000 when he bought it in 2006.

¶6 On August 11, 2011, House sued Zubrod and Josephs for negligence and fraud, alleging they had misrepresented the $696,700 he had paid for his unit was a "fair price." The superior court granted summary judgment, finding House "had the minimum requisite knowledge no later than January 2007 to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury," and thus, his claims were time-barred. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 12-542(3) (2003) (breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation two-year limitation period); A.R.S. § 12-543(3) (2003) (fraud three-year limitation period).

DISCUSSION

¶7 The fundamental issue before us is whether, as a matter of law, House's claims accrued sometime before August 11, 2008. See, e.g., In re Estate of Reynolds, 235 Ariz. 80, 85, ¶ 26, 327 P.3d 213, 218 (App. 2014) (appellate court may affirm superior court's ruling if correct for any reason). Based on our de novo review of the record, Cook v. Town of Pinetop-Lakeside, 232 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 10, 303 P.3d 67, 69 (App. 2013) (appellate court reviews de novo questions of law concerning statute of limitations, including when particular cause of action accrues), and reviewing the facts most favorable to House, we agree with the superior court. See Walk v. Ring, 202 Ariz. 310, 312, ¶ 3, 44 P.3d 990, 992 (2002); Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1990).2

¶8 Generally, the statute of limitations for a negligence or fraud claim begins to run, that is, accrues, when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should have known he suffered an injury. Little v. State, 225 Ariz. 466, 469, ¶ 9, 240 P.3d 861, 864 (App. 2010). Under this rule, known as the discovery rule, the limitation period will be tolled "until the plaintiff possesses a minimum knowledge sufficient to recognize that a `wrong occurred and caused injury.'" Richie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 304, ¶ 57, 2011 P.3d 1272, 1288 (App. 2009) (quoting Walk, 202 Ariz. at 316, ¶ 22, 44 P.3d at 996).

¶9 The discovery rule, however, does not permit a party to hide behind its ignorance when a reasonable investigation would have alerted it to the claim. See Doe v. Roe, 191 Ariz. 313, 324, ¶ 37, 955 P.2d 951, 962 (1998) (plaintiffs have affirmative duty of due diligence to investigate potential claims). A tort claim will therefore accrue when a plaintiff knows or "with reasonable diligence should know" of the defendant's wrongful conduct. Id. at 322, ¶ 29, 955 P.2d at 960. "Consequently most cases applying the discovery rule share a `common thread': `The injury or the act causing the injury, or both, have been difficult for the plaintiff to detect.'" ELM Ret. Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 226 Ariz. 287, 290, ¶ 12, 246 P.3d 938, 941 (App. 2010) (quoting Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 182 Ariz. 586, 589, 898 P.2d 964, 967 (1995)). Although when discovery occurs and a cause of action accrues are usually questions of fact for a jury, Doe, 191 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 32, 955 P.2d at 961, that is not always the case. See Little, 225 Ariz. at 469-70, ¶¶ 11-12, 240 P.3d at 864-65. Applying these principles here, the critical question is whether House knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known he had suffered an injury before August 11, 2008.

¶10 As discussed, House purchased the unit for $21,700 more than Josephs' first appraisal. According to House, Zubrod assured him, however, that $696,700 was a "very good price" and the unit was the "best opportunity in the area." Construing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to House, we conclude Josephs' first appraisal would not have put him on notice he had either been misled about the unit's value or needed to investigate further. Zubrod's September and October 2006 emails and the attached CMAs, however, should have caused House to investigate whether the unit was worth what he had paid for it only a few months earlier.

¶11 First, the September CMA listed 11 units in the complex with selling prices far below what House had paid for his unit. The unit most comparable to his unit which had been built in 2006, a year after he had entered into the purchase contract, was priced at $640,000, $35,000 below what he had paid for his unit. Further, in emailing the CMA to House, Zubrod also told House "the offering price of the units [shown in the CMA are] lower because [the sellers] bought lower."

¶12 Second, the October CMA provided House with additional information that others were selling their units for far less that what House had paid for his unit. The October CMA listed 23 different units in the complex, and with one exception, all of these units had sold or were listed for sale at prices far below what House had paid for his unit. The 2007 appraisal also provided House with additional information that other comparable units were selling for less than what House had paid for his unit.

¶13 In short, the September and October emails and CMAs along with the January 2007 appraisal provided House with sufficient information the price he had paid for his unit in 2006 was substantially higher than the selling prices for other comparable units during the same time frame. As a matter of law, this information would have caused a reasonable person to investigate whether the unit House purchased was worth what he had paid for it. Cf. Walk, 202 Ariz. at 321, ¶ 43, 44 P.3d at 1001 (summary judgment reversed because reasonable minds could differ as to whether plaintiff "knew or should have known facts that would have put a reasonable person on notice to investigate whether [the] injury had been wrongfully inflicted."). The disparity in price between House's unit and other comparable units in the complex was, simply put, not difficult to detect. See ELM, 226 Ariz. at 290, ¶ 12, 246 P.3d at 941.

¶14 House nevertheless argues that although by January 2007 he knew "there was damage, because the value of his property was going down,"3 he "was not aware of the causative agent (the what and who elements)" until he spoke to the manager in 2010. But, as a matter of law, a reasonable person on notice of this damage would have investigated the cause of the damage, rather than do nothing for several years. The discovery rule does not allow a party "to hide behind its ignorance when reasonable investigation would have alerted it to the claim." Id. We thus agree with the superior court that by January 2007, a "reasonable person would [have been] on notice to investigate whether the [unit] was worth what [House had] bargained for."

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's judgment in favor of Zubrod and Josephs. As the prevailing parties on appeal, we award them their costs on appeal contingent upon their compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.