BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.
Currently before the Court is Defendants County of Stanislaus, Stanislaus County Sheriff's Department, and Adam Christianson's ("Defendants") motion for protective order seeking to maintain previously disclosed documents as confidential under the parties' stipulated protective order. (Doc. No. 22.) On March 14, 2019, Plaintiffs Estate of Alejandro Sanchez, Bertha Sanchez, Irene Mamourieh, Cristina Girardi, and Marina Sanchez ("Plaintiffs") filed an opposition to the motion. (Doc. No. 23.) Defendants filed their reply on March 22, 2019. (Doc. No. 24.) The Court issued an order on March 25, 2019, requesting further briefing from the parties, and the parties submitted their briefs on April 8, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 25, 26, 27.)
The Court deemed this matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the parties' supplemental briefing, and the record in this matter, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part as follows.
Plaintiffs are proceeding in this civil rights action against the County of Stanislaus, Stanislaus County Sheriff's Department, Adam Christianson, and Does 1 through 50 on claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Article 1, Section 13 of the California Constitution; California's Bane Act; assault/battery; negligence; and wrongful death. (Doc. No. 1.)
This case arises out of the officer-involved death of Alejandro Sanchez ("Mr. Sanchez" or "the decedent"). (Doc. No. 1.) According to the complaint, Mr. Sanchez was at a truck stop on May 5, 2018, and not violating any criminal law when he was contacted by multiple Doe defendant law enforcement officers. (Id.) A physical confrontation lasting several minutes occurred and the Doe defendant law enforcement officers allegedly took Mr. Sanchez to the ground and climbed on top of him. (Id.) Mr. Sanchez yelled out in pain, pled, and begged the Doe defendant law enforcement officers not to injure him but he subsequently died in custody before arriving at a jail or hospital. (Id.; Doc. No. 23.)
On January 30, 2019, the parties filed a stipulated protective order, which the Court approved on February 1, 2019. (Doc. Nos. 20, 21.) The stipulated protective order concerns the exchange of what is described as "Stanislaus County Sheriff's Department report no. S18018571, documents Bates Nos. COUNTY 0030-181" and allows Defendants to designate these documents as confidential subject to the terms therein. (Doc. No. 21.) The designating party is required to file and serve a motion for protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) if the parties are unable to informally resolve their dispute regarding the propriety of a confidential designation. (Doc. No. 21.)
According to the motion, Defendants produced the documents described in the stipulated protective order and designated them as confidential. (Doc. No. 22.) Plaintiffs objected to the confidential designation and the parties subsequently met and conferred but were unable to reach a resolution. (Id.) Defendants accordingly filed the motion. (Id.)
Defendants describe the documents at issue as consisting of a "Sheriff's Department report" regarding the subject incident. (Doc. Nos. 22 at 2:4, 22-1 at 2:4.) Plaintiffs' opposition, in turn, describes the report as consisting of the following documents:
(Doc. No. 23 at 3:17-4:11.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), a party from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending. The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Options available to the court include, among other things, forbidding the disclosure or discovery, forbidding inquiry into certain matters or limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters, or requiring that confidential information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way. Id.
District courts have broad discretion to determine whether a protective order is appropriate and, if so, what degree of protection is warranted. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984); see also Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the law gives district courts broad latitude to grant protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many types of information). The party seeking to limit discovery has the burden of proving "good cause," which requires a showing "that specific prejudice or harm will result" if the protective order is not granted. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)); Westmoreland v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 2019 WL 932220 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019). "[T]he existence of good cause for a protective order `is a factual matter to be determined from the nature and character of the information sought . . . weighed in the balance of the factual issues involved in each action.'" White v. Smyers, 2015 WL 1750964 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (quoting Wright et al., 8A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2035 (3d ed. 2014)).
The parties' dispute concerns whether the documents Defendants previously produced subject to the stipulated protective order should properly remain confidential, and therefore precluded from disclosure to the public or outside this litigation. According to the motion,
In their opposition, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have not established good cause as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). (Doc. No. 23.) There is a strong public interest in the disclosure of records relating to alleged officer misconduct. (Id. at 7:6-14.) Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that law enforcement officers have a limited right of privacy generally and no expectation of privacy in official law enforcement investigations. (Id. at 7:15-24.) According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' concerns regarding the integrity of the criminal process and investigation, as well as potential Fifth Amendment implications, are speculative. (Id. at 7:26-8:1, 8:24-9:3, 9:24-10:7.)
Plaintiffs are correct that, "[h]istorically, courts have `recognize[d] a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents." Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). "[J]udicial records are public documents almost by definition, and the public is entitled to access by default." Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2006). This "federal common law right of access" to court documents generally "creates a strong presumption in favor of [public] access to judicial documents which can be overcome only by showing sufficiently important countervailing interests." Phillips ex. Rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Nonetheless, "dissemination of confidential discovery documents for non-judicial purposes is unusual and rightly so." Macias v. City of Clovis, 2015 WL 7282841 at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2015). The discovery rules are "a matter of legislative grace" and they compel parties and non-parties to divulge information "for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes." Id. (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-34 (1984)). The liberality of this process creates "a significant potential for abuse" such as delay, expense, misuse of court process and damage to the reputation and privacy of litigants and third parties. Id. at 34-35. Courts therefore must be mindful that the purpose of discovery is "to facilitate orderly preparation for trial, not to educate or titillate the public." Id. (citing Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982)).
Additionally, Federal Courts ordinarily recognize a constitutionally-based right of privacy
Where a right of privacy is at issue, courts balance the need for the information against the claimed privacy right. Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (right of privacy may be invaded for litigation purposes). "When an individual's right of privacy...conflicts with the public need for discovery in litigation, the competing interests must be carefully balanced." Cook vs. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 551 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (citing with approval Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.App.3d 313, 315 (1982)). "Even where the balance weighs in favor of disclosure of private information ... such an invasion of the right of privacy must be drawn with narrow specificity and [be] permitted only to the extent necessary for a fair resolution of the lawsuit." Id. at 552.
Here, the Court is concerned that public disclosure of some of the documents at issue infringes on the privacy rights of non-party witnesses and law enforcement officers. Given the highly charged environment in which this litigation will proceed and the ongoing parallel criminal investigation, the Court acknowledges that permitting the unrestricted disclosure of all of the underlying documents could trigger an untoward invasion of privacy as to these individuals. However, in light of the competing interests at stake, the Court finds it appropriate to differentiate between "subjective factual information" and "objective information" in determining whether protection is warranted and its proper scope. Subjective factual information, for purposes of this order, includes police reports, statements provided by officers and witnesses at the scene, audio and/or video witness interviews and transcripts, and interviews of individuals who interacted with the decedent shortly before the underlying incident. Objective factual information, in turn, includes crime scene logs, Google images, crime scene sketches, 911 recordings, and video footage of the scene. See Noble v. City of Fresno, 2017 WL 5665850 at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2017) (differentiating between disclosure of subjective and objective factual information.).
In balancing, the Court finds that the disclosure of subjective factual information should remain subject to the parties' stipulated protective order to safeguard the non-party witnesses and law enforcement officers against any untoward privacy intrusions. See Noble, 2017 WL 5665850 at *9; Garcia v. Clark, 2012 WL 1232315 at *6 n. 5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012) (noting entitlement to inspect discoverable information may be accommodated in ways which mitigate institutional safety concerns); Robinson v. Adams, 2012 WL 912746 at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Mar.16, 2012) (requiring protective order regarding documents containing information which implicated the safety and security concerns). In light of the description of the relevant documents provided by Plaintiffs in their opposition as well as the uncontroverted declaration from Ms. Fladager, the Court finds that Defendants have made a showing that specific prejudice or harm will result if subjective factual information is not maintained confidentially pursuant to the parties' stipulated protective order. However, based upon the information before the Court, there does not appear to be any potential for privacy intrusion resulting from the public disclosure of objective factual information. As the Court has broad discretion to determine the propriety of a protective order as well as the suitable degree of protection, the Court finds that objective factual information need not be maintained as confidential pursuant to the terms of the parties' stipulated protective order.
While there may be some overlap between the objective and subjective factual information within the documents at issue, the Court declines to order an in camera review and instead trusts counsel to meet and confer in good faith to identify, consistent with this order, which documents contain subjective factual information that will remain confidential subject to the parties' stipulated protective order.
In their opposition, Plaintiffs request an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 in the amount of $2,550.00 incurred in opposing the motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. (Doc. No. 23 at 15:7-16:10.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(C) provides that, if a motion for protective order is granted in part and denied in part, the Court may, after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion. As discussed above, good cause exists to designate subjective factual information as confidential pursuant to the parties' stipulated protective order but objective factual information need not be maintained confidentially. In light of this result, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to apportion attorneys' fees incurred by the respective parties in litigating the motion.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Protective Order (Doc. No. 22) is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
2. The parties shall meet and confer in good faith to identify which documents produced by Defendants as Bates Nos. COUNTY 0030-181 contain subjective factual information and shall be maintained confidentially pursuant to the parties' stipulated protective order (Doc. No. 21). The parties are encouraged to resolve any disputes arising during the meet and confer process according to the Court's informal discovery dispute procedure; and
3. Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Local Rule 251. However, the hearing on the motion was previously vacated pursuant to the Court's order dated March 25, 2019. (Doc. No. 25.) Accordingly, there is no need for the Court to exercise its discretion to remove the hearing from its calendar as authorized by Local Rule 251(a). Further, in light of the nature of the dispute and the facts of the case, the Court declines to impose sanctions upon Defendants for their failure to comply with Local Rule 251 and will not deny the motion as procedurally defective as Plaintiffs request. (See Doc. No. 23.) However, Defendants are nonetheless reminded of their obligations to comply with the Local Rules and are further cautioned that future failures to do so may be grounds for the imposition of sanctions.
Moreover, although the Court's order approving the stipulated protective order encouraged the parties to consider resolving any disputes according to the Court's informal discovery dispute procedure, it did not require the parties to engage in this process prior to or in lieu of filing a formal motion. (Doc. No. 21.) The informal discovery dispute resolution procedures are not mandatory, and the Court is unable to issue a binding ruling unless the parties first stipulate to the informal process. Here, the parties expressly elected to require the designating party to file a motion for protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) within a specified time period in the event the parties' dispute regarding proper designation of documents could not be resolved informally. (Doc. No. 21.) While the Court continues to encourage the parties to utilize its informal dispute resolution procedures and to incorporate them in to future stipulated protective orders if the parties desire to do so, particularly as this abbreviated process is designed to save time and resources, the Court cannot compel participation in the informal process without first receiving a stipulation from the parties.
