Filed: Jul. 18, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 18, 2014
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING CASE, AND EXCLUDING TIME JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. STIPULATION The United States, by and through its undersigned counsel, and the defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By prior order, this matter was set for a Status Hearing on July 22, 2014. 2. By this Stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the Status Hearing until September 30, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between the s
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING CASE, AND EXCLUDING TIME JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge. STIPULATION The United States, by and through its undersigned counsel, and the defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By prior order, this matter was set for a Status Hearing on July 22, 2014. 2. By this Stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the Status Hearing until September 30, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between the si..
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STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING CASE, AND EXCLUDING TIME
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
The United States, by and through its undersigned counsel, and the defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By prior order, this matter was set for a Status Hearing on July 22, 2014.
2. By this Stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the Status Hearing until September 30, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between the signing of this Order and September 30, 2014, under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The United States provided discovery to the defendants on November 26, 2013, and December 6, 2013.
b. Both defendants are out-of-custody and being supervised by Pretrial Services.
c. Counsel for the defendants needs further time to review discovery, conduct defense investigation, and discuss the case with their clients.
d. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The United States does not object to this continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, within which trial must commence, the time from the signing of this order, to September 30, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: July 18, 2014. OLAF HEDBERG
Counsel for Daniel Salinas
DATED: July 18, 2014. J. PATRICK McCARTHY,
Counsel for Jorge Mosqueda, Jr.
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
