THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

(Not for Publication — 103(G) Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.; Rule 28 ARCAP)

OROZCO, Judge.

¶1 Heather N. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parent-child relationship with Annaika P.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father are the biological parents of Annaika, who was born on February 14, 2011. On February 16, 2011, the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) received a report that Annaika had tested positive for marijuana and methamphetamine at birth, and Mother admitted to using methamphetamine while she was pregnant. ADES referred Mother and Father to the Substance Exposed Newborn Safe Environment program and provided them with substance abuse education and treatment, urinalysis testing, and a safety plan.

¶3 In March 2011, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine. ADES was also unable to locate Father. As a result, ADES took temporary physical custody of Annaika and placed her with Mother's relatives.

¶4 On March 18, 2011, ADES filed a dependency petition pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 8-201(13) (Supp. 2012)2 because Mother had continued using drugs and had failed to follow the recommended safety plan. During the preliminary protective hearing held on March 28, 2011, the juvenile court reviewed ADES's dependency petition and adjudicated Annaika dependent as to Mother. The court also approved a family reunification case plan, and Mother agreed to participate in substance abuse assessment and treatment, urinalysis testing, transportation, parent-aide services, and a psychological consultation. ADES also offered Mother a psychological evaluation and individual and family counseling.

¶5 Although Mother was compliant with parent-aide services and visitation, she frequently missed urinalysis tests and her weekly individual counseling appointments. Despite being referred to TERROS three times between February 2011 and June 2012 for substance abuse treatment, Mother never completed standard outpatient treatment3 and continued to test positive for methamphetamine, alcohol, and marijuana.4

¶6 In January 2012, ADES removed Annaika from her relative placement because of concerns of physical and substance abuse and placed her in a licensed foster home. Subsequently, the juvenile court changed the case plan from family reunification to severance and adoption. On January 24, 2012, ADES filed a motion to terminate Mother's parental rights to Annaika on the grounds of chronic substance abuse pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533.B.3 (Supp. 2012) and out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of six months or more pursuant to § 8-533.B.8(b).

¶7 The juvenile court held a contested severance hearing on July 23, 2012. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that ADES had proven by clear and convincing evidence the two grounds alleged in its severance motion. The court also determined that severance was in Annaika's best interest. The juvenile court subsequently filed an order terminating Mother's parental rights.

¶8 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A (2007), 12-120.21.A.1 (2003), and -2101.A.1 (Supp. 2012).

DISCUSSION

¶9 In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds listed in A.R.S. § 8-533.B exists and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000). Because the juvenile court is "in the best position to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the parties, observe the parties, and make appropriate factual findings," Pima County Dependency Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546, 744 P.2d 455, 458 (App. 1987), this court will not reweigh the evidence but will determine only if there is enough evidence to support the court's ruling. Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JV-132905, 186 Ariz. 607, 609, 925 P.2d 748, 750 (App. 1996). We will not reverse the juvenile court's severance order unless the court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998).

Trauma Counseling

¶10 Mother asserts that the juvenile court's order terminating her parent-child relationship with Annaika was clearly erroneous because ADES failed to provide her with trauma counseling recommended by ADES's consulting expert.

¶11 It is well established that ADES "has an affirmative duty to make all reasonable efforts to preserve the family relationship," Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 186, ¶ 1, 971 P.2d 1046, 1047 (App. 1999), and it should terminate the parent-child relationship "only when [a] concerted effort to preserve the relationship fails." Ariz. State Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Mahoney, 24 Ariz.App. 534, 537, 540 P.2d 153, 156 (1975). Reasonable efforts include giving a parent the opportunity and time to participate in programs designed to improve the parent's ability to care for his or her child. Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 239 (App. 1994). However, ADES is not required to provide a parent with every conceivable service or ensure that the parent participates in each service offered. Id.

¶12 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred when it terminated her parental rights because ADES failed to provide her with counseling for trauma that she had sustained during childhood. She alleges that the failure to provide this "critically necessary service that ADES's consulting expert recommended" means that ADES failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Annaika.5 Mother primarily relies upon Mary Ellen C., in which this court reversed a severance order after finding that ADES made only a negligible effort to provide rehabilitative services to a mentally ill parent in order to preserve the family. 193 Ariz. at 187-88, 193-94, ¶¶ 9-10, 42-44, 971 P.2d at 1048-49, 1054-55.

¶13 In Mary Ellen C., ADES waited "more than a year after removing the child before referring a mother with a serious mental illness for a psychological evaluation." Id. at 192, ¶ 35, 971 P.2d at 1053. The psychologist recommended intensive mental health services and a psychiatric evaluation for the mother. Id. at 187, ¶ 9, 971 P.2d at 1048. However, ADES delayed another three months before it referred the mother to a mental health provider, and it never followed up to learn that the services provided were inadequate to meet the mother's needs and inconsistent with the therapy recommended by the consultant. Id. at 192, ¶¶ 35-36, 971 P.2d at 1053. We reversed the severance and held that the juvenile court could not reasonably conclude that ADES made a concerted or reasonable effort to preserve the parent-child relationship when "it neglects to offer the very services that its consulting expert recommends." Id. at 192-94, ¶¶ 37-44, 971 P.2d at 1053-55.

¶14 In this case, ADES offered Mother numerous reunification services from the start of the case. Those services included a psychological consultation and evaluation, parent-aide sessions, family counseling, family preservation services, substance abuse assessment and treatment, transportation, and random urinalysis testing. In addition to the aforementioned services, Mother was referred to individual counseling by ADES after having a psychological evaluation.

¶15 Although Mother contends that she did not receive counseling to address trauma she sustained during her childhood, which would have helped prevent drug relapses, this argument is not supported by the record. During the contested severance hearing, Mother's ADES case manager was asked if the individual counseling Mother received would have helped prevent drug relapses. She responded that although she was not sure if the counseling would specifically help prevent relapses, it would address how issues from Mother's childhood can trigger a relapse. She opined that part of the TERROS substance abuse treatment program, to which Mother was referred and failed to complete three times, dealt with relapse prevention.

¶16 She further testified that Mother's goals during individual counseling included "assess[ing] her past childhood and how that triggered her substance abuse or triggered her to relapse." Additionally, an ADES report was introduced as an exhibit during the hearing. The report summarized Mother's counseling goals, which included "learn[ing] about the harmful effects from substance abuse and triggers from her childhood, including discussing issues from childhood and working on triggers that prompted usage, and discussing issues from childhood and how they can reoccur when least expected."

¶17 Despite numerous opportunities to participate in programs that would assist in treating her chronic substance abuse, Mother consistently failed to comply with the programs' requirements. ADES referred Mother to individual weekly counseling appointments in January 2012; however, she missed two appointments in February, three appointments in March, and one appointment in April and did not attend any appointments in May. Additionally, ADES referred Mother to TERROS three times between February 2011 and June 2012 for substance-abuse treatment, but Mother never completed treatment, frequently missed urinalysis tests, and continued to test positive for methamphetamine, alcohol, and marijuana.

¶18 Based on the record, we find that ADES provided Mother with the opportunity and time to participate in programs designed to help her become an effective parent; therefore, it made reasonable efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship and fulfilled its statutory mandate. Accordingly, we find no error.

Best Interest

¶19 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that termination of her parental rights was in Annaika's best interest because it relied solely upon the likelihood of someone wanting to adopt Annaika in making its determination. Whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest is a factual question for the juvenile court to determine. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 13, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002). "We will not disturb the juvenile court's order severing parental rights unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous, that is, unless there is no reasonable evidence to support them." Audra T., 194 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d at 1291.

¶20 Termination of parental rights requires the juvenile court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005). ADES can establish that termination is in the child's best interest by presenting credible evidence that demonstrates that the child would derive an affirmative benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d 943, 945 (App. 2004). The best interest requirement can be met if ADES proves that a current adoptive plan exists for the child or even that the child is adoptable. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 43, 50 (App. 2004). Whether the existing placement is meeting the needs of the child is also considered. Audra T., 194 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 1291.

¶21 The court found that ADES had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Annaika's best interest. Specifically, the court found that because Annaika was adoptable and termination would further the plan of adoption, termination would be in her best interest because it would provide her with "permanency and stability in a home free of neglect and abuse." Further, the court found that Annaika's current placement was a potential adoptive family because the family had expressed an interest in adopting her.

¶22 The testimony of the ADES case manager supports the juvenile court's findings. She opined that severance and adoption was in Annaika's best interest and that Annaika's foster family was meeting all of her needs. She also testified that if Mother's parental rights were terminated, Annaika would get what she deserved: permanency, stability, and the chance to continue thriving in a drug-free environment. We therefore conclude that reasonable evidence supports the court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Annaika's best interest.

¶23 Although reasonable evidence supports the court's best interest determination, Mother contends that it erred because it did not find that a specific adoptive placement existed; instead, it found that severance was in Annaika's best interest merely because there was a possibility that someone might adopt her. Mother also alleges that the court failed to consider how a particular adoption plan would benefit Annaika and failed to compare the benefits of placing Annaika in a guardianship with her half-brother, P.C.,6 with the possibility of her being adopted by someone else.

¶24 We find Mother's arguments to be without merit. Contrary to Mother's contention, ADES "need not show that it has a specific adoption plan before terminating a parent's rights." JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 352, 884 P.2d at 238. Additionally, to establish that severance is in the best interest of the child, ADES is not required to rule out possible placements with biological relatives before considering other placements, and the juvenile court need not weigh alternative placements to determine which might be better.7 Audra T., 194 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d at 1291.

¶25 The juvenile court found by a preponderance of the evidence that severance was in Annaika's best interest. Support for this finding included evidence that Annaika was thriving in her current placement, her foster home was meeting all of her needs, and termination would benefit her by providing her with stability, permanency, and a drug-free home. We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Annaika's best interest.

CONCLUSION

¶26 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

PETER B. SWANN, Judge, THOMAS C. KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge Pro Tempore*, concurring.